East-West Joint Ventures: The New Business Environment by Razvigorova, E. & Wolf-Laudon, G.

East-West Joint Ventures
The New Business Environment
Edited by
Evka Razvigorova and
Gottfried \Volf- Laudon
Changes in the East European economies
and the USSR began to take shape in the
1980s, paving the way for pcrestroi/~a and
the historic reforms of recent years. New
forms of business between East and West
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the potential that joint ventures present.
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• Contributors are drawn from a range of
Eastern European economies.
• Eleven major case studies are included
from Poland, Czechoslovakia,
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Preface
Changes in the economic policies of the East European countries
and the USSR gradually began to take place in the early 1980s.
These changes developed at different speeds with different rates of
success in the different countries and paved the way for perestroika
and economic reforms. The business environment of the centralized
economies started, though painfully, to open up to new forms of en-
trepreneurship and business initiative. The small East European
countries were the first who tried to build a bridge to the market-
oriented economic system of the free enterprise. New forms of busi-
ness and trade between East and West began to occur. One form
of East-West cooperation is the joint venture, which has become a
real challenge for both systems. This book attempts to look into the
daily problems of the joint ventures. When all negotiations are over,
a period of consolidation begins, which is also one of the themes of
the book.
The book has become a reality not only because of the contribu-
tions of scientists and managers, but also due to the shared under-
standing that in our efforts for an integrated Europe, joint ventures
are one way in which we can learn about creative partnership.
The German Democratic Republic and Rumania are not included
in the book. The first because at the time the project was carried out
there was no legislation on foreign investment. The second because
of the political climate and economic stagnation at the time.
The beginning of 1990 was marked by drastic political changes in
all Eastern and Central European countries. In general, this had a
positive impact on foreign investment activities with the exception of
Bulgaria and Rumania where there is still political instability. The
number of joint ventures increased to over 3,000 and, in addition,
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there were changes in the legislation in some of the countries. Many
more changes are expected in the near future.
The changes that occurred have not had any effect in helping to
solve the problems of joint ventures which makes this book interesting
and of importance in the turbulent world in which we live.
The book was accomplished thanks to the cooperation and joint
research of scientists from East and West, carried out with the as-
sistance and through the mediation of the International Institute for
Applied Systems Analysis. We would like to thank all scientists,
policy makers and businessmen who supported this unique project
and who gave their contribution in the form of expertise, commen-
taries, proposals, and ideas. Special thanks are due to the Chambers
of Commerce in Hungary, Bulgaria, and Poland, the Club of Joint
Ventures in Hungary, the All-Union Institute for Foreign Economic
Relations in Moscow, the numerous joint ventures in all East Eu-
ropean countries who shared with us their positive experiences and
their problems.
Finally we wish to thank Laura Franz and Lourdes Cornelio for
their competent and hard work in editing and typing the book.
Evka Razvigorova
Gottfried Wolf-Laudon
Introduction
The more high-tech, the more high-touch . ..
We must learn to balance the material wonders of technology
with the spiritual demands of our human nature.
Naishitt, J., 1984'
Robert H. Pry
The world today is experiencing revolutionary technological changes
and challenges. In keeping with the new political thinking apparent
in the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference and the first stage of
the Vienna talks, humanity is embarking upon new business and eco-
nomic opportunities. Today's technological innovations are triggering
changes in industry, trade, and commerce:
• The rapid development of telecommunication and information
technologies makes goods immediately available in a number of
companies and branches of industry.
• The introduction of flexible and automated manufacturing sys-
tems has made it possible to separate the processes of qual-
ity control, service, and design from manufacturing, replacing
high-volume production and economy of scale with small-batch,
custom-tailored production, and economy of scope.
• The rapid development of telecommunications and the availabil-
ity of cheaper transportation shorten delivery times and separate
logistics from production.
lNaisbitt, J., 1984, Megatrends, Hestra. Verlag.
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• The tendency to separate certain business functions, such as de-
sign, marketing, distribution, logistics, etc., from manufacturing
is already manifested in broker structures. This will increase
the horizontal line of integration in the future, compared to the
present vertical line of integration.
• Financial services, already specialized and internationalized, must
be globalized in order to compete with marketing companies and
other service industries.
What are the consequences of these revolutionary changes and
new challenges in business? Manufacturing and services will become
internationalized and horizontally integrated, without strong ties to
any particular region, labor market, or capital infrastructure. If these
processes in the world continue as evidence suggests, no nation will be
able to pursue a protectionist or commercially isolated policy with-
out inevitably destroying its standard of living. It will be unable to
compete with the best and cheapest competitors in the new global
business environment.
The new world realities caused by the internationalization of sci-
ence, technology, finance, and industry call for new policies iu all
countries, including members of the Council of Mutual Economic As-
sistance (CMEA). Self-sufficiency and internal integration on which
the economic policies of the CMEA countries have been based are no
longer successful in an environment of internationalized technology
and production. A policy of economic isolation is no longer viable
and does not provide enough flexibility for any country.
Having realized the new circumstances in the world, the Socialist
countries are gradually starting to introduce new economic measures
and change management to overcome a centrally managed system of
supply, production, and distribution. The first steps were taken by
Hungary and later by Bulgaria. The Soviet Union started introduc-
ing changes three years ago in both the economy and the political
structure.
Now, all CMEA members are chauging their policies and strug-
gling to find appropriate answers to technological challenges.
The reforms, while nationally tailored, are proceeding in similar
directions:
• Different forms of property use, together with state ownership, is
being introduced in production, services, and agriculture.
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• Equal economic conditions for all types of organizations are being
set out by legislation.
• The state monopoly on foreign trade has been removed to various
degrees in many countries.
• The state monopoly on economic management is being overcome
by giving business organizations the right to operate freely in
both domestic and foreign markets, to decide independently on
the profile of their activities, and to take responsibility for actions
and decisions.
The reforms have resulted in a change in the investment climate of
almost all CMEA countries. Gradually, laws and decrees have been
adopted permitting different degrees of foreign investment in these
countries. There are two different attitudes among Western business
leaders concerning the opportunities presented by the new legislation
in these countries. Due to the rapid pace of changing legislation and
new policies, investments are considered very risky and their potential
uncertain. Some businessmen recommend cautious strategies. Others
believe the reforms are opening opportunities to create and develop
new markets; they think investment, although risky, seems promising
over the long run.
Even with these two different attitudes, East-West economic re-
lations are developing and changing rapidly. Conventional trade has
been gradually replaced by other forms of international industrial co-
operation. Joint ventures currently rank as the second most widely
spread form of cooperation and are increasing in number every month
in all CMEA countries.
The most recent changes in legislation, which were introduced at
the end of 1988 and the beginning of 1989 in practically all reforming
countries, have given new impetus to the development of this pro-
cess. Two months after the introduction of the law permitting their
creation (January 1, 1989), the number of joint ventures in Czechoslo-
vakia reached 25. In the Soviet Union, 60-80 joint ventures are being
registered monthly. In Hungary, the number of joint ventures has
surpassed 500.
Capitalization of a joint venture averages about US$3 million,
but can range from US$0.2 million to US$80 million. Compared to
total national investment, this is not an impressive amount. Analysis
shows that the contribution to the national economies of the CMEA
xvi EMt-West Joint Ventures
countries and even to branches of industry is far from significant to
date. But this is just the beginning.
The strategy of most Western businessmen does not focus pri-
marily on profit or access to cheaper resources, but rather on the
potential markets in the Eastern European countries (see Chapter 3
on the Austrian experience). Western companies are accumulating
experience about the environment of Socialist countries by working
through joint ventures.
The objectives of CMEA countries in forming joint ventures are:
• To fully satisfy domestic demand for certain types of industrial
goods and services.
• To transfer technology and managerial know-how quickly.
• To improve export capabilities, reduce imports and gain addi-
tional convertible currency, and improve quality.
Even with an insignificant contribution to the gross national prod-
uct and very limited profit, joint ventures are part of the whole reform
process in the CMEA countries and can be seen and analyzed only
as part of it. After several years of experience, it is time to ana-
lyze the existing joint ventures and draw lessons from their success
and failure, systematize the difficulties and problems, study possible
barriers, and suggest solutions. The importance attached to the lat-
est form of industrial cooperation between East and West may have
been exaggerated, but joint ventures have attracted the attention
of many organizations - international, intergovernmental, and bilat-
eral. Studies have concentrated on commercial and business aspects,
mainly from the legislative point of view. No special attention has
been paid so far to the equally important organizational and manage-
rial problems. The reMon generally given is that joint ventures are
enterprises like any other, and the partners are seeking first of all to
achieve success in their business. This simple explanation, however,
fails to take into account a set of problems arising from the nature
of this new type of enterprise and its operation in a turbulent envi-
ronment. A systematic and practically oriented empirical study can
facilitate an understanding of the pros and cons of joint ventures as
well as the dos and don'ts connected with their success.
The East-West meeting held in 1987 in Helsinki on the problems
of management development of joint ventures demonstrated that no
institution is studying the problems deeply, and presenting equally
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the viewpoints of CMEA and market economies. 2 The European
Foundation for Management Development, established in 1971, has
very few members from Socialist countries. The European Institute
for Advanced Management Studies has members from Western Eu-
rope, Latin America, and North America; therefore, it does not fo-
cus on the problems of East-West relations. On the other hand,
the CMEA countries have institutes that investigate the problems
of joint ventures, but only those between Socialist countries. The
sole institute whose main goal is to study global problems of East-
West cooperation is the International Institute for Applied Systems
Analysis (nASA). nASA's unique features are:
• The presence of scientists from both economic systems working
jointly on various problems.
• The ability to carry out research using an international research
network involving groups from all member countries, particularly
useful for this kind of study.
• Perhaps the most important, a practical orientation to direct re-
search results to decision makers and maintain close links with
consumers. nASA's purpose is to provide tools of analysis and de-
cision support systems to policy makers so that they can develop
a factual basis upon which to introduce a set of realistic options
for the negotiation of agreements and management of systems.
This book shares the findings and experiences accumulated
throughout the joint venture study organized at the beginning of 1988
by the Management of Technological Change group (MTC) within the
frame of the Technology, Economy and Society (TES) Program at
nASA. National groups from the international network have studied
different joint ventures hosted in their home countries and submitted
national reports to nASA. The common framework and methodology
ofthe study were developed by the Institute's researchers to carry out
comparative analyses based on questionnaires, statistical data, and
interviews with participants in joint ventures in CMEA countries and
with their Western partners. A study oflegislation, its dynamics and
main goals formed the basis of the analysis of administrative diffi-
culties and barriers encountered by joint ventures during their first
years of operation.
2This meeting was organized jointly by the IIASA MTC group and the Finnish
Institute of Management Development.
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The entire study has the ongoing economic reforms in the CMEA
countries as a background. The framework and main tendencies of
these reforms are analyzed in Chapter 2. Business initiative is becom-
ing a concern connected with all economic and managerial changes
in the CMEA countries. The steps taken to date are characterized
by economic restructuring and by the greater freedom of action in
foreign trade operations given to individual companies.
The special national features of the process are explained in the
second part of the book (Chapters 3 to 9). The analysis includes over
300 joint ventures (12 in Czechoslovakia, 12 in the Soviet Union, 16
in Bulgaria, 282 in Hungary, and about 25 in Poland).
The legal framework and its impact on the formation of joint
ventures are illustrated by examples and data from empirical studies.
The data from national reports were compared. Information from
additional separate interviews and questionnaires aided the interna-
tional team in describing common characteristics and problems and
proposing some recommendations for solutions (Chapters 10 and 11).
Case studies are presented to illustrate different experiences in
various countries; these are of interest to business people and policy
makers alike. Practical experiences have rarely been documented;
these companies have existed for such a short time that little infor-
mation is available about their actual operation and management.
Such information, however, can be found in the Appendix.
Future outlooks and such important issues as technology transfer
through joint ventures and management development for joint ven-
tures are also discussed (Chapters 12 and 13). The need to create
a completely new style and type of management, that of coopera-
tion management, is presented. This will call for special worldwide
training of managers with specific abilities.
The term East-West joint venture signifies more than relations
based on commercial and business interests. Rather, this is a new
organizational phenomenon appearing for the first time in the world's
economic environment. We have attempted to examine East-West
joint ventures in a businesslike and empirical way because we are
convinced it is essential to make the people involved in the process
aware of the importance of this new organizational form.
Part I

Chapter 1
Radical Changes in the
Economies of Socialist
Countries: A Driving
Force for East-West
Cooperation
O. Panov
For a long time, the economic development of Socialist countries was
tied to the concept that state ownership could dominate all other
kinds of ownership as the supreme form of joint ownership. This
not only resulted in significant economic limitations in the USSR,
Bulgaria, and other countries, but also in limiting and subordinating
cooperative ownership to principles that were valid for state-owned
organizations. In Bulgaria, e.g., at beginning of the 1980s, over 90
percent of national income was derived from state-owned enterprises,
and only 4 percent from cooperatives operating in trade, services,
and light industry.
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The domination of the state sector in the national economy com-
bined with the theory that socialism was completely incompatible
with a market economy, created a highly developed form of state
monopoly in all spheres of social life. Along with other negative fac-
tors, this prevented direct contacts among producers from different
countries, even Socialist ones. The following basic features of the
system of state monopoly can be cited.
1.1 Centrally Planned Economic Activities
The national plan for socioeconomic development was valid for all
structures of the national economy, from the government down to the
enterprise divisions. In practice, this made the state a large economic
unit that balanced incomes and expenditures on the national level,
regulated material flows, and reallocated the accumulated financial
resources. The size of the state did not play any essential role. Small
countries like Bulgaria and Hungary did not have direct contacts
with the Soviet Republics; all economic contacts had to go through
the central government.
As a political organization, the state implemented mainly political
and social goals, resulting in the subordination of economic criteria
to political imperatives and social goals. Even without the neces-
sary economic basis, impressive achievements were made in the so-
cial sphere: full employment, free health care, free education, unified
pensions for all people retiring in all spheres of the national econ-
omy including agriculture, etc. The financial resources of efficient
enterprises were redistributed, which inhibited speedy development
at a time when they were flourishing and also prevented independent
innovations.
The domination of political criteria in the economy led to a ne-
glect of the basic requirements for production efficiency. As a result,
branches of industry were developed for which no preconditions ex-
isted in the country. They were supported artificially for social or
political reasons. At the same time, foreign economic relations were
determined not by efficiency but by political considerations. What
developed during this period of restricted economic relations were the
numerous limitations of Coordinating Committee on Export Controls
(COCOM).
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1.2 Bureaucratic Administration Instead of
Entrepreneurship
The business units - enterprises and their various associations - were
practically turned into various levels of the state management hierar-
chy. Thus the business manager became simply a state administra-
tor whose values were not oriented toward productivity and customer
needs, but rather to the fulfillment of given administrative orders. In
most cases, goals and decisions were defined on political grounds at a
superior level. Business managers were not encouraged to take ini tia-
tive and action, as each initiative required approval from a superior
level. Efficiency and innovation were not developed, as losses were
automatically covered from the state budget. In 1989, governmental
subsidies for inefficient production and export, as well as compensa-
tion for prices held lower than international market prices, reached
the enormous amount of 28 percent of the state budget of Bulgaria,
or about 2.2 percent of the national income. Under these conditions,
it was impossible to find suitable incentives for innovation and initia-
tive on the part of business managers. This sharply reduced the level
of their professional skills. Business managers and civil servants were
predominantly trained and selected on political rather than profes-
sional criteria. Professional schools and colleges in management were
noticeably lacking.
This situation became more significant in view of the management
boom in almost all developed countries and the related introduction
of new technology and professionalism in management. The main
feature of today's manager is his independence and ability to take
risks and responsibilities, to search energetically for innovative solu-
tions and new niches on the global market. These qualities contribute
very much to rapid technological development and large-scale inno-
vation in all fields. These qualities, however, were almost unknown
to business managers in the Socialist countries and did not receive
social recognition and support. This resulted in a lag in scientific and
technical developments and reduced the opportunities for partnership
between business organizations from East and West.
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1.3 State Regulations Instead of
Market Forces
The objective processes of the market economy, which lead to an
equilibrium of supply and demand and stimulate rapid liquidation of
a deficit, were replaced in the Socialist countries by state regulation
of the quantity of products and of the material flowing to each pro-
ducer. The state also regulated distribution and sale of the entire
output. Naturally, when a manager does not know where his goods
are sold or what his consumers' needs are and when prices are not re-
lated to quality, the manager will not care about quality. At present,
when the global market is dominated by high-quality products attrac-
tively offered, the production of the Socialist countries is far behind
in technical level and quality, despite an abundance of raw materi-
als. The development of resource-saving technologies (energy, labor,
and materials) is not a driving motivation to improve production. In
fact, the interests of business managers are oriented in exactly the
opposite direction. Prices of goods are not determined by market de-
mand, but by the volume and quality of materials, labor, and other
resources used for their production. This naturally reduces the com-
petitiveness of goods produced in the Socialist countries in the global
market. Even new technologies and equipment and a highly qualified
labor force cannot totally compensate for this. Ultimately, this lack
of motivation creates serious difficulties in the contacts between East-
ern and Western producers and between producers in the East and
consumers in the West. Even high-quality products manufactured
in the Socialist countries sell at low prices on the global market due
to the lack of proper servicing and an inability to reach customers
effectively.
1.4 Fully Centralized Foreign Trade
A basic principle of Socialist theory was the necessity to have a state
monopoly on foreign trade, to limit personal profit from foreign trans-
actions to the benefit of the whole nation.
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What happened in practice was quite different. A strong bureau-
cratic barrier was raised, supported by a small and limited number of
managers and other staff with access to foreign trade and, as a result,
opportunities for increasing their prestige and living standard. The
complicated procedures required by various state authorities to estab-
lish foreign economic relations reduced the practical opportunities for
international trade.
During the last few decades, the Socialist countries produced 30
percent to 36 percent of the total global output but only about 4
percent to 5 percent of the total volume of international trade. Be-
tween CMEA countries, the exchange of goods was based on inter-
state agreements in which political criteria dominated over economic
interests. A number of less developed countries, such as Bulgaria,
managed to achieve quick success in their industrialization and be-
come equal partners of other, more developed Socialist countries. For
example, Bulgaria exports over 50 percent of the machines it builds
and imports mainly raw materials from developed Socialist countries
like the USSR. Product levels, however, in a closed economic commu-
nity where economic agreements are made on the political level, could
never create efficient economic relations. At the same time, such
closed trade (75 percent of Bulgarian turnover with other countries,
which is almost equal to its national income, is only with other So-
cialist countries) can neither secure convertibility of the national cur-
rency, nor successful financial transactions on the international mar-
ket. Therefore, the CMEA producers are not permanently present on
the global market. Foreign trade with the newly industrialized and
developed countries depends mainly on barter deals and occasional
small-volume sales and much less on long-term agreements for timely
delivery and production cooperation. In their turn, the non-Socialist
trading partners face difficulties in trying to penetrate the CMEA
market and have relied on occasional sales of consumer goods and
equipment. Western companies were unable to work out marketing
strategies and develop successful partnerships with enterprises in the
Socialist countries. It was always necessary to do this through the
mediation of state authorities, which significantly complicated the
business partnership.
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1.5 State Monopoly on Financial Activities
Until now, CMEA countries usually had one foreign trade bank, with
only domestic branches, and specialized banks for investment in in-
dustry and agriculture. Consumer savings were kept in special sav-
ing banks which did not have the right to use that capital and put
it into operation. The interest rates were unbelievably low, around
1 percent. Several restrictions on withdrawing these savings were in-
troduced, but at the same time interest rates for various bank loans
were very low - around 2.5 percent - and payable in 25-30 years.
(This is the case when obtaining a loan for building a house in Bul-
garia.) During the past most successful years, the average inflation
rate was approximately equal to the interest rate, making more money
available in the national economy.
Practically speaking, the population was able to use its savings
for consumer purposes but not for business activities. The enormous
accumulated savings represented an amount equal to the annual na-
tional budget. (In Bulgaria, accumulated savings are now nearly
20 percent more than the annual budget.) The state has used these
savings primarily for balancing internal debt or for state investment.
All financial resources were under state control. The state was in a po-
sition to expropriate at any time and for any reason the accumnlated
capital of profitable companies and redistribute them to ineffective
organizations or invest them in new enterprises, thereby impeding
the process of modernizing production facilities and equipment.
The entire income earned by companies in convertible currencies
was expropriated by the state. At the same time, the national for-
eign debt grew enormously. For example, Bulgaria, with nine million
citizens, had a foreign debt of US$10 billion up to the beginning of
1990. The situation is similar in other East European countries, in-
cluding Rumania. This debt is the obligation of the state and not of
the companies.
This situation, together with an undeveloped banking system and
centralized financial resources (in Bulgaria, state expenditures in 1989
were 78 percent of the national income), has made contacts between
East and West companies almost impossible. In addition, the many
difficulties connected with profit repatriation demonstrate the com-
plications in organizing joint business activities between different eco-
nomic systems.
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1.6 Guaranteed Social Benefits
Instead of Motivation
9
Until recently, the state completely controlled the salary level of work-
ers and administrative staff through uniform salary scales that fixed
payment for specific work. The state also regulated the level of salary
funds in organizations, to prevent infiation and preserve a proper ra-
tio between the growth of productivity and salaries. In practice,
however, this eliminated the stimulus for labor productivity and ini-
tiative. Payment according to results was not a common practice,
which paradoxically contradicts the main principle of socialism - dis-
tribution according to quality and quantity oflabor. In fact, payment
was granted irrespective of the quantity and quality of labor input.
The lack of individual motivation reduced opportunities for efficiency
and quality. This explains why staff who work on contract abroad
usually obtain higher results than they achieved at home. Labor
productivity and product quality in Bulgaria and other CMEA coun-
tries are several times lower than in Western European countries with
similar opportunities.
In addition to general difficulties in social and economic develop-
ment, this lack of motivation also complicated the contacts between
organizations from East and West. The impossibility of applying
motivation methods based on each person's contribution continues
to impede efficient partnership in joint ventures.
The reforms currently going on, however, are opening completely
new opportunities in the Socialist countries. They aim to raise the
level of the economy and improve the fulfillment of domestic needs
by adjusting to the requirements and standards already established
in other countries. This means neither a turning away from existing
relations with other Socialist countries nor that the basic principles
of past development will be set aside. Rather, the importance of fun-
damental human values and achievements will be recognized, ending
the isolation of the Eastern countries. Present values and social im-
peratives, however, are closer to those of an ideal Socialist society
than to those of a capitalist one. Therefore, the dogmatic argument
between socialism and capitalism should be replaced by constructive
and creative cooperation and partnership. A safe and comfortable
"home" should be created, in Europe and around the world.
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The restructuring in the different Eastern countries is being car-
ried out in a variety of forms, at varying speeds, and using various
tools. The general lines, however, are the same. New opportunities
are opening for direct contacts between companies from East and
West; in turn these stimulate the development of production and act
as an economic tool for accelerating the production process.
In the transition to a multi-sectored economy based on differ-
ent forms of ownership, it is important to ensure that private prop-
erty will be sufficiently developed. Currently, all forms of ownership
are being enhanced. In addition to state ownership, possibilities are
also being developed for municipal ownership, cooperative ownership,
private and/or individual ownership, ownership of foreign legal and
physical entities, etc. Various forms of mixed property are encour-
aged by enhancing the association of firms based on different kinds
of property. By the end of December 1989, the total number of firms
registered in Bulgaria, e.g., was 11,171, counting firms based on dif-
ferent kinds of ownership as well as mixed firms. The list below shows
the composition of the existing Bulgarian firms:
State-owned
Subsidiaries (state)
Municipal firms
Firms of public organizations
Limited liability companies
Limited with foreign participation
Joint-stock companies
Unlimited liability companies
Foreign firms
Joint ventures
Partnerships
Cooperatives
Private companies
Private farms
Agricultural firms
Cooperative farms
450
22
622
34
109
40
15
4
16
109
1,656
32
7,869
3
10
180
A still greater step forward was the establishment of legal con-
ditions for joint companies. Some countries already have companies
in which shareholders are other state-owned firms. This is not yet
a common practice, and therefore there is not yet a stock-exchange
O. Panov 11
market, nor have securities transactions become a part of the global
stock market. The new rules regulating the trade in securities make it
easier for foreign partners to select the most suitable form of partner-
ship with Socialist firms, either through the creation of joint ventures
or as shareholders of national companies.
Another important factor in the economic reconstruction of East-
ern countries is the type of conditions provided for profit orienta-
tion of enterprises. In spite of numerous attempts to delegate more
rights to lower levels, no great success was achieved in eliminating
bureaucracy before the creation of completely independent and self-
regulating business units called "firms" in Bulgaria that are free from
direct state interference. Registration of firms began in early 1989.
The goal is to create economically independent and fully responsible
business units operating on principles of self-support, self-financing,
independent planning, etc. - principles that are well known in the
West. Even state firms based on state property possess all char-
acteristic features of independent and self-reliant business organiza-
tions. A new democratic form of direct control exercised by the firm's
managers through elected council members is practiced in the state-
owned, municipal, and cooperative firms but not in joint-stock com-
panies or joint ventures. In spite of this, there is a general tendency
toward reducing the level of state control in the firms, increasing their
economic independence and more active involvement of personnel in
the management process. This is a general tendency in all countries.
Current legislation allows direct contact between firms. On this
basis, free movement of capital and formation of joint property is
possible without the state necessarily being involved.
Another important aspect of the economic reforms is the intro-
duction of market regulations, aimed at bringing it closer to global
practices. Changes are being made in fiscal policy, credit policy, price
control, etc. The goal of all CMEA countries is to have a developed
domestic market in order to adapt to the requirements of today's
global economy, and to do so without foregoing social benefits. This
has proved an extremely difficult problem, however, intensified by the
fact that business managers in both the state enterprises and the firms
are not accustomed to working in an environment of developed mar-
ket relations. The state monopoly used to protect the firms through
the absence of any competition whatsoever. Stable prices did not
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allow an upsurge of economic activity, but created a feeling of secu-
rity because their existence was guaranteed. Underdeveloped markets
and a liberalization of tax and price policies in many countries led to
inflation. These processes, which are regulated strictly by the state,
in combination with existing deficits, leads to hidden inflation. From
the point of view of enhancing international economic cooperation,
the implementation of an anti-inflationary policy on the part of the
state may have a stronger positive impact than the immediate swing
of market relations without the necessary economic and psychological
preparation and without providing the necessary numbers of trained
managers. Under conditions of shortage and unsaturated markets,
foreign partners have opportunities to accumulate assets quickly in
local currency, which can be successfully used for reinvestments in the
country to implement a long-term strategy for economic expansion,
instead of seeking immediate results from the export of capital. High
inflation rates make both strategies of foreign investors inefficient.
Therefore, one of the main tasks of the state authorities in Bulgaria
should be the prevention of serious inflationary processes.
It is impossible to develop economic cooperation within the new
Europe without rapidly making changes in the monetary systems of
East European countries. The Polish case is worth studying because
it shows how the immediate introduction offree-market prices and in-
ternal convertibility ofthe local currency (zloty) caused inflation but
stabilized the market. A more equal participation in private business
has been created, and the share of speculative capital accumulated
under conditions of a national deficit is drastically decreasing.
Another extremely important feature of the reforms in East Euro-
pean countries is the reform of the price system. The Polish example
shows that without sufficient social guarantees, changing the price
system can be a very painful process. Serious consequences can be
expected without a socially guaranteed price reform in all East Euro-
pean countries, where at present one-third of the population is living
below a minimum existence level. The problem is more complicated
in the USSR, where prices have not been changed for decades. At
the same time, without a price equilibrium of supply and demand,
the transition to a market economy is practically impossible. That
is the core problem for each political party and each politician in all
CMEA countries.
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The problem of capital export has been solved from a legal point
of view, but in reality the three-fold effect is obtained only by those
firms that export goods for hard currency. Therefore, the usual goal
of joint ventures is not only to fulfill domestic demand but also to
export to third countries for hard currency.
The main problem that remains to be solved for CMEA coun-
tries during the next few years is convertibility of the national cur-
rency. Needless to say, business partnerships and broad economic co-
operation are very difficult with non-convertible local currency. The
prerequisites to solving this problem quickly are already under way
through introducing a more advanced and free credit policy carried
out not only by the foreign trade banks and national banks but also
by other commercial banks. Cooperation in the financial sphere, the
accumulation of joint capital in the banks and the creation of joint
banks could accelerate the processes of direct economic cooperation
and speed the inclusion of Eastern European countries in the global
monetary system. To attain this goal, many countries have already
created a favorable political environment, but practical steps are still
needed.
Serious opportunities to extend economic cooperation further be-
tween East and West are presented by including firms from the
CMEA countries in transnational corporations. An example is the
Hungarian firm Tungsram, which is turning into a multinational cor-
poration. A number of Bulgarian firms, especially those in electron-
ics, are planning similar developments.
Solving all these problems and developing the main reform direc-
tions will facilitate and intensify the development of economic coop-
eration between East and West. The success of the reforms in the
CMEA countries depends to a large extent on the successful cooper-
ation of companies from the East and West, which will also raise the
general level of the global economy by including countries with great
scientific, technical and resource potential in the overall development
of science and technology.
Productive economic cooperation is stimulated by the economic
policy, adopted by the majority of CMEA countries, that aims at
structural changes and technological renovation of the already con-
siderable technical base. The problem is not how to realize one-way
technological transfer. For countries like Bulgaria, this is not the
main goal. The CMEA countries are also prepared to offer high
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quality know-how that can be used to develop high-tech products.
Obviously, the opportunities to do so increase with more liberal rules
regulating the movement of people between countries, which became
a reality after the Vienna agreement was signed in 1989. More im-
portant, however, is the good interaction between equal partners at
a high level of technological and organizational development. This
is better than the preservation or artificial establishment of signifi-
cant economic and technological differences. The potential already
existing in the CMEA countries would be sufficient to overcome tech-
nological backwardness independently, but this would mean that the
separation between East and West would be encouraged, which in
turn would endanger the future of mankind through the accumula-
tion of both highly productive and highly destructive forces. There-
fore East-West economic cooperation is supported by the developed
countries and the reconstruction processes in the Socialist countries
are one of the important warrants for the future of mankind.
What is the concrete manifestation of this support and how can it
be realized by increasing constructive cooperation? In the first place,
support must be directed toward fulfilling the demand of the CMEA
domestic markets for consumer goods. These countries are paying
a high price for making the development of heavy industry a long-
time priority at the expense of light industries and food. Obviously,
economic cooperation can and must be oriented to the production
and exchange of consumer goods and services. This will be relatively
simple and will not threaten the strategic balance of forces. The
opportunities for cooperation in this field are so wide that no over-
fulfillment of needs or excessive production can be expected. The
appearance of new competitors on the global market will not have a
negative effect as competition in this field at global levels is high. It
will increase the opportunities of the whole world to solve the chronic
problems of hunger and will help provide normal standards of living
to each inhabitant of our planet.
Another important role of East-West cooperation in support of
these reforms is encouraging the conversion of the military and parts
of heavy industries. This not only complements the first trend but
in addition creates mutual trust and still better opportunities for
cooperation.
A third area of cooperation is the fields of ecology, non-polluting
and resource-saving technologies. These are fields of mutual benefit,
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as it has now become clear to all mankind that ecological problems
never remain isolated but affect the whole community. Continued
pollution of the environment must be brought to a stop. There are
good opportunities for cooperation because the previous economic
systems in Socialist countries did not stimulate the efficient use of
resources.
Last, but not least in importance, is cooperation in the field of
management training. No fruitful cooperation is possible, even on
the company level, unless managers are able to use a common pro-
fessionallanguage. There is no barrier more overwhelming than the
barrier formed by lack of professional interpretation of the problems,
methods, and means to resolve concrete situations. The management
policy that has been applied in Socialist countries so far has created
a deep gap in the interpretation of management problems between
East and West. This gap is much wider than the one between the
developed and the developing countries.
Management training is a field that can contribute greatly to
drawing countries with different social systems closer together. One
can expect quick and essential results from investments in manage-
ment training using the latest achievements of management science.
Management training activi ties also have an immediate economic ef-
fect because they guarantee that the foreign investment will not be
threatened by unprofessional management. High educational levels
currently present in the Socialist countries create favorable conditions
for achieving significant results in the field of management training.

Chapter 2
Dynamics of East-West
Economic Relations and
the Role of Joint
Ventures
E. Razvigorova and J. Djarova
The changing climate of East-West relations has gradually estab-
lished new opportunities for business people. The tendency to replace
a part of conventional trade relations by other forms of industrial co-
operation is becoming constantly stronger. Beginning in 1960, East-
West trade increased at the rapid rate of approximately 305 percent
until 1979, and then continued to increase at a slower rate through
1987. Western exports to Eastern Europe have been concentrated
in the fields of machinery, transport equipment, and manufactured
goods. Exports from Eastern countries to the West consisted mainly
of food, beverages, and tobacco (accounting for 30 percent); raw ma-
terials, minerals, and fuels (about 45 percent to 50 percent); and
engineering products (accounting for only 10 percent).
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The organizational aspects and forms of economic relations have
developed as a consequence of commercial transactions between West-
ern companies and the authorized foreign trade organizations of East-
ern countries. Almost all Western industrial countries have signed bi-
lateral trade agreements with various European CMEA countries for
periods ranging from three to six years. Inter-governmental agree-
ments have become broader in scope, including not only forms of
commercial cooperation, but also of economic, industrial, scientific,
and technical cooperation.
New driving forces have now entered into the development of
trade relations. These forces involved mainly the process of ex-
tended internationalization, but they were also embedded in national
strategies for rapid economic growth, expanded capacity, and market
diversification.
Two main features of East-West relations from the early 1970s
to the present can be pointed out. These are the gradual transfer
from simple foreign trade relations to cooperation in the fields of eco-
nomics, science, and technology, etc., and the development of different
forms of this cooperation starting with sub-contracts and moving on
to coproduction, joint projects, and joint ventures.
Another characteristic of East-West cooperative relations is that
inter-firm cooperation is now more frequently established by direct
company contact than by governmental agreements. This process
is one of the pre-conditions in developing more diversified and more
complex relationships, such as joint international trade, joint eco-
nomic and joint R&D activities, etc.
More profound inter-governmental relations also helped avoid the
type of anonymous cooperation that used to prevail in trade relations,
whereby Western firms found themselves dealing with governmental
agencies or ministries instead of with the individual enterprises in-
volved. Knowing the characteristics of all the partners is a generally
accepted practice nowadays.
The priority placed on the use of various cooperation forms has
differed among the CMEA countries. For example, in 1988, joint
ventures were the preferred form for Hungary, followed by the USSR
and Bulgaria (see Table 2.1: ranking calculated as a percentage of
the total signed cooperation contracts).
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Table 2.1-
1988).
Ranking of different forms of cooperation contracts (in
Type of
contracts
Coproduction
Licensing
Joint ventures
Delivery
Rank
1
CSSR
Poland
Hungary
Poland
2
USSR
CSSR
USSR
USSR
3
Bulgaria
Hungary
Bulgaria
Bulgaria
4
Poland
Bulgaria
CSSR
Hungary
5
Hungary
USSR
Poland
CSSR
Table 2.2. Ranking of East-West industrial cooperation forms (by
year and type of cooperation).
Type of Year'
contract --.19"'7"'3c-----;c19"'7"'6c-----;c19"'8"'4c-----;c19"'8"'6c------.-1"'98=8
Coproduction 1 1 1 1 1
Licensing 2 3 4 4 4
Joint ventures' 3 4 3 2 2
Delivery 4 2 2 3 3
GOnly the yea.rs where changes occurred are shown.
blncluding joint ventures located both in the West and East.
The history of industrial cooperation between CMEA countries
and Western developed countries has shown a stable tendency to-
wards using primarily the form of coproduction as opposed to licens-
ing, joint ventures, and delivery. The substantial growth of the share
of joint venture contracts as of 1983 indicates the increasing impor-
tance of this new form of joint economic activity and signifies the
increased attention of both Eastern and Western parties (Table 2.2).
The development of the joint venture process was influenced by
the changing legal conditions. Yugoslavia (an observer ofthe CMEA)
was the first Socialist economy to permit joint ventures within its
territory, starting in 1967. Rumania enacted legislation in 1971 pro-
viding for East-West joint ventures, followed the next year by Hun-
gary. Bulgaria introduced a special decree in 1980. During 1986 and
1987, many changes evolved in CMEA legislation for establishing
joint ventures. During these two years, three countries (Czechoslo-
vakia, Poland, and the USSR), enacted legislation or issued policy
statements making joint ventures located in the country possible for
the first time. Two other countries (Bulgaria and Hungary) further
revised their existing legislation.
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The number of East-West joint ventures established during the
1970s remained moderate due to the unchanged economic environ-
ment in these countries. The end of 1988 and the beginning of 1989
were marked by the adoption of new legislation on joint ventures in al-
most all CMEA countries: Hungary, USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia,
and Bulgaria. Currently, there are several common characteristics
and forms, as follows:
• More new opportunities for foreign investments are now open in
all countries.
• The existing restrictions on foreign capital shares have been re-
moved, and foreign citizens can now be employed and appointed
managers in all countries.
• The reforms in Hungary, Bulgaria, and Poland have provided the
legal ground for different forms of companies with foreign capital
participation (limited liability companies, joint-stock companies,
uulimited partnerships, deposit partnerships, etc.).
• The changes in joint venture legislation in Bulgaria and Hungary
aim to equalize the economic conditions of joint ventures with
those of national companies.
• In most of the CMEA countries, the recently introduced joint
venture provisions are part of legislation that further liberalizes
the country's business environment.
One very important factor must be pointed out in describing the
conditions for establishing joint ventures, regardless of location. This
factor concerns the many changes over the past three years in almost
all Socialist countries. The major part of these changes involved the
restructuring of the economy, economic organizations in general, and
of foreign trade in particular. Greater freedom of action is being
accorded to individual enterprises or associations of enterprises with
regard to foreign trade operations in several CMEA countries. To-
wards the end of 1989, drastic political changes took place in many
of these countries, further intensifying the economic changes. This
has raised expectations for enhanced East-West trading opportuni-
ties among actual and prospective Western business partners. The
fact that new markets and new forms of inter-firm cooperation are
being opened has encouraged fresh interest on both sides.
Tables 2.3 through 2.7 give a general description of the main
features of joint venture legislation in the CMEA countries. They
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26 East-West Joint Ventures
also show the ongoing process of improving conditions for establishing
joint ventures in these countries, as compared with the year when
joint ventures were instituted for the first time.
There are many similarities in the existing legislation in the Eu-
ropean CMEA countries concerning joint ventures, particularly wi th
regard to foreign participation in joint venture equity, repatriating
earnings in convertible currency, and the nationality of the chairman
or managing director. There is, however, a significant diversity of
tax rates on income earned and repatriated, and a variable scope for
negotiation of local salaries and access to the domestic markets.
The experience accumulated over the past years has shown the
importance of making the legal conditions and regulations concern·
ing joint ventures in the CMEA countries clearer and easier for the
partners involved (Table 2.8).
The practice in Hungary shows that changes in the legislation,
occurring almost every year since 1977, have significantly influenced
the process. The changes are mainly concentrated in making the
process of establishing and operating joint ventures much simpler
and less bureaucratic for both partners. For example, the simplified
procedure for obtaining a license to establish a joint venture and the
introduction of some taxation privileges, adopted in 1986, resulted in
an increase in the number of joint ventures established under the new
regulations. In 1988, one of the most important acts in Hungarian
economic history was passed. The so-called Company Act (corpora-
tion law) standardizes the operating conditions of all economic orga-
nizations in the country, including those with foreign participation.
That was followed by a special act on foreign investments in Hungary,
adopted in 1988, which also provided the rules for establishing and
operating companies with foreign capital participation. The legisla-
tive changes accelerated the process significantly during the last two
years. In 1988 alone, the number of joint venture companies doubled.
By the end of that year, the number of East-West joint companies in
the country had reached 282, representing over 25 Western countries.
In the first four months of 1989, the number of newly established
joint ventures was more than 300, and by the end of October the
same year, the total number of registered joint companies reached
700.1
1Statistics fcom the IIASA MTC da.ta base.
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Before adopting a special act on enterprises with foreign property
participation in Czechoslovakia, each joint venture with a Western
partner was considered case-by-case. The Act on Enterprise with
Foreign Property Participation, effective January 1, 1989, defined
the detailed conditions and procedures for establishing joint ventures
as well as for their economic activities. At the beginning of 1989, 16
joint ventures were in operation in Czechoslovakia. The introduction
of the new 1989 legislation accelerated the process. Within only two
months, the number of joint ventures increased to more than 22.
In Poland, joint ventures were permitted for the first time in 1986.
Companies with foreign capital participation (joint ventures) were
allowed without restrictions on company size or branch of industry.
In 1988, the Foreign Investment Law was adopted to provide a mOre
workable framework for the further development of foreign capital
investment in the Polish economy and to guarantee the protection of
the foreign parties' investment. Under the first legislative act that
allowed foreign companies investments in Poland, 52 joint ventures
were registered with Western partners in two years. The new Polish
law of January 1989 accelerated the process, resulting in 61 joint
ventures being registered from January 16 to April 20, 1989.
After the first permission for foreign investment in Soviet terri tory
was granted in 1987, Decree No. 1405 of 1988 defined some additional
conditions for joint ventures. It permitted the share to be decided by
the partners themselves and foreign citizens to be appointed general
managers. The substantial growth in number of joint ventures in
the USSR started at the end of 1988. In 1989, the average number
of the joint ventures registered monthly ranged between 60 and 80.
Approximately 700 joint ventures had been established by the end of
August 1989.
East-West joint ventures can be regarded as the most highly de-
veloped form of economic cooperation. In 1988, joint venture con-
tracts represented 26 percent of all signed cooperation agreements be-
tween CMEA countries and Western highly industrialized countries. 2
The share of joint venture agreements among the total number of
East-West cooperation contracts show a definite tendency toward
2At the time of writing the German Democratic Republic did not have any
legal provisions for Western investment in the country, and therefore was not
considered.
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growth during the last few years compared with the other well-known
forms such as licensing, delivery of plant or equipment, and copro-
duction (Figure 2.1).
The dynamics of the joint venture process vary in different coun-
tries. Rumania was the first CMEA country to initiate the process of
joint venture establishment. A number of large joint ventures were
created in the early 1970s. In the mid-1970s, however, because of
the worsening political climate, the process came to a halt. The five
joint ventures still operating represent a large but substantially de-
creasing share of Rumania in joint venture capitalization. Rumania
is therefore not included in this study. In the early 1970s, Hungary
became the most active country in promoting joint ventures. The
Soviet Union has only recently taken a more active part, followed
by Poland, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. The USSR is presently a
driving force because of its economic capacity and the huge market it
represents. The growth rate of the USSR share in the total number of
East-West joint ventures located in the CMEA countries is changing
rapidly (Figures 2.2 and 2.3).
Although the number of enterprises with foreign participation
in CMEA countries is quite remarkable, the invested capital is still
rather small. Total capitalization amounted to roughly US$l.87 bil-
lion by the end of 1988 (Figures 2.4 and 2.5), and to roughly US$2.5
billion by the end of February 1989. These figures, however, as well
as the number of joint ventures tripled in 1988 as compared with
1987. The average joint venture equity increased to US$3.36 million
in 1987 and US$3.7 million in 1988.
The recent development of the joint venture process is character-
ized also by national differences with regard to enterprise size. In
Hungary, for instance, many small joint ventures have been estab-
lished. The majority have less than US$800,000 invested capital, 32
percent of which range from US$800 to US$800,000 and 26 percent
less than US$160,000. In the USSR, 57 percent of the joint ventures
have less than one million rubles invested capital, but nearly 15 per-
cent have over 5 million rubles, of which over 50 percent have an au-
thorized fund of over 10 million rubles each. In general, joint ventures
in all CMEA countries are relatively small (up to US$1 million initial
capital). Some large companies, however, have recently been estab-
lished in the Soviet Union. Total foreign investment was estimated
roughly at US$242 million by the end of 1987 (Figure 2.6). It had
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_~=........Bulgaria (6.8%)
Czechoslovakia (1.9%)
Figure 2.2. Number of East-West joint ventures in 1987 (total =
161). (Source: MTC Network.)
POland (7.9%)
BUlgaria (3.2%)
_--r-7T~: Czechoslovakia (2.2%)
Figure 2.3. Number of East-West joint ventures in 1988 (total =
506). (Source: MTC Network.)
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Other (14.8%)
USSR (25.9%)
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Czechoslovakia (1.2%)
1><:>O<X><X>OO<x>O!"Hungary (34.5%)
Rumania (23.6%)
Figure 2.4. Share of joint venture capitalization in 1987 (total =
US$580 million). (Source: MTC Network.)
Other (11.2%) Czechoslovakia (1.2%)
Rumania (7.3%)
Figure 2.5. Share of joint venture capitalization in 1988 (total =
US$1.87 billion). (Source: MTC Network.)
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Other (14.8%)
~_..C(;z<;:e"c>--hoSlovakia (0.8%)
Hungary (33.1 %)
Figure 2.6. Joint venture foreign capital in 1987 (total = US$242
million). (Source: MTC data base.)
increased to about US$634 million by the end of 1988 (Figure 2.7)
and to approximately US$900 million at the end of February 1989.
Hungary, which led in foreign capital acquisition until 1988, has now
been replaced by the Soviet Union, which attracted US$I,286 million
in foreign investment by the end of August 1989.
The increased number of East-West joint ventures located in the
CMEA countries is accompanied by a less intensive growth of the
initial capital investment and a decrease in the absolute value of for-
eign investment per single joint venture. For instance, the average
capital per joint venture in Hungary is about US$2,293,OOO. There
are some cases of lllgher investments, mostly in the USSR, where the
USA has only five joint ventures but the value of their investments
is US$4 million. Joint ventures that do not need substantial initial
investments are those involved in engineering, consultancy, informa-
tion, and other services. In the changing environment of almost all
Socialist countries during the last few years, it is natural for Western
partners to have a trial period for their joint business. Both partners
E. Razvigorova and J. Djarova
Other (11.0%) Czechoslovakia (1.6%)
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Figure 2.7. Joint venture foreign capital i~ 1988 (total = US$634
million). (Source: MTC data base.)
need time to acquire knowledge and experience in order to enlarge
their joint activities in the future.
The participation of Western countries in joint ventures also varies.
In 1987, when the process of establishing the legal framework was
completed in almost all CMEA countries, the Federal Republic of
Germany (FRG) took the lead, participating in the greatest number
of joint companies. Austria closely followed; next were Switzerland
and Japan. The FRG, Austria, Italy, the UK, and the USA are now
the most active Western countries in the process. The tendency to
form joint ventures based on the partners' initial relations is still
dominant.
Political, geographical, cultural, and historical factors influenced
the process of establishing East-West joint ventures and had an im-
pact on the partners' choice. Finland is most active in the USSR,
based on a history of mutual economic relations, with over 100 joint
ventures.
Naturally, the dynamics of the joint venture process vary in dif-
ferent countries. In addition, the distribution by industry branch
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and the economic activi ties of joint ventures differ according to the
partners' priorities and characteristics.
Generally, East-West joint ventures located in the CMEA coun-
tries concentrate their activities in industry, services, and other sec-
tors such as R&D, engineering, consultancy, training, etc. Most
started with trading, engineering, and technical services, and then
moved towards small-scale production. Every country has its own
orientation concerning distribution of joint ventures, depending on
the country's economic and technical development, its priority areas
and the interest of the Western partners.
The majority of the joint companies in Bulgaria are engaged in
engineering services. In addition to their basic activities, most of
them also have commercial functions that were previously performed
by the Western partner's trade representative.
Hungarian joint ventures represent the broadest spectrum of in-
dustries. In the last two years, there has been a tendency to establish
companies in services; 26 percent of the Hungarian joint undertak-
ings are in that sector, 35 percent in manufacturing, and a relatively
high percentage (30 percent) in finance. This is a specific feature for
Hungary.
Drawing on the Czechoslovakian tradition of machine building
and machine-tools, 25 percent of the established joint ventures in
this country are engaged in these activities. Second priority is given
to tourism and the production of spare parts.
Analysis of the joint ventures in operation (not those that have
only been registered), shows that the process of transition to produc-
tion activities is comparatively slow. Many joint companies consider
production one of their main future targets. Joint production and
R&D activities do not occur very often, however. This is natural
in the initial stage of the joint venture process since sharing R&D
know-how requires utmost trust between the partners. As the joint
ventures develop, partners hope to move to more complicated activi-
ties such as joint R&D, joint production, and joint marketing, based
on reaching a deeper mutual understanding and trust through joint
activities.
E. Razvigorova and J. Djarova
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East-West joint ventures present a serious challenge to the scien-
tific community by addressing many questions of great importance
to business people in both the East and the West. To be successful,
an East-West joint venture must work toward a better understanding
of East and West business environments and must create a harmo-
nized international environment. What are the main problems in
this process? What are the main features of the new international
environment required by joint ventures?
The joint venture is an entity that should be analyzed in relation
to the existing environment: distribution and supply; economic condi-
tions and regulations; and managerial, operational, and environmen-
tal features. To study the systems, it is necessary to study not only
the enterprise itself and its internal structures but also, more impor-
tantly, the relation between the enterprise and its environment and
between management and operations (production or services). This
also can serve as a basis for comparison among countries. Legislation
is important, but it is more informative to see what happens after the
partners finish their round table negotiation, and the joint venture is
left to swim alone in the turbulent sea of Eastern economies.

Part II

Chapter 3
Joint Ventures From An
Austrian Perspective
G. Plasonig and K. Buchleitner
Austrian companies have taken the lead in introducing joint ventures
with CMEA countries for the following reasons:
• Austria's special geographic position between East and West.
• Austria's neutrality since 1955.
• Austria's traditional trade relationships with the countries of the
former Austro-Hungarian monarchy.
Austria's share in new East-West joint ventures is currently about
10 percent. Considering Austria's position in world trade, this is a
relatively high figure.
The results stated below are based on a theoretical and empiri-
cal study of Austrian companies operating joint ventures with part-
ners from CMEA countries. The Austrian partners agreed to provide
data" from all joint ventures existing at the time of the study.
1 For the complete results including the theoretical framework, see Eschenbach
et at. (1989).
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3.1 Strategies of Austrian Companies with
East-West Joint Ventures
The single most important aim of Austrian companies in setting up
joint ventures with CMEA countries is to gain a foothold that will
allow them to reach the entire CMEA market. Our research showed
that other motives such as cost savings, tax advantages, etc. are only
minor reasons. The most powerful market is undoubtedly the USSR,
with two-thirds of the total volume of the CMEA market. Although
joint ventures with Hungary are in the majority, these were set up to
serve as a bridge to the USSR market. The concentration of about
80 percent of the Austrian joint ventures in the Hungarian market
is due to Hungary's recent major improvements in introducing a free
market economy, geographical proximity, and Austrian knowledge of
the Hungarian market. Austrian companies have considerable expe-
rience with Hungary, thus minimizing the risk of entering new and
unknown markets. Companies using this step-by-step approach have
three possibilities for expanding their activities to other parts of the
CMEA market:
• Exporting goods and services from the East-West joint ventures
to other CMEA countries.
• Setting up other joint ventures between the existing joint ventures
and partners in other countries.
• Setting up a new joint venture between the Austrian parent com-
pany and partners in the target country.
The choice of one of these opportunities will be influenced by
the motives of the CMEA partner and the bargaining power of the
Austrian company. It has to be considered that any additional joint
venture in a CMEA country influences the relationship between the
parent company and the joint venture partner of the original joint
venture. Therefore, regulations must be stipulated clearly in the joint
venture contract to avoid any misunderstandings.
Looking at joint ventures from the point of view of competitive
advantage, it is clear that the motives of both partners play only
a very minor role. There is evidence that joint ventures are useful
in local and global competition, as shown by many East-West joint
ventures. Joint ventures are especially appropriate when the firm
seeks to expand its capability into new fields and less appropriate
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when it aims to exploit an existing competitive advantage. Some
risks in East-West joint ventures lie in the transfer of technology and
know-how from the West. This can, in the long term, endanger the
position of the Austrian companies in the local Western market if the
joint venture begins exporting cheaper products to the West. Because
of the commitment to quality and brand marketing, however, there
is no evidence that this question will be raised.
Joint ventures are currently the only way for Austrian companies
to enter the market in CMEA countries. Despite possible long-term
strategic disadvantages, Austrian companies should take the oppor-
tunity to use their specific know-how to expand into CMEA countries
and to improve their overall position in the world market.
3.2 Environment
3.2.1 Legal environment
One of the strongest indicators of perestroika is the rapid change of
the joint venture laws in CMEA countries. In 1989, with the excep-
tion of the GDR and Rumania, all CMEA countries introduced new
joint venture laws with some revolutionary contents; the highlights
are:
• Majority rights up to 99 percent (and in Hungary, Bulgaria and
Poland even wholly owned subsidiaries).
• Abolition of restrictions on Western managers as managing direc-
tors of joint ventures.
• Abolition of compulsory permission to establish joint ventures
where the Western partner holds less than 50 percent.
• Unrestricted profit transfer from Hungary to the West.
Although there has been little practical experience so far with
these laws, they have created an improved climate for investment
and more room for negotiations. In spite of these significant im-
provements, the host country still can refuse the application for a
joint venture contract; no application has been refused.
It would be advisable to draw up a tentative list of possible rea-
sons for refusal and provide for the possibility to lodge an appeal
with an independent legal authority. The foreign investor could then
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be relieved of the insecurity that often results from time-consuming
application proceedings.
From a Western point of view, practical interpretation of the joint
venture laws and, to an even greater degree, the general rules of the
CMEA countries present legal difficulties and uncertainties. This is
mainly due to:
• Language barriers.
• CMEA countries' lack of experience with Western business
practices.
• Comparatively strict "legality" of economic and everyday life in
CMEA countries.
• High level of state discretionary powers in waiving decrees. The
legislative process is less clear than in the West, and unexpected
changes in the law can lead to difficulties in adjustment.
• Partly out-of-date economic law which can now be gradually
aligned to the current changes of glasnost and perestroika.
Austrian joint venture partners who belong to the medium-sized
sector and do not have separate legal departments will find it consid-
erably more difficult than larger companies do to set up and operate
joint ventures.
An improvement in the information policies of the CMEA coun-
tries could facilitate practices in this area. The information available
at the moment on East-West joint ventures is not sufficient; it is
very general and does not correspond to the needs of joint venture
partners.
3.2.2 Economic environment
The economic climate of joint ventures is characterized by conflict
between the directively planned economy and economic reforms. The
particularly exposed position of joint ventures is also due to the fact
that their success depends on the success of the reforms. On the
other hand, they are themselves an important means in the process
of reform.
The following major problems call for solution:
• Over-bureaucratization due to a high level of vertical organization
as a condition of the extensive planning system.
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• Promotion of large projects and industries without regard to
efficiency.
• Ignoring market demand and instead promoting products that
help to fulfill plans.
• Low productivity levels due to the lack of incentives for employer
motivation.
I Considerable technological backwardness in many branches due
to the lack of market orientation.
• Poor conversion of inventions or acquired technological know-
how into products. Lack of incentives for application-oriented
research.
• Poor international competitiveness due to lack of quality; there-
fore, foreign currency is earned only for raw material exports
where price fluctuations can directly affect balance of trade.
• Domestic market price subsidies.
The Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) has categorized the
objectives of joint ventures, most of which are explicitly stated in legal
documents. The primary motives of CMEA countries are as follows:
• To obtain new technology and/or technical know-how.
• To expand the export sector and thus increase foreign currency
earnings.
• To decrease imports and thus obtain foreign currency savings.
I To obtain foreign enterprise management know-how.
I To modernize the host industry.
• To introduce new goods to the host country market.
• To create new jobs, raise labor productivity, and train host coun-
try employees.
• To economize on manpower, material, energy, financial, and other
resources.
• To increase profitability.
It is obvious that the aims of CMEA countries do not always
correspond to those of their Western partners. The most commonly
cited conflict with Austrian joint venture partners concerns sales. The
CMEA countries expect an expansion of their exports to the West
and an increase in their foreign currency earnings, whereas Austrian
companies are mainly interested in sales to the CMEA markets. Ac-
cording to Austrian entrepreneurs, the fact that joint ventures replace
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expensive imports and help save convertible currency is too often for-
gotten in CMEA countries.
3.3 Operational Problems
3.3.1 Procurement
Procurement is one of the central problem areas of East-West joint
ventures; problems mainly result from the economic environment of
the host countries. Joint ventures generally prefer to procure their
imports from the domestic market because it is cheaper and, above
all, avoids extra foreign currency expenditure.
Procurement from the domestic market, however, is impeded in
various ways:
• The joint venture is able to choose its suppliers freely, but there
are often bottlenecks and delays, due to the restrictions of the
suppliers.
• CMEA suppliers are not used to producing the quality required
by the joint ventures and prefer uncomplicated trade with state
companies.
• CMEA suppliers have an increasing tendency to demand special
terms (such as payment in convertible currency).
If the joint venture procures from the West, it avoids the problems
of domestic procurement but puts additional pressure on its balance
of convertible currency. The Austrian companies have found some
possible solutions, as follows:
• Supply by partners, mainly the Western partner. The drawback
is that the joint venture is subject to the price monopoly of its
partner who, in turn, can collect the joint venture profit to the
disadvantage of the other partner.
• Partial integration of joint ventures into state plans by the joint
venture, giving the planning authorities the opportunity to take
its requirements into account. This is important to maintain in-
dependence of plans by simultaneous exploration of alternative
sources of procurement.
• Maintaining minimum inventory levels to avoid production stop-
pages and to introduce better quality by repeated complaints.
The drawback is increased inventory cost.
G. Plasonig and K. Buchleitner
3.3.2 Production
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Problems in the production of joint venture goods or services come
in the area of procurement (delivery bottlenecks, lack of quality) and
the areas of personnel/motivation and qualification. Moreover, joint
ventures always work with technology obtained from Austrian part-
ners and usually new to the host country.
Austrian partners view production as a relatively uncritical func-
tional area because it receives a relatively high level of attention right
from the start. The main measure taken is the gradual introduction
of new technologies.
Apart from extensive training programs for stair and management
by specialists from the Austrian partner, the Austrian specialists en-
force close supervision of production in the initial stages to avoid
increased production costs through defects, stoppages, or even dam-
age to plant.
It is very difficult to ensure product quality that matches West-
ern standards, according to the experience of Austrian joint venture
managers. In particular, the lack of quality awareness of the East-
ern employees has been criticized. The following measures have been
recommended for quality improvement:
• Establish concrete quality standards and agreements as well as
strict supervision and control by the Austrian partner.
• Control thoroughly all branches involved in production, in par-
ticular procurement.
• Promote appropriate quality awareness among Eastern employees
as a part of joint venture corporate culture.
3.3.3 Sales
Sales of East-West joint ventures are influenced by two additional
factors:
• Equality in trade between the partners.
• The need to obtain convertible currency.
The geographic boundaries of the market are laid down in the
joint venture contract. The typical characteristics of an Austrian
joint venture are:
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• Restricted joint venture market.
• Sole distributor rights of the Austrian partner for joint venture
products in the West.
Basically three geographic markets are available to East-West
joint ventures:
• Sales in the host country.
• Sales in other CMEA countries.
• Sales in the West.
Convertible currency can be obtained in two ways:
• Sales in the West, which are often against the Austrian partner's
interests.
I Sales in CMEA markets against convertible currency, which are
very difficult to implement due to a shortage of foreign currency
in CMEA countries.
From the empirical study, 20 joint ventures with Austrian in-
terests showed the geographic sales distribution (Figure 3.1). The
relatively low level of sales in the West consists mainly of supplies to
the Austrian partner. There is no cause for complaint concerning the
lack of demand for joint venture products or services in CMEA coun-
tries. Joint venture products have a quasi-automatic USP (unique
selling proposition) to the CMEA buyer.
Reasons for Objective USP
• Products offered by joint ventures are quantitatively scarce on the
CMEA market.
I Comparable products of state industries are qualitatively inferior.
Reasons for Subjective USP
I The CMEA buyer associates high quality and status with the
Western image (brand name) of joint venture products. The ad-
vantages of status sometimes lead to an interesting result: if a
product is priced too low, the subjective USP is destroyed and
can have a negative effect on sales.
I Joint ventures produce and distribute goods and services from the
Austrian partner's product range.
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Figure 3.1. Sales distribution of joint ventures with Austrian
participation.
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Consumer goods are usually only adapted to the CMEA market in
secondary product features such as design, packaging, and standard
specification.
More extensive adaptations to CMEA cond}tions are often re-
quired for capital goods, technically sophisticated products in par-
ticular, since the infrastructure of the buyer is often underdeveloped
for the use of Western products. (One example is surge protectors
in EDP equipment to avoid damage from a different voltage.) Ser-
vices, on the other hand, nearly always have to be redeveloped for
the CMEA market because:
• The service sector in CMEA countries is underdeveloped and the
requirements are much less complex.
• Legal, political, and social environments are very different from
those in the West.
Difficulties arise for Austrian partners and joint ventures concern-
ing market research in CMEA countries. Secondary data are difficult
to obtain, incomplete and not up to date.
If the Austrian partner does not have enough market information
based on many years of experience in CMEA countries and if the
Eastern partner's market information is not sufficient, primary anal-
yses are necessary. But these are costly and, in spite of numerous
joint ventures, there is a lack of experienced agencies.
Good relations and contacts with political and economic decision
makers in CMEA countries are also important in obtaining informa-
tion. Especially in the branch of capital goods, these bodies have the
advantage of being informed about purchasing projects well in ad-
vance and of being able to influence the buying decision. In addition,
the image of joint veI\tures as CMEA companies carries an advantage
in the buying decisions of state-run companies and institutions over
that of Western firms who do not offer their products as part of a
joint venture.
3.3.4 Finance
The financing of joint ventures is impeded by the lack of currency
convertibility, since a joint venture must also be liquid in convertible
currency. Joint ventures are not granted any considerable advantages
concerning the supply of convertible currency. This means that they
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often suffer a shortage of convertible currency just as state companies
do.
The basic principle of the joint venture's convertible currency is
that of "zero-balance basis." The joint venture must cover all of
its expenditures in convertible currency (including wage transfers to
foreign employees and distribution of profits to Western partners)
by appropriate earnings in convertible currency. This leads to great
restrictions in the scope of East-West joint ventures:
• In procurement, where the joint venture is forced to procure as
much as possible from the CMEA market.
• In personnel and management, where Western staff can be em-
ployed only restrictively.
• Particularly in sales, because the joint venture must try to sell on
the Western market. This requirement is against the interests of
the Western partner and makes the initial stage of a joint venture
much more difficult.
The common ways of getting around these problems, such as
counter-trade or establishing consortiums for the reciprocal exchange
of foreign currency, put pressure on the joint venture right from the
start and divert resources away from the core of business. Full con-
vertibility would be desirable; the success of joint ventures can per-
haps facilitate the process.
Austrian joint venture partners regularly try to keep their capital
investments down for the following reasons:
• Uncertainty concerning political and economic developments.
• Lack of currency convertibility.
• Fear of currency devaluation.
In most joint venture contracts, the obligation to make further
contributions is excluded. This indicates that the partners assume
that the joint venture has a relatively high degree of independence.
The undercapitalization of joint ventures makes credits necessary
sooner or later. Convertible currency credits often cause difficulties.
CMEA banks have to act restrictively due to the permanent shortage
of convertible currency.
Western banks have been very cautious in granting credits to
CMEA countries due to political and economic uncertainty; they de-
mand high rates of interest as well as various provisions of collateral.
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The latter also cause difficulties for joint ventures as their assets are
very small and the desired collateral is often not feasible according to
local laws. Austrian banks try to ensure larger credits through state
guarantees.
The appropriation of profit (reinvestment or distribution of prof-
its to partners) does not seem to cause problems for Austrian joint
venture partners. Due to the long-term arrangements of joint ven-
tures, in the first years the profits are mainly reinvested. Partners'
disagreements and conflicts in the future cannot be ruled out but can
be avoided by contractual agreements.
3.3.5 Personnel
Personnel are of particular importance in this form of cooperation.
Not only do the varying corporate cultures of the partners meet, but
also two basically different economic systems.
This situation calls for a high degree of flexibility and ability
to adapt on the part of employees and workers, and demands great
sensitivity in personnel management.
Recruitment and dismissal of staff do not cause problems. These
are primarily the task of the joint venture management. The influence
of state authorities or partners has only been involved in a few isolated
incidents.
Austrian employees are involved in very small numbers and are
limited to ongoing joint ventures in key technical and economic po-
sitions. The reasons for this are primarily:
• The transfer of know-how desired by the CMEA country or CMEA
partner can succeed only if Eastern personnel are also employed
in decision-making positions.
• The employment of Austrians means a considerable extra financial
burden (one reason being payment in convertible currency).
• The number of Austrian employees who are willing to work per-
manently in CMEA countries is very small because:
The standard of living is lower.
Work in a CMEA country is not (yet) considered as a career
milestone.
Sending Austrian managers or technicians over temporarily to
solve specific problems seems to be the most common solution, e.g.,
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to work out marketing strategies, to service or repair machinery, etc.
It is often stated in literature that joint venture staff are unqualified.
This is contradicted, however, by Austrian joint venture partners
who rate staff qualifications relatively high. It must not be forgotten,
that working in a joint venture is attractive for CMEA personnel;
therefore, joint ventures can recruit the best qualified employees. The
fact that the personnel have to be extensively trained in the initial
stage is inevitable.
There is, however, a tendency among Eastern partners to pirate
trained employees from joint ventures; this shows it will be more dif-
ficult for joint ventures to keep good staff members in the future.
Austrian joint venture partners evaluate the attitude toward work
of local staff as negative almost without exception. Since this is ac-
counted for much less by an individually negative stance than a gen-
erally system-conditioned atmosphere of anti-performance, specific
measures for motivation could relatively easily bring about changes
in this respect. The most successful measures to increase motivation
are considered to be those that improve the standard of living in the
classic bottleneck areas of the CMEA economy. The most widely
used are:
• Working stay in the West.
• Performance-linked bonuses in money and in kind.
• Training.
Austrian joint venture partners also stress the importance of cor-
porate culture in this respect. There are regular attempts to build up
a separate joint venture culture that should influence the joint ven-
ture employees' attitudes to work. Mere description of the Austrian
partners' corporate culture is pointless and would result more in a
shock effect on local staff than in a positive stance towards the joint
venture.
3.3.6 Management
The demands on the management of joint ventures are, of course,
especially great because:
• It must often put into effect opposing interests of the partners.
• It must operate in a radically changing economic system that is
affected by many problems.
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• Considerable state interests are also linked to the authorization
of joint ventures that have both direct and indirect effects on the
joint venture.
The demands on the abilities of joint venture managers are great:
• Mastering of tested management techniques.
• Effectiveness.
• Flexibility, mobility, and ability to learn.
• Ability to work with information.
• Creativity and innovation.
• Well-developed sense of environmental observation, especially
with respect to unexpected changes in the environment.
• Social and communicative competence.
• All-round knowledge of languages.
There is no ideal manager for a joint venture. It would make sense
to have a combination of managers from East and West. Western
managers introduce Western management know-how and can guar-
antee effective internal work. The Eastern manager's strength lies in
knowledge of the characteristics of the planned economy system, the
CMEA market, and contacts with the authorities.
Austrian partners also prefer such a division of competence, but
due to the difficulties involved in finding managers for the CMEA
market they have to be satisfied with sending managers over in special
cases.
The success of a combined East-West management team depends
greatly on the personal relationship between managers. It is impor-
tant that there is trust and a clear and well thought-out division of
skills right from the start to avoid conflict in the future.
As far as planning is concerned, almost all joint ventures have
short- and medium-term plans that are carried out relatively au-
tonomously. Long-term planning for an East-West joint venture is
considered very difficult since uncertainty is seen as extraordinarily
high. Because of this, the joint venture should develop alternative
strategies in time to be able to react as quickly as possible to envi-
ronmental changes.
Reporting systems from joint ventures to their Austrian partners
are not strictly organized in many cases. Language and poor quality
data are considered the main probiems. Small Austrian companies,
in particular, should improve on these areas.
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3.4 Conclusions
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The study shows that in spite of various attempts by CMEA countries
to facilitate joint ventures many problems still remain unresolved.
These problems are mainly due to the position offree-market-oriented
joint ventures in an area of conflict between directively planned econ-
omy and reforms. On the one hand, the success of joint ventures
depends very much on the success of the reforms, and, on the other
hand, joint ventures are an important means in the reform process
and for future development.
The uncertainty about the future course of reforms is one reason
why joint ventures do not fulfill the CMEA policy maker's expec-
tations concerning capital investment and technological transfer. In
particular for medium-sized Austrian businesses, a certain degree of
political and economic security in foreign investments is essential.
Only when CMEA countries succeed in increasing guarantees for
East-West joint ventures by means of more determined changes in the
environment will the expectations of the CMEA economy be totally
fulfilled.

Chapter 4
Joint Ventures
Bulgaria
•In
E. Razvigorova, I. Nenov, J. Djarova,
and M. Borrisova
4.1 Recent Reforms III the National
Economy
The development of new forms of economic activities in Bulgaria
moves according to internalization of manufacturing, technology, and
research. Changes in industrial structure, and in form and subject
of property are also taking place in the country. Self-management
in business, administration, and regional organizations is increasing.
Today, other kinds of ownership are also important - cooperative, pri-
vate or mixed. The gradually changing legislation resulted in Decree
No. 56 of the State Council on January 13, 1989. The new legislation
continues the policy of democratization of the country's economic leg-
islation and management, putting all forms of ownership on an equal
basis.
Equal conditions are achieved through unified economic regula-
tions. The basic features of the new legislation are the following:
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• Further democratization of business management is carried out
by the creation of firms, which continue the process of decreas-
ing management hierarchy levels and of enhancing freedom for
internal organization of business activities.
• The shareholder's principle is introduced in all forms of owner-
ship. Different forms of shares and bonds are permitted. Shifting
capital from one firm to another is possible. This is expected to
lead to higher flexibility and investment growth, and to a greater
interest and closer relationship between the employee and the
firm.
• The economic methods for managing the national economy widen.
Contracts become the main form of relations between companies
as well as between companies and the state.
• Together with economic incentives there are increased possibilities
for Bulgarian firms to enter the international investment market
and for foreign firms in Bulgaria.
• For the first time, a significant attempt has been made to liquidate
the state monopoly on foreign trade. At the same time, the state's
interests are guaranteed through a unified foreign economic policy.
At the end of April, only a few months after Decree No. 56 was
approved, 265 state-owned, 27 regional, 17 cooperative, 6 public, and
6 joint-stock companies were registered.! The number of private firms
registered was more than 1,600. By October 1989, the total number
of private companies exceeded 7,000, but the majority are very small
in terms of both capital and personnel.
The process is still at the beginning. The new conditions impose
higher demands on all companies and on individuals. New knowledge
is necessary to deal with the new business situation in the country.
Therefore, business schools, courses, and consulting companies are
being opened. The responsibility of individuals and of separate firms
will be recognized in the future.
For the first time, any company in Bulgaria can go bankrupt,
irrespective of its form of ownership. Inefficiency and inflexibility
based on state support and donations can no longer exist. Existing
administrative procedures are being simplified.
1 Robotniche~ko ddo (newspaper), May 6, 1989.
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Table 4.1. Level of Bulgarian foreign trade.
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Foreign trade volume 1970 = 100
Exports
Imports
1970 1980
100 262.9
100 294.1
100 228.6
1985
362.4
416.6
306.1
1987
362.9
408.6
313.5
The economic security that used to be associated with the proper
and punctual fulfillment of the state plan is being replaced by eco-
nomic competition and uncertainty. This means that companies not
only must fulfill "state orders," but also must identify new opportuni-
ties. Trade with foreign countries takes different forms: independent
foreign trade organizations that offer commercial services to business
organizations and commercial departments in the firms or in foreign
trade organizations belonging to the firms. The firms are orienting
themselves to more active trade activities and cooperation. Income
and expenditures in hard currency as well as profit and loss from
imports and exports now should come more under the control of the
producers. The amount of income in foreign currency will directly
affect the opportunities to buy high technology from Western com-
panies. This calls for quality improvement and new skills.
4.2 Dynamics of the Joint Venture Process
The movement toward new opportunities is also reflected in Bul-
garian participation in East-West economic relations. Like almost
all CMEA countries, Bulgaria developed mainly conventional trade
with Western partners during the 1970s. Although the growth rate
of trade has not increased during the last decade (Table 4.1), Bul-
garian firms have developed more direct contacts with their partners.
The most widespread form of economic cooperation used for years
by Bulgarian firms is coproduction, followed by delivery of plant and
equipment (Table 4.2).
Compared with other forms, coproduction is complex, involving
parties in production procedures connected with the delivery of know-
how, documentation, designs, drawings, and sometimes R&D, coop-
eration in marketing, etc. Coproduction also provides opportuni-
ties that usually make the country-trade arrangements easier. This
form of cooperation can be regarded as a transitional form toward
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Table 4.2. Bulgarian participation in East-West industrial cooper-
ation (by year and type of cooperation).
Type of
cooperation
Coproduction
Delivery
Licensing
Joint ventures
1979
50.0
21.4
0.0
21.4
1980
47.4
31.6
0.0
15.8
1981
45.8
25.0
4.2
12.5
1982
42.9
21.4
3.6
17.8
1983
52.4
14.3
2.4
19.0
Type of
cooperation 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Coproduction 50.0 51.0 48.8 47.0 44.8
Delivery 13.6 13.3 12.8 12.2 12.1
Licensing 4.5 4.4 4.2 4.1 3.4
Joint ventures 18.0 17.7 19.1 22.5 27.6
joint legal entities or joint contractual ventures. Starting in 1983,
joint ventures replaced delivery of plant and equipment as the sec-
ond most widespread form of cooperation. This category includes
the contractual and equity joint ventures located in the West as well
as those in Bulgaria. Thus coproduction and joint ventures were the
most prevalent forms during the early 1980s; joint ventures showed
a slightly higher growth rate (Table 4.3). The number of Bulgar-
ian joint ventures located in West European countries is considerably
higher than the number located in Bulgaria because of the legal pro-
visions supporting their establishment.
It is important to note that many of the Bulgarian joint ventures
located in the West were created on a contractual basis, mainly for the
better promotion of mutual trade. They can be classified as commer-
cial companies, since they deal mainly with advertising, warehousing,
marketing, and distribution of export goods.
The first Bulgarian joint venture with a Western partner was es-
tablished in 1981, shortly after the first legislation on foreign invest-
ment in the country was passed. Fanuk-Machinery Ltd was created
on the basis of formerly established business contacts between the
Bulgarian ZMM company and the Japanese Fujitsu Fanuk company.
Such cases of previous cooperation can be seen in many joint ven-
tures established in Bulgaria, considerably speeding up the process
of setting up new companies.
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Table 4.3. Growth rate of Bulgarian participation in East-West
industrial cooperation (by years and types of cooperation).
Type of
cooperation
Coproduction
Delivery
Licensing
Joint ventures
1979
0.00
0.00
0.00
1980
-5.20
47.66
-26.17
1981
-8.40
16.82
0.00
-41.59
1982
-14.20
0.00
-14.29
-16.82
1983
4.80
-33.18
-42.86
-11.21
Type of
cooperation 1984
Coproduction 0.00
Delivery -36.45
Licensing 7.14
Joint ventures -15.89
Source: llASA, MTC (1989).
1985
2.00
-37.85
4.76
-17.29
1986
-2.40
-40.19
0.00
-10.75
1987
-6.00
-42.99
-2.38
5.14
1988
-10.40
-43.46
-19.05
28.97
The number of joint ventures registered through January 1, 1989
reached 20, but only 13 actually started business during the time
the study was conducted (Table 4.4). The number of joint ventures
under negotiation and in the start-up period is more than 25. Under
the new decree, 25 joint ventures have been registered.
Most of the joint ventures listed in Table 4.4 are in the field of en-
gineering services. The joint venture of Bioinvest and the British firm
APV, e.g., constructs food factories and implements the transfer of
biotechnology. The French firm Sormella, leader in the field of manip-
ulation and FMS production lines, has created a joint venture named
Electron-Sormel-Electroimpex (ESE). It produces unique manipulat-
ing systems that can replace human workers on assembly lines, based
on licenses provided by the French firm. The activity of the joint
venture Systematics, which provides engineering and foreign trade
services for the implementation of management information systems
(MIS) developed by the Western partner, Honeywell Inc., is highly
esteemed. Systematics designs and engineers systems for measure-
ment and control, develops software for various Honeywell systems,
and writes programs for all kinds of computers, especially for control
of production, energy, and maintenance.
0> ""
T
ab
le
4.
4.
B
ul
ga
ri
an
jo
in
tv
e
n
tu
re
s.
Jo
in
t
co
m
pa
ny
Fo
un
de
d
Fo
re
ig
n
pa
rt
ne
r
B
ul
ga
ri
an
pa
rt
ne
r
Ty
pe
o
fb
us
in
es
s
Fa
nu
k-
M
ac
hi
ne
ry
19
81
Fu
jit
su
Fa
nu
k
FT
O
M
ac
hi
no
ex
po
er
t
M
ai
nt
en
an
ce
a
n
d
se
rv
ic
e
o
f
Lt
d
(Ja
pa
n)
ZM
M
m
a
ch
in
e
to
ol
s,
N
C
m
a
ch
in
es
an
d
de
ve
lo
pm
en
to
fN
C
m
ac
hi
ni
ng
ce
n
te
rs
.
T
an
gr
a
19
81
T
an
gr
a
N
ef
to
ch
im
C
om
pa
ny
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
a
n
d
e
x
po
rt
o
f
Sw
itz
er
la
nd
FT
O
C
hi
m
im
po
rt
pl
as
tic
a
n
d
m
e
ta
lp
ro
du
ct
s.
So
fia
-M
its
uk
os
hi
19
82
M
ar
iu
ch
iS
ho
ji
a
n
d
4
FT
O
D
es
ig
n,
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t,
M
its
ub
is
hi
D
ep
t.
St
or
e
2
re
ta
il
ch
ai
ns
m
a
n
u
fa
ct
ur
e,
di
st
ri
bu
tio
n,
an
d
(b
ot
h
Ja
pa
n)
3
m
a
n
u
fa
ct
ur
in
g
co
m
pa
ni
es
ex
po
rt
o
fc
o
n
su
m
er
go
od
s.
Tr
ad
e.
Fu
te
x
Lt
d
19
84
Fu
ku
za
w
a
Ch
em
ic
al
F
T
O
"
Te
ch
ni
ca
"
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
,s
a
le
,a
n
d
ex
po
rt
La
bo
ra
to
ry
(Ja
pa
n)
o
fl
iq
ui
d
fu
el
o
il
ad
di
tiv
es
.
C
hi
m
tr
ad
e
Lt
d
19
84
D
ow
C
he
m
ic
al
Co
.
FT
O
C
hi
m
im
po
rt
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
,
tr
ad
e,
im
po
rt
,
t>l
(U
SA
)
FT
O
Ch
im
ko
m
pl
ec
t
ex
po
rt
,e
n
gi
ne
er
in
g,
m
a
rk
et
in
g
~ ~
fo
r
ph
ar
m
ac
eu
tic
al
in
du
st
rie
s.
I
Sy
st
em
at
ic
s
19
84
H
on
ey
w
el
l
In
c.
(U
SA
)
M
in
is
try
o
fC
he
m
ic
al
E
ng
in
ee
ri
ng
,d
ev
el
op
m
en
t,
a
n
d
~ '"
In
du
st
ry
tr
ad
e
o
fa
u
to
m
at
io
n
co
n
tr
ol
~ ~
sy
st
em
s.
-
. '"
ES
E
19
84
So
rm
el
la
(F
ran
ce
)
El
pr
om
Co
m
po
D
es
ig
n,
en
gi
ne
er
in
g,
de
liv
er
ie
s
~ ~
FT
O
El
ec
tro
im
pl
y
st
ar
t
u
p,
et
c.
,
an
d
sa
le
s
in
th
e
'"
el
ec
tr
ic
al
a
n
d
el
ec
tr
on
ic
~ '"
in
du
st
ri
es
.
~
t>
l
T
ab
le
4.
4.
C
on
tin
ue
d.
;"
Jo
in
tc
o
m
pa
ny
Fo
un
de
d
Fo
re
ig
n
pa
rt
ne
r
B
ul
ga
ri
an
pa
rt
ne
r
Ty
pe
o
fb
us
in
es
s
~
A
PV
-
B
io
in
ve
st
19
85
A
PV
-
Pa
ra
ce
l
In
tI.
B
io
in
ve
st
E
ng
in
ee
ri
ng
a
n
d
co
n
su
lti
ng
~.
(U
K)
En
gi
ne
er
in
g
Co
m
po
in
bi
ot
ec
hn
ol
og
y.
:3
M
ed
ic
om
19
86
To
ky
o
M
ar
iu
ch
i
FT
O
Te
ch
ni
ca
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t,
pr
od
uc
tio
n,
.
Pi
Sy
st
em
s
(Ja
pa
n)
In
st
itu
te
fo
r
Te
ch
ni
ca
l
a
n
d
m
a
rk
et
in
g
o
fm
ed
ic
al
~
Cy
be
rn
et
ic
s
e
qu
ip
m
en
t.
~ ;,
Fe
st
o-
M
ac
hi
ne
x
Fe
st
o
FT
O
M
ac
hi
no
ex
po
er
t
E
ng
in
ee
ri
ng
,d
ev
el
op
m
en
t,
0
19
87
.
<
M
as
ch
in
en
fa
br
ik
In
st
itu
te
fo
r
Co
m
pl
ex
an
d
tr
ad
e.
;...
(A
us
tri
a)
A
ut
om
at
ic
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g
S.
C
om
pa
ni
es
~
M
ed
ab
yk
19
87
By
k
G
ul
de
n
B
ul
ga
ria
n
A
ca
de
m
y
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t
an
d
pr
od
uc
tio
n
.
Pi
(F
RG
)
o
fM
ed
ic
in
e
o
fm
ed
ic
al
pr
od
uc
ts
.
§ Q..
V
W
TM
19
88
V
ol
ks
w
ag
en
AG
(F
RG
)
H
ea
vy
M
ac
hi
ne
B
ui
ld
in
g
T
ra
de
in
a
u
to
m
ob
ile
s
a
n
d
f::
AS
Ba
.
o
th
er
go
od
s.
tl;
j
Bi
m
ax
19
87
H
ol
lis
In
du
st
rie
s
B
ul
ga
ria
n
In
du
st
ria
lA
ss
o.
Tr
ad
e
in
m
ac
hi
ne
ry
an
d
~ -.
(U
K)
Ec
on
om
ic
Ba
nk
eq
ui
pm
en
t;
in
ve
st
m
en
t
'"0
pr
oje
cts
in
B
ul
ga
ri
a
a
n
d
th
e
Oi
th
ird
w
o
rld
.
""W
64 Ea.st-West Joint Ventures
Some joint ventures also perform commercial functions that were
previously obtained from a trade representative of the Western part-
ner. This is the case of Chimtrade, which was set up for production,
technical assistance, engineering, marketing, and trade in the fields
of chemistry and pharmacy. In performing these activities, Chim-
trade applies technical innovations from the American partner, Dow
Chemical.
Other joint ventures perform design work, introduce high tech-
nologies, and carryon wholesale trade and import and export: Sofia-
Mitsukoshi; Medicom Systems; VWTM, ajoint venture between Volk-
swagen and the Heavy Machine Building Association; the Rossa Com-
pany, a recently registered joint venture of Bayer (Federal Republic of
Germany) and Industrialimport FTO, etc. There are joint ventures
with mainly production activities: Futex, Tangra, Fanuk Machinery,
etc. In many cases, however, production activities are combined with
engineering, marketing, design, etc.
The parallel development of different activities (design, engineer-
ing, production, marketing) enables joint ventures to fulfill the goals
of both partners. By means of simultaneous design, engineering, and
marketing, it becomes possible to use Bulgarian machines, equipment,
and know-how (engineers and designers) to organize and equip pro-
duction plants. Thus joint ventures stabilize themselves faster and
start to provide services that are in demand by Bulgarian companies.
This, in turn, contributes to the stabilization of their position in the
domestic market. At the same time, they often gain a position in the
foreign market by using the channels of the Western partner.
To create production facilities and put them into profitable oper-
ation requires considerable time (up to five years on average). There-
fore, the combination of production and other activities accelerates
the development and stabilization of East-West joint ventures.
4.3 Equalizing the Legislative Conditions:
Dynamics of Legislation
Companies located in capitalist or developing countries with Bulgar-
ian investment participation have been legal since the early 1970s.
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In 1980, however, joint ventures with foreign participation located in
the country were permitted by Decree No. 535.2
According to the provisions of this decree, each joint venture is a
part of the Bulgarian economy, but is not subject to regulations valid
for all other Bulgarian socialist business organi2ations. They are not
subject to the rules and regulations applied to socialist property.
Joint ventures are subject to the general regulations only with re-
gard to production and services in the country as well as all problems
related to construction, technical security, environmental protection,
sanitation, fire prevention, statistics, accounting, labor conditions,
etc. These rules apply to everyone in Bulgaria, irrespective of their
origin and type of property.
With the introduction of Decree No. 56 of the State Council of the
People's Republic of Bulgaria3 the first step was taken toward equal-
izing conditions of economic activity for all organizations in the coun-
try. This includes companies having a foreign share or fully owned
by foreign entities. With Decree No. 56, special legislation was cre-
ated for firms, companies with limited and unlimited liabilities, and
companies limited by shares. A month later, regulations were issued
to implement the ordinance. Detailed rules for firms of all kinds were
established. The two legislative acts are the basic documents con-
taining the legislative framework, principles, rights, obligations, and
responsibilities of all companies, including joint ventures. The com-
petent state bodies can issue instructions and rules for each aspect
of joint venture activities.
In order to stimulate foreign investment in the country, the joint
ventures are grouped legislatively into two categories based on the
amount of foreign participation. This is important during the pe-
riod of their establishment and for the specific regulatory state rules
applied to joint venture activities.
The first group contains limited liability companies with more
than a 49 percent foreign share and with more than five million leva
in convertible currency or 50 million transferred rubles invested, as
well as companies limited by shares of more than 20 percent. For
this group, it is necessary to obtain permission from the Ministry of
2Published in the State Gazette No, 25, March 25, 1980.
3Published in the State Gazette No.4, January 13, 1989.
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Economy and Planning and the Ministry of Foreign Economic Rela-
tions, but the economic conditions for their operation are more favor-
able (Article 105 of Decree No. 56). The second group, with smaller
foreign shares, functions according to the economic conditions esta.b-
Iished for all national firms.
The right to work under more favorable conditions can be granted
to joint ventures with less than the above-mentioned foreign partici-
pation by special permission. It is important to stress that the current
legislation contains a legal definition of "foreign person" and "foreign
investment." Foreign persons are those domiciled abroad and foreign
citizens with permanent residence in other countries, as well as Bul-
garians living permanently abroad. Foreign investment is considered
to be all those investments by a foreign person in a branch of indus-
try or an economic area, participation in a company or the right to
movable properties in relation to any business activity.
There is new motivation for foreign persons to invest in high-
technology business defined by the Ministry Council. These invest-
ments enjoy exemption from taxation of their profits. Other tax
reductions are also possible.
In Decree No. 535 of 1980, the joint ventures were not allowed
to build on state-owned land. This right was granted only to the
Bulgarian partner. Today, Decree No. 56 gives joint ventures the
right to construct and the right to use immovable properties during
a certain period of time with the permission of the Ministry Council.
The new legislation protects foreign investments, as did former
legislation. The state ensures equal economic and legal conditions
for business activities of all foreign persons; it is not responsible,
however, for the firms' activities and debts or for state-owned or
other companies' debts. This certainly makes the firms with foreign
investments more independent, but also demands greater responsibil-
ity, particularly from the Bulgarian partner. Legal and naturalized
foreign persons are not allowed to own land, minerals, forests, or
water.
Investments of foreign persons, according to both new and previ-
ous legislation, cannot be subject to confiscation or expropriation by
the state, with one exception: If state or public needs cannot be sat-
isfied by any other means, investments can be confiscated, but must
be paid on the basis of mutual agreement. If agreement cannot be
reached, the amount of payment is subject to the local courts.
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The repatriation of profits received in convertible currencies, pay-
ment for expropriated properties, or liquidation quotas equal to the
amount of the initial share in convertible currency is guaranteed by
law.
Guarantees are also given to foreigners working in joint ventures.
All disagreements that may arise should be solved according to the
provisions of the individual labor contract.
According to the legislation of January 1989, all kinds of com-
panies must to be registered by the court, including joint companies
with foreign investment and fully owned companies. This can be
done on the basis of the foundation act (or agreement), the com-
pany's adopted statutes, and approval where required. Different re-
quirements exist for registering different companies; for example, for
a limited company, 30 percent of the capitalization funds must be
available. Distribution of all shares and the amount of foreign shares
that must be paid, etc. are specified.
The opportunity to have more than 49 percent, but not over
99 percent foreign shares under Decree No. 535, was extended by
Decree No. 56 to permit an unlimited number of foreign shares. In
other words, it is also possible to create fully owned branches and
subsidiaries, acquire shares in national stock companies, etc. The act
provides for trade representations to be opened in the country under
two conditions - permission must be obtained from the competent
bodies and at least 50 percent of the employees must be Bulgarians.
The economic conditions created within the country for joint venture
operations are of great importance. Special attention should be paid
to taxation, fund allocations, prices, supply, labor, and personnel.
Following the policy of Decree No. 56 to encourage foreign invest-
ment in the country, the law sets a different taxation system according
to the size of the foreign share in the two groups mentioned above.
The basic tax on profits is 30 percent in the case of predominant
foreign shares established by the legislation. In all other cases, the
companies (in the second group) are treated like all Bulgarian com-
panies and are subject to a profit tax of 50 percent. Profits from
an independent economic activity are basically taxed at 40 percent,
and the profits resulting from dividends, shares, and author's license
remunerations are taxed at 15 percent. In the case of companies
with foreign participation, dividends are taxed at 10 percent. These
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tax regulations tend to promote joint business activities as well as
companies fully owned by foreigners.
The funds can be freely established, but all companies are obliged
to set R&D funds at a minimum amount as defined by the Council
of Ministers. While giving independence to the firms, the state still
wants, to a certain extent, to ensure the companies' development.
The state policy is supported by possibilities for tax exemption in
cases of high-tech operations (for five years), or exemption from cus-
toms duty on goods imported by foreign persons for the production
of export goods.
The joint venture companies can establish contracts for produc-
tion with the State and the Ministry of Economy and Planning. In
this case, even profit in Bulgarian leva can be repatriated abroad
when transferred into the desired foreign currency according to the
exchange rates of the Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank.
Until the beginning of 1989, Bulgaria was the only CMEA coun-
try to allow more than a 49 percent foreign capital share to establish
a lower profit tax for joint ventures. Decree No. 535 also enabled the
partner to participate fully in the management of all activities. With
this in mind, the dynamics of the process of establishing joint ventures
in Bulgaria should be considered low compared with other Socialist
countries. Two reasons, aside from political considerations, appear to
be the main factors for this. First, more attention is paid by Bulgar-
ian organizations to other forms of industrial cooperation. Coproduc-
tion remains in first place as Bulgaria's favorite form of East-West
cooperation, although with a slight decrease. Western companies in
the Bulgarian market can be considered traditionalists4 because they
have a stable, long-lasting relation to the domestic market and com-
panies. Newcomers in business from abroad lack information on the
rapidly changing legislation. In spite of efforts made to provide in-
formation on this topic, small and medium-sized firms - potential
partners of Bulgarian companies - have not yet been reached.
Simplification of foreign economic relations by Decree No. 56
brings up new possibilities and stimulates different enterprises to
make use of these new opportunities. There is already an obvious
"This was one of the conclusions of the Bulga.rian-German study performed in
1986.
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interest in new forms of cooperation. A few months after the adop-
tion of the recent legislation, a number of contracts were signed and
others are being negotiated.
Analysis of the legislation and its development shows that the
barriers gradually have been removed; this will surely stimulate col-
laboration with Western companies. The mutual benefit of both part-
ners is the main goal of the legislation and the resulting changes in
foreign economic relations. Solutions to all problems acceptable to
both partners are being explored.
4.4 Joint Ventures in Action:
Problems in Creation and Operation
Decree No. 535 created a considerable number of opportunities for
economic cooperation between business organizations of the People's
Republic of Bulgaria and companies from other countries. Joint ven-
tures started to appear, and their number increased gradually during
the period 1986-1988. At the same time, a number of problems
emerged in relation to the preparation, creation, and operation of
joint ventures in Bulgaria.
The following analysis is based on the study of joint ventures es-
tablished under the provisions of Decree No. 535. The main goal of
the study was to identify the problems in administration and daily
business activities that were beyond the scope of legislation. The
analysis is based on questionnaires, interviews, and discussions with
the joint ventures' general directors, staff members, and partner rep-
resentatives as well as with the decision makers from different state
organizations and a reading of company documents. Results of previ-
ous studies on the country's economic relations with Western compa-
nies and partners' comments on joint ventures in Bulgaria also were
taken into consideration. The conclusions summarize and generalize
the current problems and make an attempt to formulate ideas for
possible solutions.
All joint ventures registered by January 1989 were approached
with questionnaires, but four who had just registered were not able
to make any statements concerning the problems of the two groups.
Some refused to fill in the questionnaires but gave interviews. Of the
entire sample, eight joint ventures had been active for more than two
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years and were objects of an in-depth analysis. The operational joint
ventures were distributed by Western countries in the following way:
Japan - 2, USA - 2, UK - 2, FRG - 2, Austria - 1, France - 1,
Switzerland - 1.
4.4.1 Initial problems
Choice of a Partner
In the majority of cases, the Bulgarian enterprises playa passive
role in contrast to Western firms, which are actively searching for
market opportunities and an environment for implementing efficient
business. As a rule, the Western partners in the joint ventures created
in Bulgaria have been present in the Bulgarian market for a long
time and have been maintaining close contacts with Bulgarian foreign
trade organizations (e.g., Tokyo Mariuchi and Dow Chemical).
The right to operate in foreign markets and to perform foreign
economic activities was given to all domestic companies, but their
knowledge and experience in the field are not correspondingly large
and in-depth. Therefore, some Bulgarian partners seem to be slow
and insufficiently competent in the process of negotiating and estab-
lishing joint ventures.
The feasibility studies for joint ventures that were conducted be-
tween Bulgarian and Western companies during this period are based
on incomplete and rather general information, Le., sales of the prod-
ucts to be produced, innovative competitiveness, long-term goals of
the joint venture, etc. The weaknesses and deficiencies in the prepara-
tion of technical and economic appraisals pose the question of whether
there are methodological handbookss and recommendations for the
Bulgarian partners to use when selecting a partner. Such a method-
ology is extremely necessary, especially because of the wider field of
opportunities open today for foreign investment; it would help Bul-
garians to evaluate better the more favorable economic conditions
offered by Western partners in regard to credit terms, capital invest-
ments, provision of materials and components, sales, etc. Consulting
companies, both local and foreign, also can contribute to solving the
problems.
5UNIDO methodology is used in some cases, but is not widespread.
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Establishment of Joint Ventures
The weaknesses in partner selection affect the length of time needed to
prepare and set up joint ventures in Bulgaria. In many cases, foreign
partners were discouraged by the inefficiency of the authorities and
of their Bulgarian counterpart in obtaining permission for economic
activities. Decree No. 56 handles this issue considerably better, as
the Bulgarian partner is now allowed to present the declaration and
to secure permission for joint activities without involving the foreign
partner. Joint ventures with a minority foreign share do not have to
obtain permission.
Apart from this, foreign persons may perform economic activities
alone after receiving permission to do so. The activities for which such
permission is required are specified. Foreign persons also are permit-
ted to establish limited companies and joint-stock companies, to open
branches and subsidiaries, and to perform economic activities inde-
pendently without necessarily registering the firm. This facilitates
the procedure considerably and avoids some of the administrative
difficulties, but the process still lasts longer than might be expected
(several months to one year).
Of great importance in decreasing the duration of this process is
the goodwill participation of the interested state authorities, organi-
zations, and banks that support the preparatory work and evaluate
the economic activities of the projects.
The problems related to the process of negotiating and establish-
ing joint ventures require careful observation and also should be given
maximum assistance. The following suggestions can be made:
• Rapid development of a wider range of consulting companies in
Bulgaria (local, foreign, and joint) to perform feasibility studies,
organize administrative formalities, and assist internal organiza-
tion of joint ventures.
• Assistance in advertising their activities in Bulgaria and abroad
from the Bulgarian Industrial Association, Chamber of Com-
merce, etc. to help newly established joint companies build up
commercial and economic prestige, create and maintain a certain
profile, and increase their popularity in the domestic and inter-
national markets.
• Tighter control of the administrative procedures to reduce
bureaucracy.
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4.4.2 Operational problems
Access to Markets
The main problems in operating a joint venture, according to the
study, stem from the production and market monopoly that still ex-
ists in Bulgaria. This creates many complications in the procurement
and supply of materials, assemblies, and parts from Bulgarian sub-
contractors.
Another main problem is the difficulty in reaching a compromise
agreement fulfilling the interests of the two partners. It is important
for the Bulgarian partner to gain access to the Western markets and
therefore he agrees to terms that will secure his competitiveness and
a corresponding influx of hard currency. The foreign partner's goal
is to increase his share in the domestic market, to reduce some ex-
penditures, and to obtain profit or, in several cases, strategic goals in
positioning himself in the Bulgarian market. Some companies wish
to avoid the higher expenses of maintaining trade representation and
therefore use joint ventures as trade companies.
The conflict in goals can in some cases lead to reduced interest
by the foreign partner, who may become passive regarding the sale of
products to third countries. The expected export of products and ser-
vices (even through the distribution network) may remain unrealized.
Problems arise also concerning access to foreign and domestic
markets for the products produced by the joint ventures. The con-
trol exercised on exports and imports to third countries by the state
authorities sometimes prevents joint ventures from quick stabilization
and free access to the potential markets of other CMEA countries.
Decree No. 56 and regulations for its application will play an
important role in solving these problems. According to these docu-
ments, the foreign physical and juridical persons are offered equal eco-
nomic and legal conditions in performing economic activities. Joint
ventures (and foreign firms in Bulgaria) should perform their activ-
ities bearing in mind the national goals for social and economic de-
velopmentand the impact of market mechanisms. Joint ventures are
given free access to the domestic market and export of goods is free,
with the exception of certain quotas for the import and export of a
limited number of goods and services that are fixed by the Council
of Ministers.
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Goals and Scope of Activities
The analysis has shown the existence very often of another major
problem in the operation of joint ventures: the difference between
the initially fixed goals and field of activity and actual activities and
results. After the majority of joint ventures were established in Bul-
garia, their main goal and tasks gradually recede to the background.
Most of them orient themselves toward engineering and trade ac-
tivities because they quickly generate profits in hard currency and
are less capital-intensive. This is in contrast, however, to the main
idea behind extending the economic cooperation of Bulgaria to the
developed Western countries and firms.
Simultaneous development of production and engineering activ-
ities, or the priority given to the latter, helps to stabilize the joint
venture and its economic status. It also helps to establish its pres-
tige quickly. But a balance of both types of activities is necessary.
Analysis shows that joint ventures become profitable after four to five
years of operation. Even after that period, their contribution to the
economic results of the branches in which they operate and to the
gross national product is far from significant.
Prices and Taxation
The unresolved problem of convertibility of Bulgarian leva is an im-
peding factor. The study finds, however, that inconvertibility is not a
problem at present at the level of the individual joint venture. With
the accumulation of profit, the issue will become more urgent. As to
profits and their taxation and conversion, the situation is unclear to
some extent.
The prices of goods and services bought and sold by the joint
ventures on both domestic and foreign markets are negotiated freely
with the exception of those goods and services for which the Council
of Ministers has fixed price limits.
Starting in 1989, the joint ventures could make transactions in
hard currency with Bulgarian firms and other juridical persons in
Bulgaria. The free zones in Bulgaria are areas where payments can
be made in hard currency by following a certain procedure.
One of the main motives of the Western partner for starting his
own or a joint firm in Bulgaria is connected with the opportunity to
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make a profit. This is especially valid for the medium-sized and small
firms. The foreign partner can make a profit by various means: by
using cheaper labor and free capital, by sharing the risk of business
activities with the Bulgarian partner, by using raw materials and
know-how available in Bulgaria, etc.
Bulgarian legislation guarantees the joint ventures the right to
transfer part of the profits in hard currency and this procedure does
not create problems. Decree No. 56 brought a positive development
in this respect. According to Decree No. 535 (Article 19), the profit
regime for the foreign partner was defined rather generally, and it was
stated that the foreign partner could use rus share of the profits either
in Bulgaria or abroad. In practice, this statement created problems,
as it did not specify the type of currency that could be transferred
abroad. The new decree:
• Clearly and definitely expressed the right of the foreign partner
to transfer all of his share of profits in convertible currency.6
• Provides several opportunities for converting an amount of money
from Bulgarian leva to the currency in which the foreign invest-
ment was made.7
• States the natural right of the foreign partner to convert the
payment obtained for expropriated investment of his liquidation
quota from leva into hard currency up to the amount of his cur-
rency input at the time of liquidation.
One problem that is directly related to the profit regime in joint
ventures is the transfer rate. The ordinance for business activities
states that trus rate will be that at which the Bulgarian National
Bank buys currency from firms and individuals.
The application of a common transfer rate will be economical and
reasonable, bearing in mind the long-term foreign economic relations
of the country; also, it creates better conditions for the operation of
joint and foreign-owned companies.
The legislation does not clarify questions related to the reinvest-
ment of profit by Western participants. The profit tax itselfis reduced
for the joint activities, but the mechanism for determining the profit
is rather complicated and far from the Western idea of profit. Apart
from this, Bulgaria requires that foreign investment be self-financed.
6Decree No. 56 for business activities.
1 Ibid., Article 119 (2).
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Evaluation of the Capital Investment
The problems related to the assessment of the capital in kind are
mainly regarding convertibility, legislation, and methodology. The
authorized fund of joint ventures in Bulgaria has the following
provisions:
I The Bulgarian partner provides the land, premises, equipment,
and cash in leva.
I The Western partner provides, in general, the technology (mainly
in the form of patents, licenses, and know-how, which are subsi-
dized), and hard currency.
According to both previous legislation and Decree No. 56, the
evaluation of the in-kind capital of a Bulgarian partner must be made
in national currency, taking into account prices on the international
market. The evaluation of this foreign share is made by transfer-
ring foreign currency into national currency using the official rates
of the National Bank at the time of signing the contract. Since na-
tional rates are different from those in the West, the evaluation of the
property is performed on the basis of two completely different rates,
which often presents problems. If joint ventures are to be success-
ful, a standard and realistic approach to evaluate initial and further
capital must be guaranteed.
If a competent state authority decides to liquidate a joint venture,
the foreign partner redeems his share in cash and in kind on the basis
of the remaining value of his share at the time of liquidation, provided
that he has fulfilled his obligation to third parties. The problem of
property assessment emerges, together with the problems of currency
exchange and distribution of joint venture funds. If the initial capital
was fixed, it can be transferred back to the country of origin in the
form of hard currency. The problem of additional capital investment
made in the course of operation of the joint venture remains. Such
cases did not exist at the time of this analysis.
4.4.3 Management problems
To become a viable organization, the newly created joint venture
should introduce and develop a common management approach,
methods, and style. Joint ventures are the crossing point not only
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of two cultures (sometimes even more) but also of two economic sys-
tems. Each joint company faces fundamental difficulties in creating
its organizational culture and image. Representatives of two differ-
ent organizations have to work together most of the time. They may
be technically and technologically well prepared but, unfortunately,
without a deep knowledge of each other's business environment. Only
a few of the constituent contracts include provisions for training the
staff, especially management.
The findings are summarized as follows:
• Training and upgrading of personnel to meet standards and norms
accepted in the global economic system is still a problem. Al-
though some joint ventures show positive results in developing
a separate entity and a good management system, the general
picture is far from encouraging.8
• People who work in joint ventures should not only be highly qual-
ified but also multi-functional (because of their limited number).
Present practice puts heavy demands on employees and calls for
adequate salary levels, which should be specified in individual
contracts. Very often, administrative difficulties are created arti-
ficially, with the direct or indirect participation of the Bulgarian
employee.
• Bulgarian managers of joint ventures are ambitious and work hard
for the success of their companies. Joint companies already in
operation are good examples of the transfer of managerial know-
how. The experience of those companies should be studied and
used for management training.
• Consulting activities should be organized and made available to
joint ventures on a larger scale.
• Because accounting procedures and bookkeeping are done differ-
ently than in the West, these procedures are either done twice or
created especially for the company.
Decree No. 56 created a number of provisions to solve some of the
labor problems:
• Labor relations are defined in labor contracts.
8These conclusions about the personnel of some operating joint ventures were
made by Western partners.
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• The parties to labor contracts can agree which part of the salaries
of both foreign and Bulgarian employees will be paid in hard
currency.
• Foreign persons can perform economic activities in the country
and can be employed by foreign and joint companies.
To transfer management know-how and to develop management
in Bulgaria, opportunities are given by the legislation, namely:
• Foreign persons can acquire personal shares and set up joint-stock
companies, thus participating in the firm's management.
• Foreign persons can be elected members of the board of directors
even if they are not employed by the company.
• Foreign persons can be elected chairman of the board and man-
agers of any firm.
These steps will allow a quicker adaptation to the Western style
of corporate management and make it possible for Bulgarian man-
agers to develop experience and accumulate managerial knowledge
and skills. In this connection, business schools have been established
as well as specialized firms and offices for economic, accounting, and
legal support. The Joint Ventures Club of the Bulgarian Chamber of
Commerce also contributes by providing managers with information
and consulting services.
Other problems such as lack of market information, insufficiently
clear relations with local authorities, and the need to define specific
legal regulations of organizational structure in joint ventures were
stressed in the analysis. It was reported, e.g., that the salaries of the
Bulgarian staff do not always reflect the higher demands of joint ven-
ture employment. It is interesting and useful to study the motivation
of employees, both local and foreign,9 in order to assist the manage-
ment of joint ventures in establishing good social relationships.
9Such a pilot study based on methodology developed by a group of Bulgarian
sociologists was carried out in a few Bulgarian and Hungarian joint ventures,

Chapter 5
Joint Ventures Are
Taking Root in
Czechoslovakia
o. Betvrif and E. Vosicky
5.1 Czechoslovak External Economic
Relations and their Possible
Evolution
The present distribution by country of Czechoslovak external eco-
nomic relations dates back to the beginning of the 1980s. At that
time, the West was alarmed by the financial situation of some of the
Socialist and developing countries, and as a consequence tight credit
policies were established. Czechoslovakia opted for a very cautious
credit policy, which allowed it to remain a financially sound coun-
try. A reticence about borrowing large sums reduced the number of
credit-based projects imported from the West. As a result, a ma-
jor shift in the flow of trade occurred, considerably increasing the
share of the CMEA countries in Czechoslovak foreign trade. While
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the share of these countries averaged around 65 percent in the 1970s,
this share increased to around 75 percent ten years later.
The 1980s have also seen a steady decrease in the share of the
developing countries in Czechoslovak foreign trade. Due to the eco-
nomic difficulties of some of Czechoslovaki a's major partners from
the developing countries, this trend will continue to reduce the role
of these countries to a very marginal level unless new incentives are
found.
A clear difference exists between the evolution of trade with the
developing countries and with the Organisation for Economic Coop-
eration and Development (OEeD) countries. While the share of the
former continues to sink, the share of the OECD countries dropped
in the beginning of the 1980s, but has grown moderately since.
The major changes in the overall management of the Czechoslovak
economy resulting from various restructuring processes also have af-
fected external economic relations. These changes can be summarized
as follows:
• The possibility of handling foreign trade exclusively through
specialized foreign trade corporations has been to some extent
abandoned.
• The specialization of these foreign trade corporations is increasing
as many of them create their own trading departments, dealing
with other goods than originally planned.
• A procedure allowing production enterprises to become fully or
partially active and independent in their foreign trade activities
has been established.
• Rules for the negotiation and conclusion of contracts on industrial
or production cooperation have been simplified.
• Incentives to stimulate exports have been improved.
• A law covering the establishment of joint ventures in Czecho-
slovakia came into force on January 1, 1989; the first agreement
calling for mutual promotion and protection of investments was
signed in Belgium in April 1989, serving as a precedent for other
agreements in the future.
At the same time, a dramatic change has occurred in the economic
management of some major Czechoslovak trading partners such as the
USSR, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria. These countries are tackling
their economic reforms in a radical way, uniting the opportunities for
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traditional central coordination of trade with other CMEA countries
and giving a wider degree of independence to production enterprises.
In this new environment a Czechoslovak enterprise must react not
only to local processes, but also to the new situations of a number
of major trading partners. It must develop expertise in doing in-
ternational business, an activity that until recently was reserved for
foreign trade corporations. This expertise involves both marketing
and languages.
An attempt has been made to evaluate the future development
of Czechoslovak external relations. Some of the restructuring pro-
cesses in the Czechoslovak economy could cause a shift of priorities
in the Soviet Union. For example, buyers from the Soviet Union
have been interested in the full range of the Czechoslovak machinery,
equipment, and engineering products. Until recently, the trends and
priorities leaned toward equipment and machines for the production
of consumer goods and foodstuffs. Continuing this way would expose
the Czechoslovak producers to keen competition from Western coun-
tries and would encourage them either to change their product range,
making it similar to that of Western companies, or to search for sub-
stitute markets. The consequence conld be a temporary decrease in
the Soviet share of Czechoslovak foreign trade.
Although the business situation among small CMEA European
countries sometimes appears confusing and unclear, one can assume
that the existing system will allow them to maintain trade at the
present level, with a dynamic increase over the medium term. This
increase will depend on the economic modernization of these countries
and also on their capacity to produce more market-oriented products.
A satisfactory solution to the monetary problems prevailing in the
CMEA would contribute greatly to a new economic take-off.
The growing independence of Czechoslovak enterprises in their
foreign trade activities would speed up remarkably the country's trade
with the neighboring OECD countries - the Federal Republic of Ger-
many (FRG) and Austria. A logical hypothesis is that the Czecho-
slovak newcomers to international trade will mainly speak German
and will know their German and Austrian partners better than oth-
ers. This tendency will be strengthened by the steady and long-
lasting activity of German and Austrian firms in the Czechoslovak
market. These two countries already represent nearly one-half of the
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Czechoslovak OECD trade. We can expect the volume of their trade
with Czechoslovakia to grow in both relative and absolute terms.
They also seem to be prepared to tackle the problem of "global
solutions" with Czechoslovak partners, offering them buy-back deals,
leasing, joint ventures, cooperation contracts - all tailor-made. Con-
tacts between Czechoslovak industries and their German partners
also may ease some of the negative consequences for Czechoslovakia
when a single market is formed in Western Europe.
The role of the OECD countries (specifically France, Italy, Swe-
den, Denmark, Canada, and Japan) remains very active in the
Czechoslovak market and can be expected to increase in the future.
The current trade policy between Czechoslovakia and the USA, re-
sulting from the USA's suspension in 1951 of Czechoslovakia's Most
Favored Nation status, keeps trade at a low level, not exceeding 2
percent of the Czechoslovak trade with OECD countries.
We expect further development of Czechoslovak trade relations
with China. Since 1985, many producers of machines and equip-
ment in Czechoslovakia have been focusing successfully on China.
Assuming their efforts remain steady, we may witness further growth
because both partners complement each other well: Czechoslovakia
produces equipment and China produces a variety of consumer goods
popular on the Czechoslovak market.
Ongoing development in Czechoslovakia, particularly the self-
financing of enterprises, will trigger the selection of sectors where
Czechoslovakia is highly competitive. The limited range of products
produced in the country and increased competition in the remaining
sectors could bring Czechoslovakia into the international division of
labor.
5.2 The Law on Joint Ventures
After a period of experimentation, the Federal Assembly of the CSSR
on November 8, 1988 adopted a law on enterprises with foreign cap-
ital participation, effective January 1, 1989. It provides that joint
enterprises are subject to the following taxes: income (or profit) tax,
social security contribution (known also as a tax on wage volume),
and turnover tax.
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The tax base for joint enterprises consists of the profit derived
from the activities forming the object of the tax. The basic sum
is increased with the amounts paid by the enterprise in the form of
penalties, sanction interest and other sanctions, and the amounts of
increased production costs or decreased yields.
The rate of income tax for joint enterprises is 40 percent. It is
possible to ask the Federal Ministry of Finance for tax relief, which
can mean complete exemption from the tax for a maximum period of
two years. If the tax base does not exceed Kes 100,000, the rate of
income tax is only 20 percent.
The social security contribution reflects labor costs in relation to
technology assessment. The basis of this contribution is the total vol-
ume of wages paid by the enterprise in the current year; the tax rate
is 50 percent. The income or profit tax base is reduced by deduct-
ing this contribution. As with income tax, it is possible to request a
reduction or modification of the base of the social security contribu-
tion for a maximum period of two years. For dividends, the generally
applicable rate in Czechoslovakia is 25 percent.
Czechoslovakia has concluded agreements to avoid double taxa-
tion with a number of countries, which further lowers rates. This
taxation, however, applies to foreign partners only. For Czechoslovak
partners, the dividends are included in profits and are taxed accord-
ingly. A total of 17 bilateral treaties with Western countries have
been concluded so far based on the OECD model treaty.
The law requires that the joint enterprise provide for the following
funds: a reserve fund, a fund of cultural and social needs, and bonus
funds.
Beginning January 1, 1989, another change took place in Czecho-
slovakia: the so-called single-component rate of exchange was in-
troduced, issued by the State Bank of Czechoslovakia in absolute
figures. Until December 31, 1988, only the so-called official rate of
exchange was listed officially, while the rates for commercial and non-
commercial payments (in Czechoslovakia different rates are used) for
internal purposes were determined by means of coefficients.'
1As of January 1, 1989, the respective rates are given directly on the official
list. For instance, in January 1989, the rate {or non-commercial payments was
US$l = Kes 9.39 and the rate for commercial payments was U8$1 = Kes 14.49.
The use of other rates is prohibited.
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Bank credits to joint companies are also possible. The types in-
clude operation, investment, and foreign currency credits. Operation
credit can be granted for working capital, current accounts, and other
short-term assistance. Investment credit serves for purchasing fixed
assets and for bridging time intervals between the need for resources
and the information. Foreign exchange credit is granted by the bank
to enhance both exports and imports. Short-term credits payable
within one year have a 5 percent rate of interest, medium-term credits
payable within three years a 6 percent rate, and long-term investment
credits 7 percent.
The interest rate of foreign exchange credits is based on rates and
conditions of international money markets, the type of currency, and
the repayment period. The bank also can grant credit to pay a share
in a joint enterprise (venture) or to purchase stock. This credit is
payable within five years at 6 percent interest.
Protection against measures limiting property rights is of major
interest to foreign partners. Some states endeavor to increase business
security by proposing to conclude intergovernmental agreements on
investment protection. The first of them was signed with Belgium on
April 24, 1989. The law itself contains important provisions in this
respect.
In those cases when it would become necessary to expropriate or
otherwise limit property rights, the foreign partner must be afforded
compensation corresponding to the actual value of his property at the
time of execution without delay. That is, compensation must be paid
simultaneously with the invocation of the decision to expropriate. It
must be freely transferable to another country in foreign currency.
The prices at which joint enterprises will buy and sell both in
Czechoslovakia and abroad, and the procedure for their formation
represent one ofthe decisive aspects that must be taken into account
during a feasibility study.
The prices of products manufactured in Czechoslovakia or sup-
plied to Czechoslovak buyers are currently uniform throughout the
entire territory of the CSSR.2 An exception in this respect consists
of imported products or products intended for export and products
whose prices are determined by an agreement between seller and
2According to the Order of the Government of the CSSR No. 112/1982 on state
control of prices.
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buyer. The price proposals must be submitted for approval to the
respective authority. The determination of prices at which joint en-
terprises sell to and buy from other countries depend on conditions
of foreign competition.
Under the conditions described above, joint ventures can exist as
joint-stock companies3 and also in the form of an association.'
A supplement to the law is the Decree of the Ministry of Finance
on auditors and their activities, which codifies the procedure for nom-
inating and recalling auditors and their activities in joint ventures.
The provisions were applied for the first time in auditing annual bal-
ance sheets and economic activities of joint ventures for the year
1989.
Regulations differ regarding record-keeping and financing meth-
ods for joint ventures. Except in free trade areas, all accounting is
done in local currency. Observing local regulations is unavoidable
when dealing with financial institutions and banks. Records of capi-
tal assets and operating results should always be available to share-
holders in the West and disclosure cannot be refused. Until uniform
regulations in both systems are achieved, top business executives in
joint ventures must do double accounting to satisfy both parties.
Difficulties in bookkeeping arise because of the different account-
ing procedures used in the Eastern European and Western countries.
The main differences are in accounting for business profits and losses
abroad, in the value of goodwill, stocks and work in process, loans, re-
search and development expenses, and depreciation. While in CMEA
countries the information system must follow the fulfillment of a cen-
tral plan, Western bookkeeping serves as an exact description of the
commercial standing of a corporation to the date of closing the books.
These facts are directly linked with auditing. The auditor states
whether the record-keeping corresponds to generally accepted meth-
ods and whether consolidated accounts have been found true and fair.
The cooperation of the auditors for both parties is useful, particularly
with regard to the correctness of the reported amount of profits and
expectations as to the return of invested capital.
3Codified in Czechoslovakia by Law No. 243/1949 on joint-stock companies.
"Section 625 ff. of Law No. 110/1963 of the Foreign Trade Code. Under this
law, only the association as a legal person (Section 636) can be considered for
joint enterprises.
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The assistance of consultancy agencies is recommended especially
during the establishment stage of an East-West joint venture. Spe-
cialists from large international firms would be able to analyze and
solve almost all aspects and problems mentioned. For medium-sized
and smali enterprises, a consultancy service should be available. This
service must not be considered as belonging to either side, but rather
as an interconnection between both sides in the joint venture and
highly beneficial for potential partners.
5.3 The Process of Establishing Joint
Ventures
The establishment of enterprises with foreign capital participation in
the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic began experimentally in keeping
with the government's decision in 1987 in sophisticated production
sectors (chromatographs and video recorders). Before that, two joint
enterprises were set up with partners from Socialist countries - one for
the processing of waste rock following black coal extraction (founded
in 1983), and the other for research, development, and production of
components for robotics (founded in 1985). A third joint enterprise,
in maritime shipping, was established in 1987 with a partner from
the People's Republic of China.
The drive to launch joint ventures started in earnest in 1988.
Nine ventures involved partners from developed Western countries;
two ventures had partners from CMEA countries. This accelerated
pace continued into 1989. Another 17 joint ventures were set up with
partners from Western countries and two with partners from CMEA
countries. By the middle of 1989, a total of 36 joint ventures existed
in Czechoslovakia, seven of which were with partners from CMEA
countries.
At first, joint ventures were established in industry. Then came
a period of setting up joint ventures in hotel and spa-facilities con-
struction. Recently, both of these categories are well represented.
The present breakdown is as follows: Industry - 1, Tourism - 9,
Health - 3, Construction - 1, Transport - 1, Services - 3.
Most of these joint ventures are small enterprises. This explains
their relatively small influence on the overall trade exchange of the
country. The Enterprises with Foreign Capital Participation Act
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passed in November 1988 has considerably improved the conditions
for entrepreneurial activity and has also simplified the approval pro-
cedure. In turn, this has greatly speeded up the establishment of new
joint venture companies.
This short history of joint ventures in Czechoslovakia does not
permit a thorough analysis of the results of their operations. For the
sake of the future, however, it is necessary to gather and analyze these
results. Draft recommendations are being prepared for operating
joint companies as well as for working out conceptual resolutions.
The partial evaluation of the data that has been gathered may be
generalized, although with a certain risk. Bear in mind that the great
majority of joint ventures in Czechoslovakia are still in a preparatory
stage, not yet in regular operation.
Given these reservations, the following may be stated:
• The key but non-specific cause of the limited development of
joint ventures is a number of obstacles in external economic re-
lations, particularly in exports. These obstacles have been iden-
tified by experts as insufficiently high technical standards, high
production costs, inconvertibility ofthe Czechoslovak currency, or
commercial-political impediments applied to Czechoslovakia and
also affecting the production of joint venture companies.s
• On the other hand, management conditions obviously do not con-
stitute the principal cause of the restraint shown by potential
partners. The safeguarding of foreign investments also was re-
inforced by the Enterprises with Foreign Capital Participation
Act, which clarified the possible transfer of the share of net profit
(dividends). In the case of repatriation of profit earned in local
currency, a new option was introduced on July 1, 1989 with the
launching of the so-called limited foreign currency market as an
experiment in which a joint venture company can participate.
• Despite the publicity given to the possibilities of joint ventures
by the Czechoslovak Chamber of Commerce and Industry, a con-
siderable information gap still exists in foreign entrepreneurial
circles. The practice of issuing lists of offers by parties inter-
ested in setting up joint ventures, already common in some other
5These obstacles may possibly be removed after the current political changes
go into effect.
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countries, has not yet been introduced in Czechoslovakia. Prepa-
rations, however, are under way for the establishment of a Joint
Venture Club.
• Substantial untapped resources for joint ventures still exist in the
national capacities available in basic and applied research as well
as in other intellectual work, notably in the preparation of soft-
ware, the need for which still is not covered worldwide.
• The concept of establishing joint ventures does not always follow
the optimal relationship between basic capital and the amount of
credit. Profitability based on high credit sources will be influenced
by interest payment obligations. Similarly, it appears that the
national resources of the suppliers are not always used. Preference
is sometimes given to deliveries from abroad in cases of investment
construction (new hotels or health facilities).
In contrast to other CMEA countries, Czechoslovakia's bank-
ing services are conventional and banks have refrained from es-
tablishing joint banking institutions locally. The same applies to
the consulting field, including services related to consultations on
joint enterprises.
As far as the human factor in joint entrepreneurial activi ties
is concerned, notably the competence of management in decision
making and in relationships with partner organizations, no nega-
tive signals have been apparent as yet.
• Very little is being done to rationalize management and adminis-
trative activities. Despite this finding, it will be useful to intensify
the systematic training of managers so as to broaden the scope of
joint entrepreneurial activities. Considerable care must be taken
in choosing the curricula and lecturers. It appears that this kind
of training cannot rely exclusively on either national or foreign
sources. Instead, there must be a combination of domestic and
advanced foreign methodology in training.
Under existing Czechoslovak conditions, no preparations have be-
gun to establish free zones where joint ventures can operate as they
do in other countries, including landlocked countries. Despite the
assumption that establishing free economic (duty-free) zones will not
playa decisive role, a re-examination of this issue must be made.
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Some of the established joint ventures have extended the scope of
their activities to other foreign investments. A joint venture in West-
ern countries has a good reciprocal effect in the allocation of capital
and most frequently in the rational division of labor. Multilateral
joint ventures are being set up in Czechoslovakia as well. The incor-
poration of a Czechoslovak supplier into an East-West foreign-based
joint venture provides an opportunity to participate in an entity with
a much larger operational range.
5.4 The Practice of Czechoslovak Joint
Ventures
At the beginning of 1989, 16 joint ventures were operating in Czecho-
slovakia, five of which were East-East joint ventures. Eighty percent
of all joint ventures are companies limited by shares. The rest are
associations (Table 5.1).
The list of joint ventures by sector in Czechoslovakia shows that:
• 25 percent are engaged in machinery and machine tools.
• 13 percent are engaged in chemistry and timber industry.
• 6 percent are engaged in transport.
• 6 percent are engaged in electronics and software.
• 6 percent are engaged in civil engineering.
• 18 percent are engaged in service and trade.
• 13 percent are engaged in health care.
• 13 percent are engaged in other areas.
No joint venture has been established in the consulting and bank-
ing sectors.
Act No. 173/88 on Enterprises with Foreign Property Participa-
tion in Czechoslovakia became effective on January 1, 1989. This law
provides conditions for establishing companies with foreign, legal, or
individual participation. Compared with the former status, many
conditions have been simplified and facilitated. For example, permis-
sion from only one central authority of the State administration is
required to set up a joint venture. Other key provisions:
• An authorization can be granted to any branch of the national
economy (except those sectors related to national defense and
security).
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• No tasks can be imposed on the corporation by the State Plan
for Economic and Social Development.
• The corporation has the right to dispose freely of funds for the
purposes for which they have been created.
• Upon payment of taxes due and allocation of the necessary
amounts into the respective funds, the earnings available may
be distributed among the shareholders.
• The corporations are not obliged to offer their own exchange for
sale to a bank.
• There are no limi tations regarding the share of foreign capital
participation.
• No special nationality is required for the corporation's chairman.
Necessary steps have been taken to clarify significant problems,
such as the material supply of joint venture companies or the system
of price stipulation. On the other hand, self-financing of joint venture
companies is a categorical requirement.
Summarizing this deliberation on the feasibility of joint ventures
in Czechoslovakia, it seems that the necessary conditions have been
established to support the positive development of joint ventures.
This analysis is based on the IIASA questionnaire.6
While evaluating the answers to the questions, bear in mind that
most joint ventures in Czechoslovakia had been established (and reg-
istered), only recently, i.e., in 1988. Only two had been operating
for more than one year. Most were in the beginning stage, shaping
their own entrepreneurial policy and preparing investments and other
initial undertakings.
The distribution of joint ventures among the different branches of
activity is as follows:
Manufacturing
42%
Tourism
Hotels
25%
Medical
care
16.5%
Projects and
engineering
16.5%
Total
100%
610 the first quarter of 1989, all 12 East-West joint ventures in operation on
Czechoslovak territory were approached by the Research Institute of Economy in
Electrotechnical Industries and asked to share their experiences, viewpoints, and
recommendations according to the uniform IIASA questionnaire. In several cases,
the firms were given assistance in filling in the answers. By the given deadline, 66
percent of the questionnaires had been returned.
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The distribution of foreign partners is as follows:
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Austria
52%
Holland
8%
Denmark
16%
FRG
8%
France
8%
UK
8%
Total
100%
Joint ventures established as joint-stock companies predominate.
Only one joint venture was established as a consortium and one as a
limited company.
In all cases the capital share of the Czechoslovak partners is larger,
which is partially due to previous legal stipulations; the law concern-
ing joint ventures with foreign participation permitting a foreign cap-
ital majority has been valid only since the beginning of 1989. The
enterprises are mostly medium sized. The total amount of basic cap-
itallies within the limits of two to 140 million Czechoslovak crowns
(Kes). The ownership participation of Czechoslovak partners in the
joint ventures consists in all cases of invested financial capital and
long-term leasing of buildings or land and, to a smaller extent, pro-
vision of machinery and licenses.
All joint ventures were established for an unlimited duration of
time. This is due to the considerable investment in buildings or tech-
nology and the subsequent possibilities for production innovation,
all factors contributing to long-term entrepreneurial objectives. The
activities within the joint ventures include marketing and technical
pre-production stages (development and also partially research). In
nonmanufacturing activities, no financial or consultancy services are
represented. The Czechoslovak and foreign participants know each
other from previous business activities, mostly foreign trade. Joint
ventures involved in the construction of hotels and spa facilities are
often newly established relations.
In the joint venture turnover that has been seen to date, home
market deliveries are predominant. The size of the share achieved
by exports reflects the fact that the joint ventures are newcomers in
the world markets although they receive the assistance of the foreign
partner.
The products introduced and technology used in the new joint
ventures have, in general, a progressive character. In joint ventures
that have been operating for more than one year, positive results
have been achieved in local currency. Reserves are carried over from
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achieved profit to the next period to be used for further investment
in the company.
The joint ventures employ local manpower in agreement with the
foreign partners. The percentage of administrative staff to the to-
tal number of employees is lower than in national enterprises. (This
comparison is not relevant for joint ventures still in the stage of con-
structing premises.)
The motives for establishing joint ventures are as follows:
(1) The local partners:
• Ensuring new product manufacture with foreign assistance.
• Obtaining freely exchangeable currencies, often to purchase
components and technology.
• Providing capital for construction (particularly hotel and spa
facilities ).
(2) The foreign partners:
• Extending their activities to new markets.
• Obtaining economically more advantageous basic materials
in some cases.
• Utilizing suitable local conditions for developing tourism and
health resorts.
The initiative for negotiations leading to the establishment of a
joint venture cannot be determined precisely; it usually resulted from
previous trade relations.
The establishment of the joint venture is negotiated with the high-
est authority in the given branch, the foreign trade activity licensed
with the Federal Ministry of Foreign Trade. In addition to regis-
tration at the competent local court, the new joint ventures open
accounts with a bank, and in most cases, obtain authorization to
raise credits in foreign currency.
A positive tendency is that usually a number of persons involved
in the preparation continue as executive members of the joint venture.
Consulting agencies usually are not involved until foundation doc-
uments are prepared. The responding companies found that elaborat-
ing a technical-economic analysis, as is customary in Czechoslovakia,
has an important influence on the successful establishment of a joint
venture. The foreign partners devote the same attention to preparing
a feasibility study. Market studies, performed by both sides in their
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respective regions, serve a decisive basis for both analyses. The other
segments of the approval process are considered less important.
The firm's standing is the most important criterion for choosing
a partner. In itself, standing is the result of a number offactors, such
as the production program or staff qualifications. Priority is given to
modern technology in manufacturing organizations, based on licenses
and know-how, and to products.
Specific factors that favor the establishment of joint ventures exist
in Czechoslovakia. First is the highly qualified manpower in manufac-
turing, research and development, designing and engineering services.
Second is the planning system and material supply structure, which
can sometimes affect the delivery of materials and parts, often forc-
ing the participants to adopt individual solutions, e.g., joint ventures.
It is necessary to consider the important and complicated issues of
currency convertibility. These call for special solutions when import
reqnirements are not covered by adequate exports.
The initial stages of preparing to establish a joint venture have
been gradually shortened. The Law of Enterprises with Foreign
Ownership Participation considerably simplifies administrative pro-
cedures. Applications are approved currently within three months.
In setting prices, the joint ventures foresee no important obstacle.
The method of price setting is not regulated in foreign trade; prices
always are agreed upon under contract. For setting prices on the
domestic market, a gradual rationalization is now envisaged. Foreign
trade monopoly does not seem to be a major problem. Monopoly
can be avoided by issuing authorizations for foreign trade activities.
The prescriplion of planned delivery tasks has been abolished by law.
Responding companies expressed certain apprehensions about provi-
sions during the transitional period, when there is a tendency to limit
the budgeting system before applying a full free supply mechanism
on the basis of actual demand.
The joint ventures' view is that a technically and economically
competitive product only can be produced through the application
of modern technology. This appears to be a decisive element for
the success of joint ventures. Increased profits only can be achieved
through modern technology and good market position.
In identifying potential problems, the economic issues associated
with realizing entrepreneurial objectives are cited. Problems of an ad-
ministrative nature are considered less important. From the technical
96 East-West Joint Ventures
point of view, the problem of ensuring first-class quality consistently
ranks first. Such personnel issues as remuneration and management
style, effectiveness, and culture are regarded as important but less
problematic.
Among environmental uncertainties, the responding companies
stress increasingly changeable consumer preferences and the difficulty
of predicting them accurately. In manufacturing, the influence of
competition is also important; this aspect does not apply, however,
to joint ventures operating in the field of tourism and spa facilities.
In most cases, the management structure of the joint ventures has
a standard form typical for joint-stock companies. The joint ventures
mention no particular problem in relations between managers of dif-
ferent nationalities. The executive jobs are held by local specialists
with the agreement of the foreign partners.
Decisions on strategic issues must be taken unanimously. In some
instances, special consulting groups (policy committees) are used.
The responding companies mentioned some isolated factors as being
risky, e.g., to adapt to changing foreign technical standards and to
provide supplies, both local and imported ones.
In analyzing the advantages of joint ventures compared with tra-
ditional foreign economic relations, foreign capital investment is dom-
inant. The main feature of the integration formalized by establishing
an independent organization (joint venture) is the rational manage-
ment system of the enterprise, which could never be provided to such
a degree by other forms of industrial cooperation.
The short period of practice has shown that joint ventures bring
an improvement in management procedures, including the application
of new methods. This is considered to be a second important benefit
from the development of joint ventures.
Chapter 6
Hungary: Pioneer
Joint Ventures
T. Benedek
•In
6.1 National Economy and the Reform
After World War II, an autocratic strategy was introduced in Hun-
gary that led to a very weak economic structure:
• Traditional Hungarian agriculture was nearly destroyed by forced
methods of collective activity.
• Ineffective new industries were created, while traditional indus-
tries stagnated.
• Heavy industry without a basis in basic domestic materials and
traditions was overdeveloped.
Finally, the country itself was burdened with an unhealthy indus-
trial capacity, greater in some fields than what the domestic market
required. A more serious problem was that general product quality
was not high enough to compete in Western markets. This remains
one of the main problems of the Hungarian economy. Production
requires a great quantity of Western materials, spare parts, machines
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Table 6.1.
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Hungarian foreign trade partners.
Foreign trade 1987
Thousand million Ft
Imports Exports
Percentage
Imports Exports
242 247
191 165
30 38
463 450
CMEA countries
Developed countries
Developing countries
Total
Of which:
Ruble account
Dollar account
210
253
214
236
52
41
7
100
45
55
55
37
8
100
48
52
and know-how, and this situation has led automatically to problems
with the balance of payments.
Industry is the main active earner in Hungary with a 31.2 percent
share of gross domestic product (GDP). The second branch is agri-
culture (19.3 percent), followed by services (12.5 percent), trade (10.5
percent), construction (7.6 percent), and transport (6.8 percent). For
the last 5 years, the GDP has increased on average by 1 percent to
1.5 percent per year, and the increase in the national income has been
slightly less.
Foreign trade and international economic relations have played a
very important role in the life of Hungary. The main partners and
the quantity of foreign trade are shown in Table 6.1. The net debt of
the country is currently about US$ll billion.
Economic and political reforms began in 1974. The tasks were
enormous, and included solving many economic problems such as:
• Handling the balance of payments and the debt problem.
• Changing the unhealthy structure of the economy.
• Opening trade to Europe.
• Changing old-fashioned methods of direction and management.
• Aiding the privatization process.
• Strengthening East-West cooperation in all fields.
• Solving unemployment and raising the standard of Ii ving.
• Solving problems which arose as a parallel effect of the reform.
These are the main problems that have to be solved in Hungary
within the next decade.
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6.2 The Effect of Legislation on the
Establishment and Operation of
Joint Ventures (1970-1989)1
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The law-decree concerning trade companies was passed on August
7, 1970, and was offered in accordance with a new economic mecha-
nism introduced in 1968. During the economic boom of the following
years, it first became legally possible for foreigners to participate in
Hungarian economic ventures. This possibility, however, existed only
theoretically because the competent authority had unlimited discre-
tional powers regarding approvals. This meant that the legal basis for
establishing such companies had to be approved by the authorities.
A significant step was the decree of the Minister of Finance at
the end of 1972, regarding "economic companies operating with the
participation offoreign entities, and containing a more detailed regu-
lation concerning the operation of such ventures." According to this
decree, such economic ventures may be established in the form of an
unlimited partnership, joint-stock company, company with limited
liability, or joint company.
The share of the foreign partner(s), in general, could not exceed
49 percent. Although the possibility of a foreign share majority was
not excluded, the first instance of such occurred only in 1979, when
the Central European International Bank was established as an "off-
shore bank."
An important element of the regulation was the guarantee of the
National Bank of Hungary to allow profits due to the foreign party
to be transferred in convertible currency and, upon request, to reim-
burse any loss suffered by the foreign party as a result of government
measures in convertible currency up to the amount contributed by
the foreign party to the joint venture.
After five years, the government authorities extended the possi-
bility of establishing joint companies in production fields. In 1977,
the Minister of Finance modified the regulation regarding trade asso-
ciations operating with foreign participation and declared that, with
the permission of the Minister of Finance, associations may be es-
tablished that offer trade and service activities aimed at economic
development at the technical and commercial level.
IThis section is based on the study of Ferenc Revsanyi, IGI t 1989.
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The decree was an important change in taxation: the extent of
tax on profit was determined uniformly at 40 percent. It also declared
that no other tax or tax-like fees would be imposed besides the profit
tax. Another clause states that the Minister may grant the company
a more favorable tax rate than the one foreseen by the decree.
In 1978, the Minister of Finance issued two qecrees concerning
trade partnerships involving foreign participation. One of them made
it possible to establish mixed companies in the form of deposit com-
panies. The other decree regulated the former profit tax, currently
called "company tax." The rate was left unchanged at 40 percent.
An additional tax, "extra company tax," covers commissions, prizes,
attendance fees, and honorary fees as well as lump-sum grants, un-
documented confidential expenses, and the costs of a company car
for personal use. The rate of this tax was 20 percent until the end of
1988.
An order issued by the Minister of Finance in June 1979 described
the formalities to be observed by the Hungarian party in obtaining
permission to participate in a joint venture. This procedure involved
three phases:
• Declaration of intent to found the company must be filed with
the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Foreign Trade prior
to preparatory negotiations.
• Upon approval, an application for a permit to commence negoti-
ations must be filed.
• Finally, application (in ten copies) must be made for approval of
the agreement that is to govern the joint venture.
The last-mentioned application (in original language and in trans-
lation) had to be accompanied by the contracts, agreements, minutes
of meetings, and other documents (statutes, associations, agreement,
agenda, etc.) that regulated the founding, internal order, and oper-
ating conditions as well as the rights and commitments towards the
company and towards each other if not regulated in these documents.
These procedures, taken together, explain why the approval process
lasted six months to one year for each joint company.
Among other requirements, the regulation also committed the
company to establish a risk fund to disburse tax and social security
fees upon the wages and salaries (35 percent at that time and 43
percent in 1989).
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Until 1982, a total of 12 joint companies were set up with only two
or three of major importance: SICONTACT (see Chapter 12), Cen-
tral European International Bank Ltd (acting as an off-shore bank),
and a pharmaceutical plant jointly owned with Ciba-Geigy, Switzer-
land.
A joint decree of the Minister of Finance and the Ministry of For-
eign Trade issued in 1982 represented a step forward. It regulated
joint undertakings established in customs-free port areas. The de-
cree exempted the parties from a number of bureaucratic regulations
concerning:
• Company revenue.
• Wages and salaries.
• Prices.
• Investment process.
• Government control, company and interior supervision.
• Establishment of various funds and allocations (except the risk
fund), the extent and methods of handling the company funds.
• Purchase and use of motor vehicles.
Goods brought into the country from the free port are considered
as goods imported from abroad, Le., as hard-currency imports subject
to extremely high customs duty, particularly for products of the latest
technological level.
During the first half of 1980, partly as a result of more intense pub-
licity, the number of joint companies increased but both the number
(annual average: 10) and the foreign investment of operative funds
remained far below expectations. Two fields required radical changes:
permits and taxation. This was recognized by the government, and
considerable changes were effected by the end of 1985.
The requirement for license application was suspended. There
remained only the obligation to declare that, in the course of pre-
liminary talks, the parties have reached a conceptual agreement to
establish their association in Hungary. The simplified approval pro-
cess reduced the duration of the process from six months to a year
to between two and three months.
The other important measure concerned taxation. If the com-
pany's activity was of particular importance to the Hungarian econ-
omy, the joint company could be fully exempted from taxation for the
102 East-West Joint Ventures
first five years and, from the sixth year, the rate could be set at 20
percent. The sphere of such important activities was defined jointly
by the Planning Office of the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry
of Foreign Trade. These fields were electronics, packing technologies,
pharmaceutical products, and tourism.
The regulation covered mixed companies in such nonpriority ac-
tivities as direct production and hotel operation. It declared that if
the companies were prepared to use their tax-net profit for invest-
ments and
• The amount of such investment attained 50 percent of the pre-
ceding year(s) (maximum period of five years) but not less than
Ft 5 million, 50 percent of the paid-in company tax would be
reimbursed upon request; or
• The investment attained 100 percent of the tax-net profit of the
preceding years but not less than Ft 10 million, 75 percent of the
paid-in company tax would be returned upon request.
The simplified procedure of obtaining license and taxation priv-
ileges went into effect on January 1, 1986. These measures accel-
erated considerably the influx of foreign capital and correspondingly
increased the number of joint companies. Through 1985, a total of 45
joint companies had been established with foreign funds amounting
to US$50 million. From 1986 to the end of 1988, another 200 joint
companies were founded with an additional US$250 million foreign-
authorized funds.
A decree of the Minister of Finance concerned the first line joint
companies: setting Ft 500,000 as basic capital for limited compa-
nies and defining the minimum basic deposit as Ft 100,000 and Ft 5
million with a minimum share extent of Ft 100,000 for joint-stock
companies.
Another significant measure was the regulation issued in 1987
by the Minister of Trade with regard to the administrative order of
foreign trade activities; it became effective on January 1, 1988. An
interesting feature of this regulation is the extension of the right of
foreign trade activities to the private sector, declaring (under Section
8) that private persons and their companies are entitled to pursue
trade activities. After having obtained permission from the Ministry,
they may sell their own products and/or services to foreign markets.
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This liberalization of foreign trade activities refers to hard-currency
regulations only.
By the end of 1988, the above regulation resulted in approxi-
mately 200 private persons and over a thousand trade organizations
obtaining the right to pursue independent export/import activities, a
significant increase since the beginning of the 1980s when the number
had been no more than 30-40.
One of the most important laws enacted in the past 40 years is the
Act VI/1988 concerning trade companies, which opened up important
new possibilities to promote foreign investments in Hungary. The
law covers partnership relations established between Hungarian legal
and natural entities (Hungarian citizens), with the participation of
foreigners or foreigners alone for trade and economic activities or
their promotion. Consequently, foreign parties may own 100 percent
of such trade companies, including the means of production, Le., real
estate or mobile assets.
It is important to make clear to the foreign parties that they
can participate in the founding or be members of such companies
only if they are already owners of a company or are respectively
registered as a company in their own country in accordance with the
prevailing legal regulations. Any foreign, natural, or legal entity may
be a shareholder of the company established in Hungary.
If the share of the foreign partner is less than 50 percent, no
special permission is required, not even that of the foreign exchange
authority. A company contract signed by a lawyer and the registra-
tion of this contract signed by the Court of Registration are sufficient
to establish the company.
The law declares that the share of a company's profit due to the
foreign party or, in case the company ceases to exist or the foreign
share becomes partly or entirely alienated, the amount due to the
foreign party may, upon its disposal, be remitted in the invested
currency and out of the funds at the company's disposal without
special permission from the foreign exchange authorities.
The main new possibilities offered to foreign investors by the new
company law are: investments, 100 percent foreign possession, ac-
quisition of real estate, establishment of partnership with Hungarian
natural entities and, in case of less than 50 percent participation,
establishment by court registration only.
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The government decree set up an operating committee to coordi-
nate and accelerate the governmental tasks involved in establishing
trade organizations with foreign participation. One of the deputy
prime ministers acts as chairman of the committee and the members
are the Minister of Trade, the Minister of Finance, and the Presi-
dent of the National Bank of Hungary. The President (Chairman) of
the Cabinet Bureau appoints deputy ministers as members who can
substitute for the committee chairman. The important tasks of the
committee are to coordinate the work of all government organizations
involved and to arrange and/or initiate the elimination of obstacles
to trade development.
Act IX (Section 14) of 1988 defines the tax privileges to be applied
as follows:
(1) If the foreign share in the statutory funds attains 20 percent or
Ft 5 million, a 20 percent tax on profits is imposed.
(2) If more than half of the price returns arise from the output of
products or from operating a company-built hotel and ifstatutory-
comprising funds exceed Ft 25 million comprising a foreign share
of 30 percent, a 60 percent tax reduction is granted for the first
five years and 40 percent from the sixth year onwards.
(3) Finally, if the stipulation under (2) is complied with and the com-
pany pursues an activity of particular importance, a 100 percent
tax exemption is granted for the first five years, and from the sixth
year a 40 percent tax reduction is granted, i.e., can be retained
from the tax imposed.
Fourteen activities of particular importance are listed by the
legislation, including: electronics, manufacturing of vehicle com-
ponents; machine tools; machineries for agriculture, food industry,
and forestry; manufacturing of machine elements; packing/wrapping;
telecommunication services; tourism; and biotechnology.
A decree issued by the Ministry of Finance concerning modifica-
tions in the law regarding planned foreign exchange policy is part
of an effort to update regulations in this field. This decree makes
the exchange affairs of foreign investors in Hungary less complicated.
It declares that no permission from the foreign exchange authori-
ties is required for the foreign party to take or send his shares out
of the country, provided the joint-stock company confirms that the
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foreign party obtained such shares in accordance with the pertinent
regulations.
The company can keep the hard-currency contribution of a foreign
member of the joint-stock company as part of its original foreign
exchange being held by a Hungarian bank. It can use such funds
to procure means of production or permanent stock items without
obtaining special permission from the foreign exchange authorities.
Law XI of 1988 concerning central funds for technological de-
velopment was effective on January 1, 1989. The act declares that
a central fund for technological development must be established to
serve as a financial source for realizing the government's development
policy. This is a commitment that refers to the trade companies, in-
cluding those with foreign participation. Such companies must also
contribute under this heading to the central funds. The rate of con-
tribution is 4.5 percent of the base for profit taxation of the preceding
year.
The last act pertaining to joint companies is Act No. XXIV of
1988, which concerns the investments of foreign parties in Hungary.
Actually, this act can be considered the code of investments because
it summarizes all the important elements of earlier legal regulations
in this field and offers a clear survey to foreigners who wish to in-
vest in Hungary. This act refers to investors of highly developed
and developing countries alike, and also to investors from the CMEA
countries.
The regulations concerning influx offoreign operating capital have
been liberalized and provide for trade companies involving foreign
funds, conditions that compare favorably with internationally offered
solutions. A number of other regulations currently in preparation
deal with such questions as changing state-owned enterprises and
cooperatives into trade companies, and setting up and establishing
the statutes of a stock exchange.
All these endeavors stem from the understanding that the struc-
tural changes in the economy and the increase of exports will neces-
sitate the efficient production, trade and service activities of compa-
nies engaged in foreign participation. Intensifying participation in
the international division of labor and attaining international levels
of production technology make these concepts of immediate concern.
The figures reflecting the development of joint companies speak
for themselves. Between 1972 and 1985, their number totaled 50
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with foreign investments amounting to US$50 million. From 1986 to
the present, 250 permits have been issued, totaling US$250 million,
and most of these companies already have been launched. Among
the joint companies, 65 percent are engaged in the field of machine
building, food, textile and synthetic industries; 30 percent offer ser-
vices (software, tourism, etc.); 3 percent are engaged in trade; and
2 percent in financing. The list includes a number of small and
medium-sized concerns, but also several worldwide organizations of
high renown.
The increasing amounts of foreign investments in joint compa-
nies constitute another important feature. In this respect, the two
agreements signed in November 1988 with South Korean parties are
of paramount importance. Signed by the Hungarian Credit Bank (a
joint-stock company) and the Daewoo Concern, one acts as a bank-
ing house under the name Investment Trade (with a statutory fund of
US$100 million), and the other purchases and operates hotels under
the name Szent Istvan (St Stephen) Hotels with funds of US$90 mil-
lion. In both arrangements, the parties are each 50 percent owners.
In June 1988, the contracting parties signed the founding docu-
ment of the DUNAMANI Polistyrol Factory Ltd, a joint company
involving the largest investment volume in Hungary to date. This
is an Italian-Hungarian company in which the investment of the In-
ternational Financial Corporation (IFC) amounts to US$34 million.
The foreign shareholders in the joint company, representing a total
investment of US$73 million, are Montedison and IFC. IFC, playing
an important part in this sphere, has participated in four undertak-
ings with approximately US$12 million in funds and more than US$53
million in financing.2
Generally, most of the foreign capital so far has been invested
in the following fields: banking (financing), hotel construction and
operation, polystyrol production, float glass, computing peripherals,
robot production, glass-cotton insulation material, plywood, chip-
board, concrete roof tiles and other roof elements, textile printing,
telecommunication products (color TV, videotape, etc.), production
and assembling.
2By the end of October 1989, the number of registered joint ventures in Hun-
gary had reached a.pproximately 700. The total invested capital is calculated to
be around USS800 million, 48 percent of which represents foreign share. (Source:
IIASA MTC data base.)
T. Benedek
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Countries with joint ventures in Hungary.
At the end of 1988, there were 282 joint venture companies in Hun-
gary. All of them were licensed by the Ministry of Trade. The new
law (Act XXIV of 1988) that eliminated the requirement to apply for
a license if the foreign share is less than 50 percent became effective
on January 1, 1988. More than 25 countries are represented in these
282 companies (Table 6.2).
Table 6.2.
Country
Austria
FRG
Switzerland
USA
Sweden
Holland
Italy
Great Britain
USSR
Finland
Denmark
South Korea
Liechtenstein
Luxembourg
Number of
joint ventures
77
62
26
20
15
II
10
10
4
3
3
2
2
2
Country
Greece
Japan
France
Canada
Norway
Portugal
India
Belgium
Cyprus
Spain
Australia
Anonymous
Mixed
Number of
joint ventures
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
I
2
17
The total capital of these 282 companies is Ft 38,111,320,000
or about US$635,189,000. The foreign share of this capital is
Ft 17,361,530,000 or about US$289,359,000. This means that the
average participation is 45.55 percent. The average capital is
Ft 137,586,000 or approximately US$2,293,000 (Table 6.3).
The process of establishing joint ventures developed rapidly in
recent years. In 1988 alone, the number of joint venture companies
doubled; in the first four months of 1989, over 300 new joint ven-
tures were established. The first joint venture company in Hungary
VOLCOM with the Swedish company Volvo, was established in 1974.
The most successful joint venture to date, SICONTACT KFT, was
founded in the same year (Table 6.4).
3The profile concerns only those joint ventures a.nalyzed within this study.
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Table 6.3. Distribution of capital.
East-West Joint Ventures
Number of
joint ventures
15
41
36
91
23
71
5
Amount of capital
over Ft 500 million
Ft 100-500 million
Ft 50-99 million
Ft 20-49.9 million
Ft 10-19.9 million
below Ft 10 million
unknown
(over US$8.5 million)
(US$1.6-8.49 million)
(US$850,000-1.59 million)
(US$333,000-849,000)
(US$160,000-332,999)
(below US$160,000)
Table 6.4. Growth of joint ventures from 1974-1988.
Number of Number of
Year joint ventures Year joint ventures
1974 2 1983 8
1975 1 1984 12
1979 1 1985 16
1980 2 1986 22
1981 1 1987 57
1982 6 1988 155
The joint venture companies cover a wide range of activities in
the Hungarian economy. There are 48 joint ventures in the machine
building industry, two of them dealing with metallurgy. Sixteen joint
ventures are in high technology or computer businesses. Light indus-
try includes 35, of which 15 are in textiles and clothing. Two com-
panies, Adidas and Levi's, not only have factories but also specialty
shops in Budapest. Twenty-five companies belong to the chemical in-
dustry, and another 25 to the agriculture and food industry. There are
19 joint venture companies producing construction materials. These
companies offer planning and other services in the construction busi-
ness. Sixteen specialized companies deal with packaging, and nine
with construction. The service sector has nine joint ventures, six of
which produce industrial services. The hotel and tourism industry
is also an attractive sphere, with 18 joint ventures. New areas are
auditing with nine and consulting with 24 joint venture companies.
There are eight banks and financial institutions. Transportation has
five and special trading companies number six. One is specialized in
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R&D activity and one in energy. The activity of six joint ventures is
unknown.
6.4 Current Problems of Joint Ventures
in Hungary
Expectations
Joint ventures are the most sophisticated level of international busi-
ness relations. It is said that simple export-import activity is followed
by the hiring of manpower and then by international cooperation.
The joint venture, as a form of international economic or business
relations, can integrate all other forms, but it is much more impor-
tant and interesting as an organizational system. It is not only a
development of quality but a change of quality as well.
Tills fact itself would be enough to underline the importance of
joint ventures, but there are many other national arguments for joint
ventures. Practical economic and governmental demands and expec-
tations have been growing in Hungary during the recent period.
With the help of new laws the number of such companies should
multiply and help the entire economy directly and indirectly. The
initial governmental idea was to use the joint ventures to solve the
balance of payments problem: If moving capital would come into
the country, the shortage of hard currency to finance research and
development activities could be partially alleviated. It also was esti-
mated that this process would allow the government to maintain the
standard of living and to pump additional money into the economy.
The second expectation was that, with the help of newly established
joint ventures, advanced technology and techniques would come into
the country and, with the help of foreign entrepreneurs, would be
adopted within a shorter period of time. Tillrdly, it was expected
that the permanent problem of economic and industrial restructur-
ing would be solved or at least the main directions established with
the help of new joint ventures.
The next intention was to give direct help to the budget. The
main factor in the balance of payments is the trade balance. If the
new joint ventures could increase export activities, the result could
be a better trade balance.
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The fifth expectation was to establish and disseminate advanced
methods of management, data processing, computer techniques, mar-
keting, and software. Within this frame, there could be two varia-
tions. One could be the effect of the new joint venture companies
developing a good and vital relationslUp with the mother company.
The other could be a specialized joint venture company selling con-
sulting services to the Hungarian market.
The sixth expectation was to improve the marketing management
of Hungarian companies abroad.· With the help of joint ventures, the
domestic companies could find a better way to learn about interna-
tional markets and to establish relations to create organizations.
Only a few of these expectations have been realized. With the help
of a better economic and legal background, however, we think that
the advantages listed above will be realized and perhaps additional
ones as well.
The Problems We are Facing
The periodical International Management regularly publishes an ad-
vertisement about Singapore. It lists the important factors in ven-
turing:
(1) World's top airport (rated by business travelers) and busiest sea-
port.
(2) World's best workers, rated for attitude, productivity, and tech-
nical skills eight years in a row.
(3) Multilingual capabilities making Singapore an ideal gateway to
the rest of Asia.
(4) Modern and reliable telecommunication services at competitive
rates.
(5) Free enterprise policy with freedom for business ownerslUp and
repatriation of profits.
(6) Well-developed supporting industry with wide range of competi-
tively priced quality parts and services.
(7) Ready-built factories, fully-serviced industrial parks, and modern
office space, enabling a quick start-up.
(8) Wide range of competitive financing available from 280 leading
financial institutions.
(9) Safe, modern cosmopolitan city offering excellent living conditions
for foreign expatriates.
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All these factors raise the question, "Is this why over 3,000 global
companies have chosen Singapore?" If this is the international stan-
dard, it is difficult to rate Hungary as an attractive country for mov-
ing capital. Hungary is not able to offer most of these facilities to its
partners. We have attempted to get a picture about the demand from
some foreign businessmen through personal interviews. We asked
them about the estimated advantages and disadvantages of the Hun-
garian economy (market) in supporting joint venture activities.
Market expansion was mentioned most frequently by the foreign
entrepreneurs as a reason for coming to Hungary. They meant not
only the small Hungarian market but also the possibility of exporting
to other CMEA countries, primarily the Soviet Union. Hungary is
seen as a possible bridge between East and West. Its location is also
a positive factor that was mentioned especially by Austrian and West
German businessmen.
Low-priced manpower. Wages are relatively low in Hungary and
this implies low-priced manpower. Labor costs are one of the most
important questions when a company is considering an investment.
Although the Boston Consulting Group mentioned in a study that
the "low-priced manpower in Hungary is only a myth, and we must
forget about it," this statement cannot be substantiated without first
investigating actual productivity under a related business structure
and company organization. We collected nine important factors to
be examined when a foreign person is considering investing capital
abroad. Hungary's standing according to these nine criteria is out-
lined below.
(1) Product knowledge: Highly advanced products are mostly un-
known and product knowledge is very often not sufficient. Knowl-
edge of the entire business sphere is also necessary (competition,
technology, demand, market situation, raw materials, etc.).
(2) Market knowledge: The company must know the existing demand
in its market. Without this, the company and its managers will
not be able to build a minimal level of trust with its Western
partners. Without trust, cooperation is impossible.
(3) Professional knowledge: The level of technical skills and techni-
cal professional knowledge in Hungary is not bad. Sometimes
the operation or preparation of a project is not worked out on
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an advanced level, which may give a worse impression than the
situation really merits.
(4) Organization of meetings and discussions: Anyone can lose an
opportunity if he/she is not able to organize or chair a meeting.
This is one of the main weaknesses of Hungarian managers.
(5) Organization: Most Hungarian companies are over-organized. Ex-
ternal bureaucracy will be enough to deal with, so internal bu-
reaucracy should be kept to a minimum.
(6) Flexible and fast decision-making process: If a company is over-
organized, the decision-making process may be slow and bureau-
cratic. This is a sensitive area to Western partners. Who makes
a decision? When? How is it presented? We must answer these
questions if we want to encourage more joint ventures in Hungary.
(7) Keeping the terms of an agreement: Without keeping these terms,
a firm is out of the competition. Correct behavior in personal
contacts is as important as the terms of delivery.
(8) Realization of contracts: Reliability is the most important factor
in business relations. It is very difficult to achieve and very easy
to lose. In normal competitive circumstances, no one can ignore
or forget written or verbal agreements.
(9) Productivity and performance: Competitors always try to propose
something better: better quality, better price, better package, etc.
To be better depends on the most important element of compet-
itiveness: productivity and work performance. Without better
performance, long-term profitable results cannot be assured.
Some Weaknesses of Hungarian Enterprises
In this study, we have tried first to compare Hungarian companies
and their economic conditions with the main competitors such as
Portugal, Turkey, Greece, and some economies in the Far East. The
main negative characteristics are as follows:
Govemment guarantees: We are not able to offer the same guarantees
as our competitors.
Free market situation and free competition: The monopolistic situa-
tion is still strong.
Balance of payments aspect: The currency/market is not convertible.
Old products, old-fashioned methods: There are difficulties in adapt-
ing to new ideas.
Difficulties in Western import and Eastern export: It is not easy to
obtain licenses.
Shortage of capital: The interest is to remain poor and small.
Difficulties in bookkeeping and accounting: Differences exist in bal-
ance and calculations.
Most of the existing joint venture companies can be described and
compared with traditional firms through the following differences:
• Dealing with customers.
• Work discipline.
• Business organization.
• Human-oriented management.
• Internal and external contacts.
• Small and fiexi ble.
Wages are definitely higher in joint venture companies. The av-
erage difference is about 40 percent to 50 percent, but we find cases
ranging between 10 percent and 20 percent. The salary of blue collar
workers is higher by 50 percent to 70 percent in a new joint venture
company. The salaries of managers depend strongly on the results of
the firm and the difference can be much higher. The other important
factor when comparing new joint venture companies with traditional
national firms is the speed of reaction time. Letters and telephone
calls are answered within three days; offers and pre-contracts are
prepared in half the time it would take a traditional Hungarian firm.
We deeply hope that the cases of joint ventures in Hungary and
elsewhere in the world can help to build stronger relationships among
nations, cultures, and people. Mark Palmer, US Ambassador to Hun-
gary, was interviewed by Newsweek's Michael Meyer in April 1989.
After listing several US companies that were doing business in
Hungary, the Ambassador said that the West plays a critical role in
reinforcing East Europe's reformers.
If we simply lend more money, we will actually hurt them by remov-
ing the impetus for reform. I would like to get the American media
involved, perhaps by helping to set up an independent newspaper,
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radio or television station. The great danger in East Europe is not
explosion but stagnation. People in these countries are not going
to tolerate falling further and further behind the rest of the world.
[Newsweek, April 3, 1989]
6.5 Conclusions
In summarizing the main problems of joint ventures in Hungary, three
groups of difficulties must be considered. They are closely followed
by the different stages in a joint venture development, as follows:
• Problems of establishing the joint venture (including legislation).
• Problems of connecting the partners.
• Problems of operating within the new economical circumstances.
Without the first step, we are not able to deal with the problem
of the second, and we must consider the second step to be able to
understand the third.
First, it is necessary to solve the bureaucratic problems in estab-
lishing joint ventures. The new law helps to create a joint venture
company within one month. This possibility cannot be exploited if
the country is not attractive enough for the foreign investor or if it is
unable to help the foreign and Hungarian partners to meet. Finally,
a joint ventllre company cannot become a relevant factor in the econ-
omy if it is highly isolated. If ordinary companies and the whole
economy 90 not 'Yant to change or change slowly, the joint venture
companies remain "islands in the Socialist Sea."
Chapter 7
Joint Ventures in Poland
R. Maciejko
Next to perestroika and glasnost, the fashionable term in discussions
of East-West relations for the last few years has been "joint ventures."
The volume of analysis of this phenomenon to date has far exceeded
results. Nevertheless, Poland's business and government community
has tried its best to push this form of economic cooperation with
the West, and it will most likely playa significant role in changes
in the local economy. This chapter reviews the current structure for
foreign investment including Poland's new joint venture legislation,
reflects on the significance of over 100 joint ventures with permits
as of April 1989, and suggests changes that can be made to improve
foreign interest and investment in Poland.
Relationships in Europe and the continent's ties with the outside
world are undergoing dynamic change. In Western Europe, the coun-
tries are tugging and pulling to define a new economic and perhaps
political unit under the EC umbrella. The Eastern Europe CMEA
countries are struggling to make their economies competitive on a
world level. At the same time, North America, especially the United
States, is trying to define its new role in these two tumultuous re-
gions. These relationships must be understood to see the possibilities
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for Poland's economy and for trade-driven joint venture enterprises
in particular.
Almost all of the investors in Poland (97 percent) have come from
countries in Europe and North America, and this trend is likely to
continue. These countries have warmed to Poland's new-found im-
petus for reform. All are involved in the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) which may provide a multilateral
framework for increased economic contacts. Western European busi-
ness, led by the West Germans, is increasingly looking eastward to
augment its own saturated markets. Now that Poland's government
has announced free elections, even the US has announced measures
to conditionally increase economic ties. Except for technologies with
military applications, almost anything goes in East-West trade.
In the world context, there is no exact analog to the CMEA,
which accounts for only about 8 percent of world trade (The World
in Figures, 1987). Economic strength is increasingly the measuring
stick of countries, and the EC, US and Japan are far ahead of the
CMEA's best. Poland is aware of this and thinks that joint ventures
are one way it can help fill the gap between itself and the rest of the
world.
7.1 Poland's Economy: Current Situation
Poland's economy is going through a difficult time. The country owes
the West an amount approaching US$40 billion. If it were able, it
would have to use two to three times its hard-currency export surplus
yearly to payoff interest and principal on this debt. To raise foreign
exchange, many exportable goods are shipped out. As a result, just
about everything in Poland is scarce. Goods are hoarded. Producers,
forced by workers and suppliers to pay more, are shooting prices up
at their discretion (prices are no longer centrally controlled). The
price structure does not help; prices do not reflect opportunity costs.
The government has tried to alleviate these problems through re-
form since 1981. Despite six years of recovery after the stagnation
of 1979-1982 when the national income fell by 25 percent and in-
vestment by 50 percent, the economy still does not produce as much
as in 1978-1979 (Rocznik Statystyczny, 1988). Poland's leaders have
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realized that they cannot solve their problems alone. They need debt-
alleviation help from the West and new investment funds from either
creditors or, as is the current trend, joint venture partners.
From 1985 to 1987, Poland's gross debt grew from US$29.3 bil-
lion to US$39.2 billion (self-reported NMP was US$44.4 billion); this
growth was not a result of new loans, but mainly because of Poland's
inability to pay interest on the existing debt.' At present, Poland
cannot afford to pay the approximately US$3 billion needed yearly
for interest and maturing principal payments. The year 1984 was the
only time Poland's trade surplus exceeded US$1.5 billion.
In 1986, Poland officially rejoined the international banking sys-
tem with membership in the World Bank and the IMF. Membership
will make it easier for Poland to borrow foreign exchange. Many pri-
vate and government creditors practically insist on it before lending.
Further, the World Bank had already announced about US$250 mil-
lion in project lending that could increase to US$l billion if Poland's
reform steps are successful. The IMF has also announced US$300
million in new credit for Poland. These organizations can also be
important for joint ventures. For example, the IFC, a World Bank
affiliate that lends to the private sectors, was willing to consider fund-
ing a large joint venture between Asahi of Japan and the Polish glass
works in Sandomierz. The significance of funding from these inter-
national financial institutions should not be underestimated. The
amounts are massive when compared to the approximately US$50
million of capital in the 113 firms with permits under Poland's For-
eign Investment Law.
Creative ideas are needed to solve the problems of the world's big
debtors. This is also true in Poland. Something like the 20 percent
debt relief for the LDCs and Yugoslavia as foreseen by the Brady
Plan could be possible. Polish and Western leaders have also talked
about exchanging debt for equity in Polish enterprises (Weinraub,
1989; Radwan, 1988).
Business Infrastructure
Poland does not meet Western standards for infrastructure needed in
the daily operations of Western firms. There are shortages ranging
IThe fluctuations of the dollar's worth also played a role in the size of this
dollar denomina.ted debt.
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from personnel, equipment, and raw materials to simple office space.
What is available often sells only for foreign exchange. Telephone
density is low and quality even lower. There are approximately 109
telephones per thousand people. This does not look bad in compar-
ison with the USSR, which registers 98, or even Hungary, the GDR,
and Czechoslovakia with 140, 212, and 226 respectively. The fig-
ure fails, however, in comparison with world-leader Sweden with 890
telephones per thousand people or the USA with 760 (Die Presse,
1989).
Many businesses in Poland hesitate to rely on the postal system
because of slow deliveries. Only relatively expensive courier services
can guarantee delivery witlUn a reasonable time. The road system
is fairly highly developed, but there are few highways except in the
western parts of the country. Management and other consultancy ser-
vices are not sufficiently developed. Computer networks are relatively
unknown.
Polish Foreign Trade
Under the new legislation, any firm with export capability in Poland
can export freely. Foreign trade has been greatly decentralized, which
often causes difficulties. The number of trading bodies expanded from
60 in 1981 to 700 at the end of 1988.
Poland's most important trading partners are still the CMEA
countries which account for 51 percent of trade turnover. The Soviet
Union makes up over half of that total. The industrialized West
accounts for another 41 percent of the trade; developing countries
make up the remainder (Figure 7.1).
7.2 Poland's Economy: Reform Attempts
Poland has found that central planning and state monopoly of in-
dustries were producing unsatisfactory results, and is introducing a
new economic order. The intent of recent legislation is clear. The
decision-making power of the state in the economy is being broken.
A real market is in its prenatal stages and not just in consumer goods
and services. To make it grow, the Poles realize that they need capi-
tal, cash, and a labor market at the same time. As long as distortions
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Figure 7.1. Polish trading partners. (Source: Rocznik Statystyczny,
1988, p. 356.)
exist in one of these sectors, the economy will be dependent on central
authorities and the chance that a market can be born is hindered.
Currency Reform
As of June 1, 1988, the state-owned PKO savings bank began trad-
ing dollar-denominated coupons (bons) at free market rates (Bobin-
ski, 1989). A new foreign currency law, passed on March 15, 1989
(Tekielski, 1989), further opened the areas of possible transactions.
Now everyone in Poland can trade their foreign currency for zloty at
market rates. Previously, currency exchanges among individuals were
common, but illegal. At Pewex Premium Exchange windows, the go-
ing rate was about 3,700 zloty to US$l compared to just over 620
zloty at official rates at the end of April. Polish officials have taken
steps to make the Polish currency at least internally convertible and
hope that the gap between the two rates will eventually merge to
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a rate twice the current rate? Then, in about three to five years,
external convertibility also can be attempted (Montagnon, 1989).
Firms are less likely now to get their hard-currency allotments at
the previous low rate. In 1988, US$120,000 was auctioned at near
market rates; in 1989, the amount auctioned was estimated to be
US$3-3.5 billion (US$2.5 billion of this was previously allocated at
the low rate; The Economist, 1989). This at least should make Polish
firms more careful about how they spend their scarce hard currency.
At the same time, however, it will also fuel inflation as firms pay
more for input costs with price hikes.
For joint ventures, these convertibility issues are of vital impor-
tance. The problem is not selling in Poland but rather how to get
profits out. Joint ventures can now sell foreign currencies at auctions
in Poland but cannot buy them. Inconvertibility will limit growth
and potential for foreign investment in the Polish market.
Private Sector
Previously, the government viewed firms in the order of importance:
state, cooperative, and then finally private firms, but now all firms are
legally equal. Of course, this is only the written law at present and it
may never be totally true in practice. The law of December 23, 1988,
on Economic Activity allows private business in almost all economic
branches. At present, at least one and a half million Poles work in
630,000 private enterprises and the number is growing rapidly. Before
the number of workers allowed by these firms was limited, but today
private companies in Poland can hire as many workers as they can
afford. Like joint venture enterprises, however, these businesses will
face the same problems with regard to the supply of workers, raw
materials, machines, and plant.
7.3 Foreign Investment III Poland
Significance of Polonia Firms
Over 700 Polonia foreign firms have been formed in Poland since
this was legalized in 1976. The name "Polonia" fits since 55 percent
2New measures were taken on August 1, 1989; the two rates were merged to a
stable rate of 9,500 zloty to US$l, as of January 1, 1990.
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of the firms are owned by Polish expatriates or foreigners of Polish
background. Most of these firms are small and involved in the limited
fields of craft, domestic trade, restaurants, hotels, and other services.
Five, however, have more than 500 employees. Polonia firms account
for 1.5 percent of Polish industrial production. They concentrate on
the domestic market, and together had exports worth only US$35
million in 1986 (about 5 percent of their production; World Bank
Country Study, 1987). Almost all are owned 100 percent by foreign-
ers. New Polonia firms are regulated by the Foreign Investment Law
of January 1, 1989.
There are several lessons to be learned from the experiences of
the Polonia firms in Poland. They were initially looked upon with
great favor and were given generous tax and business incentives. Over
time, however, local authorities (voivodships) began to complain that
the owners of the Polonia firms were halting operations by the end of
the three-year tax holiday and were concerned only with short-term
profiteering.
The profit tax was raised from 50 percent in 1982 to 80 percent
in 1985. Also, new legislation in 1985 established minimum levels of
investment. These new limitations had an inhibiting effect on the
number of new Polonia enterprises, as shown in Figure 7.2. Only
50 new permits to operate were issued in 1985, and only 10 in 1986,
compared with an average of 188 in the years 1982 to 1984.
Role of Joint Ventures
Western businessmen invest in Poland for the following reasons:
• Poland is a large market, centrally located between Western Eu-
rope and an even larger untapped market, the Soviet Union.
Those who are first in and get to know the system are likely
to be those who will profit most in the future if market-type re-
forms, especially convertibility, materialize. In many cases, the
joint venture may not be an end in itself but rather a means of
increasing related import sales.
• Poland offers a relatively cheap and highly educated labor force.
In 1978, the records showed over one million scientists and engi-
neers. As with supplies in Poland, however, one has to be sure
that low price also does not mean low performance.
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Figure 7.2. Polonia firms - new permits issued. (Source: World
Bank Country Study, 1987.)
• The bottom line is not in all businessmen's calculations; what can
best be described as sentimentality also plays a role. Ten million
people of Polish heritage live abroad. Hundreds have already
invested in Polonia firms. These people generally enjoy a higher
than average standard of living in Poland.
For Poland, joint ventures and other foreign investments are a
means to help economic growth. Thus, some main driving forces are:
• To combat the lack of hard currency. Given Poland's debt, this is
probably the most important factor from Poland's point of view.
The tax schedule set up for investments encourages exports that
would help Poland's current account. Foreign investors always
bring in foreign capital. Through import substitution, Poland can
produce goods locally that were previously imported. Finally, the
credit rating of Western partners can help bring new credits to
Poland.
• To introduce modern technology and management techniques.
Many of the firms have brought their own advanced equipment to
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ventures in Poland. This can help Poland change its export struc-
ture from raw materials to high-quality value-added products.
Western management techniques are usually brought at least to
the venture itself. When the foreigners have money invested in
Poland, they also have an interest in keeping the technologies
efficient and up to date.
• To supply the local market. Given chronic excess demand in
Poland for many things, the government hopes that firms will be
able to supply goods and services not only for exports, but also
for the local market.
Options for Joint Ventures
What some investors seem to forget is that there are many options
for joint ventures that are not complicated and that have been suc-
cessfully used in the past. In many cases, these forms of cooperation
(e.g., switch and barter deals, licensing, franchising, and industrial
cooperation agreements) are economically more important than joint
ventures.
An International Chamber of Commerce study of industrial co-
operation agreements noted that these agreements often lead to ex-
panded cooperation between partners in cases where the agreements
were implemented to the satisfaction of both parties (East- West In-
dustrial Coopemtion Agreements, n.d.). The main example listed in
Poland involved International Harvester (Navistar) in a relationship
with its Polish partner that grew over the years. To be successful in
a joint venture, this type of long-term cooperation with the partner
can be vital, if only to build mutual trust and understanding.
Some Statistics and Overview
The following figures are almost outdated as soon as they are pub-
lished. Nevertheless, they give some indication of trends in foreign
capital investment in Poland. Table 7.1 shows that 52 firms were
granted permi ts in the first two years that joint ventures were allowed
to operate. In less than four months under the new law, 61 firms re-
ceived permits. Clearly the formation of such firms has become very
dynamic. The Foreign Investment Agency (FIA) was processing more
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Table 7.1. Permits issued and corresponding equity capital."
Permits issued Total planned equity capital
Old lawb 52 9.79 billion zloty ("" 30 million)'
New lawd 61 9.98 billion zloty ("" 20 million)
Total 113 19.77 billion zloty ("" 50 million)
aFIOm Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation (1988) and the list of permits
granted for joint venture operation from January 16 to April 20, 1989 put together
by the FlA.
bpram November 12, 1986 to December 24, 1988.
(:The exchange rate applicable for firms allowed under the old law ranges from
240 to 500 zloty/US$, the majority of those allowed under the new law had an
exchange rate of 500 to 600 zloty/US$,
dFrom January 16 to April 20, 1989.
Table 7.2. Total equity capital (all 113 firms with permits).
Old law New law Total
Up to 50 million zloty 12 31 43
From 51 to 100 million zloty 10 17 27
From 101 to 300 million zloty 17 6 23
From 301 to 1,500 million zloty 11 3 14
Over 1,500 million zloty 2 2 4
Total 52 61 113
Unknown 0 2 2
than two hundred additional permit applications in 1989, and many
were expected to come through during the year.
We see that the investment in these firms has also grown. Nowal-
most 20 billion zloty (US$50 million) is invested in firms with foreign
capital.
Tables 7.2 and 7.3 show, however, that most of the firms can
be best classified as small or medium in size. Table 7.2 shows the
distribution of the total equity capital of these firms. Over 60 per-
cent have total capital investment amounting to less than 100 million
zloty (approximately US$200,000). It should be noted that the trend
recently has been toward smaller firms. Over 80 percent of the firms
allowed under the new law include investments of less than 100 mil-
lion zloty. Under the old law (through the end of 1988), this figure
was 40 percent. Of course, the devaluation of the zloty plays some
part in this change.
R. Madejko
Table 7.3.
Million zloty
~ 25
25-50
50-100
100-500
500-1,000
:::>: 1,000
Total
Unknown
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Foreign capital contribution (under the new law).
US$ (approximate) Firms
"" 50,000 13
"" 50,000 - 100,000 31
"" 100,000 - 200,000 8
"" 200,000 - 1,000,000 4
"" 1,000,000 - 2,000,000 2
"" 2,000,000 1
61
2
Table 7.4. Geographical pattern of foreign partners.
Country
FRG (without West Berlin)a
West Berlin
USA
Sweden
Austria
UK
Netherlands
USSR
Switzerland
Italy
Canada
Finland
France
Yugoslavia
Liechtenstein
Belgium, Denmark,
United Arab Emirates,
Thailand, Tunisia, Lebanon
Total
Unknown
Old law
17
3
7
3
5
5
5
5
4
a
a
2
2
2
2
(1 each)
New law
34
4
7
8
5
3
2
1
1
3
2
a
a
a
a
Total
51
7
14
11
10
8
7
6
5
3
2
2
2
2
2
6
apoland separates figures for the FRG and West Berlin.
bMany firms have more than one foreign partner from a single country. These 138
partners participate in 111 ventures.
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Table 7.5. Value of foreign investments in Poland in 1989."
Country
USA
FRG
UK
Sweden
Austria
Netherlands
Lebanon
Italy
Canada
Switzerland
Thailand
Tunisia
USSR
Total
Unknown
Joint ventures
5
33
2
5
4
2
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
59
2
Partners
7
38
3
8
5
2
1
3
2
1
1
1
1
Foreign capital
(US$)'
4,010,000
3,690,000
1,300,000
390,000
373,000
124,000
120,000
107,000'
103,000
55,000
52,400
50,000
50,000
10,424,400
Foreign capital
zloty (million)
2,005.2
1,847.4
649.4
195.1
202.0
72.0
62.0
57.0
54.5
29.2
25.2
25.0
25.0
5,249.0
"For the firms tha.t received permits from Ja.nuary 16 to April 20, 1989 according
10 Ihe FlA.
bApproximate, with adjustments for fluctuations in exchange rates.
'US$50,OOO + 28.5 million zloly.
Table 7.3 gives some idea of the size of foreign investment in the
firms that received permits recently. The foreign investors added
US$100,000 or less in 44 of 50 ventures. The largest investment
among them and the largest foreign investment to date in Poland is
by Barbara Piasecka-Johnson, the Johnson & Johnson heiress, who
invested US$3 million to start the firm Tricotex in 1989.
Table 7.4 lists in detail the origin of the foreign partners of firms
in Poland. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), including West
Berlin, accounts for over 40 percent of the partners or 58 in total to
date. Far behind are the United States, Sweden, and Austria. Table
7.5 summarizes the value of foreign investments in Poland in 1989.
We see that although the USA has only five joint ventures, it leads
in new investments. It is followed closely by the FRG and the UK.
Figure 7.3 shows Poland's top Western trading partners. It is
useful to compare this figure with Tables 7.4 and 7.5. The Federal
Republic of Germany is at the top of the list. The USA, UK, Austria,
Sweden, and Switzerland also are high. France and Italy, which are
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Figure 7.3. Poland's top western trading partners. (Source: Rocznik
Statystyczny, 1988.)
among Poland's six trading partners, have fielded only one venture
each. It is here especially that we see the importance of joint ventures
with respect to other forms of economic cooperation. Italy has only
one relatively small joint venture, but the participation of the Italian
firm, Fiat, in the Polish auto industry is arguably more important
than all the joint ventures allowed to date, and it is not organized as
a joint venture.
Sales in 1988
Fourteen joint firms recorded sales and exports in 1988, according to
the Polish monitoring authorities. These firms registered almost 32
million zloty in sales and US$17.5 million in exports to hard-currency
areas. Tables 7.6 and 7.7 show the comparison between these firms
and the Polish Polonia firms.
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Table 7.6. Sales of firms operational in 1988."
Firms Total sales (zloty) Exports (US$) Exports (rubles) Employed
14 31,778 million 1.7 million 10.73 million 5,669
"From Table No.2 - The Performance in 1988 of the Largest JV Established in
Poland, Polish Embassy, FRG.
Table 7.7. Polonia firm sales in 1987."
Firms Total sales (zloty) Exports (US$)
~ 700 154,768 million ~ 35 million
aFraID InterPolcom, 1988.
7.4 Doing Business in Poland:
Problem Analysis3
Employed
61,562
Foreign firms have had capital investments in Poland for the past 13
years. Since the start, the laws regulating capital investment have
been modified several times to broaden the areas open to investment.
The momentum for these changes has come from the 700 foreign
companies in operation and from over 100 joint ventures that have
been set up since they were first allowed in 1986. This law allowed
companies with foreign capital participation (joint ventures) without
constraints on the size of the company or branches of industry. On
December 23, 1988, the Polish Sejm approved the Foreign Investment
Law,4 liberalizing the laws for companies with foreign capital even
further.
7.4.1 Problems in initial steps
Each joint venture starts with an application submitted to the newly
formed FIA for a permit to operate. A decision is made within two
months of submission. Proposals that affect state security and eco-
nomic interests or that are environmentally dangerous will be re-
jected. Rejected proposals can be appealed to the President of the
3This introduction and the comments to the law that follow are by Burzynski,
1989. Several of the comments come from the experiences of various businessmen
in Poland.
""The Law on Economic Activity with the Participation of Foreign Parties -
the Polish Foreign Investment Law," Warsaw, December 23, 1989.
R. Maciejko 129
Agency. If the company engages in activities contrary to those out-
lined in the permit, the FIA can request that these activities be
curtailed. If necessary, the FIA will restrict or withdraw the permit.
The items required for a permit application include a feasibil-
ity study. Such studies usually are done using UNIDO guidelines
(UNIDO, 1986). In the past, the Polish consulting company, Invest-
export, had a virtual monopoly on doing these studies. Since then,
other consulting companies and bodies have sprung up to do this
work. These studies weed out unjustified ventures and help joint ven-
ture partners see their options more clearly. On the other hand, they
add cost (some have paid US$5,000) and time (up to three months)
to the joint venture process (Business Eastern Europe, 1988). West-
ern partners often have not been impressed by feasibility study work.
The studies often are done using theoretical models and not such
methods as "cruel accounting" (worst-case scenarios). Sometimes
they simplify reality by using planned results as actual ones.
The share of the foreign participants ranges from 20 percent to
100 percent of capital stock, to be determined in consultation with
the FlA. Investment should not be less than 25 million zloty, adjusted
in exchange rate changes.
The foreign share5 of the firm must be at least 20 percent to avoid
arrangements where Polish firms joined with a foreign investor just
to reap tax benefits. Until the new law was passed, foreign partners
could have more than a 49 percent share of capital only in special
cases.
The foreign partner shares in joint ventures that already have
permits are summarized in Table 7.8. It is clear that many firms have
taken advantage of the liberalization of restrictions on the extent of
foreign ownership. Under the new law, only 19 of 59 firms had half
ownership or less. Before the law changed, the figure was 50 out of
52. Significantly, 12 of the new firms have 100 percent foreign capital.
These results are made somewhat less significant by the fact that
Polonia firms, which previously also were allowed up to full foreign
ownership, are now included under the new foreign investment law.
5Foreign firms that ha.ve 100 percent of the ca.pital stock cannot be called joint
ventures by definition. Thus, we cannot group this legislature in the category of
the joint venture law.
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Table 7.8. Percentage of capital equity of the foreign firms."
Percentage Old law' New law' Total
0-49% 47 11 58
50% 3 8 11
51-59% 1 7 8
60-69% 1 8 9
70-79% 0 5 5
80-99% 0 8 8
100% 0 12 12
Total 52 61 113
Unknown 0 2 2
aFraID Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation (1988) and the list of permits
granted for joint venture operation from January 16 to April 20, 1989 put together
by the FIA, and also from permits kept at the FlA.
bFirms registered under Poland's 1986 Foreign Investment Law for the period
November 12, 1986 to December 24, 1988.
cFirms registered under Poland's New Foreign Investment Law for the period
January 16 to April 20, 1989.
Investments can be made in cash or in kind. Zloty invest-
ments must have accompanying official exchange forms. The value of
the in-kind investments (buildings, equipment, licenses, trademarks,
patents, etc.) should be specified in the contract of establishment.
The value of the in-kind contributions can be subject to verification
by independent authorities at the request of the FlA.
Valuing cash investments is not difficult once an exchange rate is
agreed upon. Valuing in-kind investments, however, can be a serious
hurdle. While Western inputs usually have a well-defined value based
on their price on Western markets, Eastern European inputs often
do not have such a clear valuation. Eastern European goods sold on
foreign markets, for example, often have entirely different prices than
they do at home.
7.4.2 Problems within the financial framework
Accounting principles are provided by the Minister of Finance in
compliance with the Commercial Code of 1934.
Polish and foreign accounting standards often are very different.
While firms have found officials flexible in the application of account-
ing standards, and many find Eastern European accounting practices
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easy to get used to, they are not accustomed to many of the systems'
features. Special care must be taken with such items as depreciation
methods and safeguards against theft or misappropriation of funds.
One Western businessman described Polish accounting and taxation
rules as a minefield. In his example, all foreign investors are forced
to tread through this minefield blindfolded. To get through with-
out being "blown up," the foreign investor needs a guide. Though
technically allowed, authorization to employ an outside auditor is not
given. At least one firm was not allowed to work with its choice of
auditor.
Fifteen percent of the hard-currency earnings from export must
be sold to a Polish foreign exchange bank. The President of the
FIA can reduce this rate in economically justified cases. Selling hard
currency to the Polish bank means that the joint venture has less for
purchases and distribution to the partners. This resale also has an
effect similar to a tax. All currency is sold at the official rate, which,
at the end of April 1989, was just over 600 zloty to a dollar. The
premium exchange rate was about 3,800 zloty to a dollar. To make
matters worse, resale is based on gross earnings not on net. Still,
enterprises with foreign investment have a relatively good situation.
Polish enterprises on average sell 82 percent of their export proceeds
to the foreign exchange banks (Burzynski, 1989).
The company keeps accounts at a Polish exchange bank of its
choice. This bank can guarantee the company's obligations. Credits
can be obtained from that bank or from abroad. Accounts can be
opened with foreign banks once the company has a foreign exchange
permit. To help the insufficient banking system, new banks recently
have been established to join the big three: Bank Handlowy, Bank
PKO, and Bank Pekao. Most of these will have a regional customer
basis.
The foreign partner can receive a guarantee from the Finance
Minister promising compensation for losses due to expropriation or
nationalization. It should be noted that this guarantee does not help
those who make foolish business decisions or suffer from bad market
conditions. Furthermore, many firms, especially small- and medium-
sized ones, are not satisfied with this guarantee alone. Many are
said to be waiting until their government and Poland have signed a
bilateral investment protection agreement before investing. Among
other things, such an agreement means that the state takes over the
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Table 7.9. Scope of business activities of the first 52 firms under
the old law.
Branch
Agricultural processing
Computers (hardware and software)
Engineering and tools
Hotels
Construction and production of building materials
Metallurgy
Textiles
Electronics
Chemicals
Films and publishing
Wood and furniture
Others
Total
aSome firms were active in more tha.n one industry.
No. of joint ventures
13
5
5
5
4
4
4
3
3
3
2
4
55"
rights and claims of investors in certain situations. The agreements
also specify that foreign investors are not to be treated worse than
local investors. Agreements are in force with the UK and China;
agreements with Belgium, Luxembourg, and Austria are signed but
not yet ratified. Negotiations are under way with other countries
(Maciejko, 1988; Burzynski, 1989; Bacynski, 1988).
7.4.3 Problems during operation
The preferred businesses for joint ventures include:
• Introduction of modern technologies or management techniques.
• Provision of goods or services for export.
• Improvement of domestic supply with modern high-quality goods
or services.
• Introduction of environmental protection equipment.
Table 7.9 lists the industries in which the first 52 firms were
engaged.
Not only will engaging in preferred businesses increase the chances
of getting a permit, but it also will help in obtaining the government's
support in such important issues as obtaining supplies. With the
approval of the President of the FIA, the companies' tax holiday can
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be extended from three to six years if the firms are active in such a
preferred business. The Polish government has issued a specific list of
businesses in which foreign investment is encouraged. This list also
provides information as to which Polish businesses are insufficiently
developed and could possibly make for profitable investments.
No licenses are necessary for foreign trade except for a few limited
commodities (Burzynski, 1989). Even in that case, if firms have to
wait for some office to approve a new foreign trade license each time
they change the conditions slightly, they will in the long run most
likely fail.
Joint companies will operate under the same regulations as Pol-
ish enterprises with regard to supplies in Poland. State enterprises
can transfer fixed assets and limited rights into the company. Joint
ventures can purchase necessary goods or services in Poland for for-
eign currencies or import them. For anyone trying to do business
in Poland, getting high-quality supplies delivered on time is a major
issue as is quality that meets Western standards. Often supplies can-
not be found in Poland and must be imported. This, of course, is a
hard-currency expense. When firms with foreign investment find the
supplies they need in Poland, they often have to pay more for them
than state enterprises despite the new laws. Because of their need
for hard currency and because they see joint ventures as relatively
rich firms in this respect, the suppliers often demand that the joint
ventures pay at least partly in foreign currency. If a state enterprise
cannot meet its planned targets because it could not get supplies that
went instead to a company with foreign participation, the officials re-
sponsible for the firm's performance will have problems and will put
pressure on the supplier. Some suppliers simply do not want to risk
this.
The centrally distributed raw materials in 1989 were coal, coke,
diesel oil, heating oil, copper, tin, aluminum, and silver (Burzynski,
1989). Under this law, firms obtain these items under the same rules
that govern state enterprises.
The Polish partner can contribute rights to use state-owned real
estate according to the provisions of the Utilization of State-Owned
Land for perpetual use or lease. Companies can also acquire and
lease real estate not owned by the state. If the foreign partner is
a majority owner of the firm, any purchase must be verified by the
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Ministry of Internal Affairs. Purchases from the foreign shareholder's
profit require a separate foreign exchange permit.
7.4.4 Taxation
Taxation is a major issue for joint ventures in Poland. Although
the corporate income tax was lowered to a moderate 10 percent with
the new law, the tax burden is higher including some charges not
detailed in the law. For example, 1.5 percent of total capital must
be paid to the notary and a further 2.5 percent as a treasury fee.6
For many firms, these charges are unbearably high. Since March
15, 1989, firms must also pay 200,000 zloty to have their application
considered by the FlA. This fee replaces the previously levied stamp
duty of about 1,500 zloty (information from the FIA). Firms now
operating in Poland are still enjoying the tax holiday and have not
yet paid corporate income tax.
The corporate income tax is 40 percent of taxable income minus
0.4 percent for each percentage point of sales export (thus the mini-
mum is 10 percent). Taxable income is calculated using depreciation
applicable to state-owned enterprises. The corporate income tax has
been reduced from 50 percent to 40 percent as specified iu the 1986
Foreign Investment Law. The reduction in tax as exports increase
shows Poland's emphasis on export. Taxes are at a minimum when
exports reach 75 percent of sales. Poland's government does not re-
duce taxes more for firms that export more than 75 percent because
it would like to have at least some production for the local market.
No corporate income tax is charged for the first three years after
the establishment of the firm (Le., from the date of the first invoice).
The tax holiday can be extended up to three years with the approval
of the President of the FIA if the companies are active in a preferred
business area (see Table 7.9). If the company is dissolved within six
years of its establishment, income taxes have to paid retroactively for
the entire activity period. The foreign partner's income is subject to
a 30 percent tax unless international agreements provide otherwise.
6 Also turnover tax, corporate income tax, agricultural tax, wage tax, real estate
tax, local taxes, stamp duty, and community and city fees.
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Poland has signed double taxation agreements with 21 countries. 7
Firms from these countries pay from 5 percent to 15 percent tax.
7.4.5 Management and employment
Management
In keeping with Poland's commercial code rules on joint-stock and
limited liability firms, the shareholders decide on the composition
and powers of the management. This is a change from the law of
1986 wherein the companies' top manager had to be a Polish citizen
and a permanent resident of Poland. In comparison with conventional
firms, joint ventures have fewer management personnel. One firm ex-
plained that the previous organization was 60 percent administration,
the comparable figure for a joint venture was only 10 percent.
Finding qualified skilled employees, such as executives and engi-
neers, may be the biggest challenge for a joint venture. The employees
have to be flexible and work in a combination of two economic sys-
tems. Many firms look to the younger generation for this flexibility.
The Furnel Joint Venture, for instance, has recruited people from the
Foreign Trade Department of Warsaw's Central School of Planning
and Statistics. Finding people with the appropriate language skills
as well as a business knowledge of West and East is difficult. Un-
til now, Poland's expatriate community or second generation Poles
born abroad has been one source of foreign employees in Western
representative offices, but not for joint ventures.
Employment
The first 52 joint venture firms that received permits in Poland planned
to employ 7,079 people. The structure of employment for these firms
is listed in Table 7.10.
Foreign citizens can be employed by the company with the per-
mission of regional authorities. Wage specifications are to be defined
in the contract of establishment or by management. While cash pay-
ments are generally in zloty, at least a certain percentage of payments
is usually made in foreign exchange.
7Austria, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Spain, Nether-
lands, Japan, Yugoslavia, Malaysia, FRG, Norway, Pakistan, USA, Sweden, Sri
Lanka, Thailand, Hungary, UK, and Italy (Burzynski, 1989).
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Table 7.10. Structure of employment."
No. of employees
Up to 50
51 to 100
101 to 200
201 to 500
501 to 1,000
Over 1,000
Total
East-West Joint Ventures
No. of joint ventures
21
11
10
6
3
1 (Furnel)
52
G According to data included in the feasibility studies submitted by the first 52
firms.
Previously, foreign employees could draw only 50 percent of their
salary in hard currency. The permission of regional authorities is not
needed for employees of the foreign participant, but this does not
apply to the joint venture. Significantly, there are very few foreigners
working in joint venture management in Poland. Compared with
Polish management, they are expensive.
Polish employees are paid in zloty and are taxed according to the
tax applicable to employees of non-socialized entities. The tax on
the Polish employees can be rather high. One joint venture reported
that the Polish workers' salaries are subject to a 75 percent "equal-
ization tax." Some companies report that joint venture wages for
Polish employees are from 20 percent to 100 percent higher than for
conventional workers. The Polish government wants to avoid wors-
ening Poland's disastrous wage-price spiral and applies at least some
pressure to keep wages reasonable.8
Often the joint ventures demand more productivity and more
hours from the workers. Most of the joint firms offer the employ-
ees only a higher salary, but not necessarily benefits that are normal
in Polish state enterprises. Further, one company that has foreign
and Polish workers together reported that the Poles are 50 percent
less productive. Another manager reported that Polish workers were
four times less productive than Western workers for the same job
(Gotbaum interview). One company noted that the Polish laborers
must be motivated to do good work; those working abroad are often
excellent workers. Companies working with some kind of incentive
SMany of the observations on employment were recorded by Noah Gotbaum of
IIASA in interviews with joint venture managers in the summer of 1988.
R. Maciejko 137
scheme, such as piecework, reported better success with the Polish
employees.
7.5 Conclusions
In Poland, the number of investments is small but growing. The
20 billion zloty ('" US$50 million) in foreign investments announced
since joint ventures were first allowed in 1986 is equal to less than
1 percent of Polish investments during the period.
Joint ventures in the CMEA are not always easy. It can take
a long time to conclude negotiations and start operations. Positive
returns cannot be expected for several years in many cases. In Poland,
Western joint venture partners have to realize that the joint ventures
are seen as a means of increasing exports to the West; they must
decide whether they can afford possible further competition in these
markets. If they want to sell in the local market, they must find a way
to export profits. Barter trade is the main solution until convertibility
becomes a reality.
Some firms are looking into the possibilities of joint ventures with
Eastern European companies without considering other options. In
many cases, it seems that joint ventures are not the best way to
make a quick entry into Eastern European markets. It may make
more sense to build up cooperation with Eastern European partners
slowly, and learn how business in the Eastern European country works
before pursuing a joint venture. The same goes for the Polish firms.
They must remember that joint ventures are but one of their op-
tions, although an attractive one at present for various reasons (e.g.,
taxation).
Polish leadership is trying to address economic issues. Most for-
eign businessmen applaud the liberalizing moves, but some complain
that changes come too fast and the situation is too unstable. The
extent of foreign capital in Poland will not be sufficient unless there
is a good business environment.
It is a dilemma. Poland needs foreign investors if reform is to
be successful, but foreign investors will hesitate to invest unless the
conditions foreseen by reform exist. Poland's economy is still too
unpredictable to guess its future, but we can at least look at two
possibilities.
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First, hesitant reform moves have been rewarded by mediocre eco-
nomic performance. Popular resistance to changes that bring certain
short-term pain and only perhaps long-term gain slows down reform-
ers. Inflation, price increases, and corresponding labor disputes dis-
tract decision-makers from major moves. Legal changes are made,
but are not realized in practice. The level of foreign investments
will stagnate. After a period of initial interest, only a slow growth
in foreign investment can be expected. Multinationals wary of the
economic risk generally stay out.
Second, reform could be a major success. Decision-making is
practical. Justified investment is being made to improve the in-
frastructure including transport, communications, and office space.
Temporary unemployment, with retraining if necessary, is becoming
acceptable. Profit orientation that does not harm social welfare is en-
couraged to spread and is flourishing. The currency is steadily being
made convertible, and prices are being adjusted carefully to reflect
opportunity costs. Foreign investment is growing especially among
small- and medium-sized firms as foreigners feel comfortable working
in Poland.
Members of the 13-million-strong international emigrant commu-
nity have set up 55 percent of the 700 Polonia firms established in
Poland. While these firms are small in scale, they are at least a start
in increasing cooperation between Poland and the West. The Poles
abroad can be one of Poland's most valuable assets in raising its lev-
els of exports and in injecting life into the moribund economy. Other
Eastern European countries do not share the advantage of such a
large foreign population.
Training managers to work in a two-system environment will be
a particular challenge. The Soviet Union already has sent some of its
brightest foreign trade specialists to the West for intensive training
and on-the-job experience in cooperation with Western governments,
and Poland must do the same. The West provides opportunities
not only to create such exchange programs but also to negotiate an
international legal framework for investors, including investment pro-
tection agreements. Such agreements can be important to guarantee
foreign investment capital from expropriation and to make sure that
external forces such as boycotts will not affect business security in
times of political tension.
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Attracting big multinationals to invest in Poland will be difficult.
They are not likely to send top management to check out conditions in
Poland and therefore have difficulty estimating the risks. An excep-
tion was ICL, which had an experienced executive working for several
years in the country. The management of smaller and medium-sized
firms, however, does often have an opportunity to understand their
chances in Poland. They are closer to the action and can often make
quicker investment decisions. The longer the companies have expe-
rience in Poland the more likely they are to be able to estimate the
possibilities for joint ventures. Furthermore, mutual trust built up
over these years can be the basis for joint venture cooperation. Firms
want to be in the CMEA if economic reform succeeds and big oppor-
tunities come. Many want to get to know the system, to make the
contacts, and to learn from iuitial mistakes.
Western investors have many options outside Poland and out-
side Eastern Europe. Poland has to continue stressing its economic
strengths such as its central location and skilled labor pool. The
UNIDO conference in 1987 and the accompanying project identifica-
tion were a good start. Given the list of industry branches in which
foreign investors get special tax treatment, it is clear which branches
are being stressed. Poland must convincingly show the advantages to
foreign firms of doing business in those branches. In the process, it
must make sure its laws provide a framework for doing business that
awards profit and performance and removes obstacles.
But while flexible legislation may grease the turbine of joint ven-
ture formation, it cannot fuel the engine. No laws can possibly cover
all aspects of operations. Practice in Poland does not resemble the
legal framework in which it operates. Much more important is the
willingness on the part of the joint venture participants and their
home governments to make economic cooperation work. The real
problems will not be legal; they will be practical, such as how to get
supplies and the right personnel.

Chapter 8
Experiences and Future
Outlook of East-West
Joint Ventures in the
Soviet Union
V. Ranenko and A. Soloviev
The economy of the USSR is an extremely vast national complex,
uniting production, distribution, and consumption of material re-
sources, goods, and services. This complex comprises more than 300
sectors and subsectors operating in the territory of 15 Soviet Socialist
Republics. The management of the economy is based on the use of
sectoral and territorial principles.
The development and activity of the national economic complex
has at its foundation a system of state planning and control, edited
centrally on the basis of united national plans.
There are more than 46,000 production organizations and enter-
prises in this complex that are legal entities, nearly 50,000 kolkhozes
and sovhozes, and more than 32,000 different inter-economic con-
struction and installation organizations.
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Table 8.1. Rate of economic growth in the USSR from 1980-1988.
Indicator (1970 = 1) 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988
GNP 1.65 1.98 2.07 2.12 2.21
National income 1.61 1.92 2.01 2.09 2.26
Production assets 2.14 2.90 3.09 3.28 3.37
Capital investments 1.63 1.94 2.10 2.16 2.23
Industrial output
Group "A" (capital goods) 1.82 2.18 2.30 2.38 2.44
Group "B" (consumer goods) 1.67 2.02 2.10 2.20 2.24
Agricultural gross output 1.12 1.24 1.31 1.34 1.38
Labor productivity 1.47 1.72 1.77 1.86 1.93
The fixed assets of the national economy are 2.5 billion rubles.
The production assets are 1.7 billion rubles, 49 percent of which are
made up of industrial assets, 21 percent of agricultural assets, and
20 percent of transport and communications assets.
More than 131 million people (or 45 percent of the population) are
engaged in the national economy of the USSR, 73 percent of whom
work in the various sectors of industrial and agricultural production
and 27 percent in service sectors. Nearly 25 percent of all people
working in the national economy have graduated from universities
and have specialized professional education. The state enterprises
of the USSR currently produce 97.8 percent of the gross industrial
product, and cooperatives 2.2 percent.
The Gross National Product of the USSR in 1987 was 2,120 billion
rubles. The national income of the USSR used for consumption and
accumulation averaged 576.0 billion rubles in 1986; this is a 30 percent
increase over 1980. The development of the national economy is based
on large-scale state investments. Their total value exceeded 194.4
billion rubles in 1986, or more than 1.3 times the amount for 1980.
The main figures of the rate of economic growth in USSR are shown
in Table 8.1 .
In the 1970s, there were a number of negative aspects in the So-
viet economy, such as the diminished volume of economic growth,
which were connected with the extensive development of the national
economy. These tendencies were not overcome during the period
1981-1985.
v. Ranenko and A. Soloviev 143
A program to intensify production and increase labor productivity
from 2.3 to 2.5 times by the year 2000 was approved in the 27th Party
Congress.! This program should be realized through:
• Accelerating innovation processes.
• Intensifying R&D activities.
• Democratizing economic management.
• Using the advantages derived from the wide participation of the
USSR in international economic relations.
• Strengthening the social dimensions of national economic
development.
8.1 Foreign Economic Relations in the
Period of Perestroika
One of the key problems of economic reform in the USSR is believed
to be implementing and strengthening the new economic mechanism.
It should combine centralized management with the development of
different forms of business activities, encouraging initiatives from the
prime producers of goods and services. This problem is resolved now
on the basis of:
• Differentiation of various forms of property, development of coop-
erative enterprises, wide use of leasing, development of individual
business activities.
• Endorsement of the independence of the main economic entities
in the planning process, the use of profits and goods produced.
• Enlargement of trade including means of production and devel-
opment of market relations within the national economy.
• Strengthening of sectoral and territorial profit-and-loss account-
ing and self-financing.
A package of legislative acts such as the Law on the State En-
terprise, the Law on Cooperatives, the Law on Property, the Law
on Leases, the Law on Stockholding Companies, and the Law on the
lSome of the negative tendencies in the USSR economy developed further in
1989. At the same time, some obvious changes took place, directed at restruc-
turing the economy and social orientation. The growth rates for 1989 GNP and
National Income are 3 percent and 24 percent, respectively. (Editors' note.)
144 East-West Joint Ventures
Use of Soil, which strengthen the legal basis of economic reform in the
country, were adopted during the past years. These laws were COn-
siderably improved by a recent session of the USSR Supreme Soviet.
Economic reform is supported by the democratization of the COUn-
try's political system. Glasnost and broader participation of the
people in State management are some of the main features of the
democratization process. The results of the political and economic
reforms, however, cannot be seen immediately due to the complex
character of the problems to be solved as well as to the slow pace of
implementation and the bureaucratic hindrances to their realization.
Food shortages are still a major problem in the country. The State
budget deficit has increased to 100 billion rubles, inflation processes
are more widespread, and the country's foreign debts have not been
reduced.
A vast scientific and technological potential is available to the
country. In 1986, there were 5,070 scientific establishments includ-
ing universities in the USSR. Of that number, 20 are academies with
21 branches, scientific centers and laboratories; 3,200 are scientific
research institutes (including their branches); 412 are scientific re-
search laboratories, scientific and applied-experimental centers; and
15 are observatories. About 15 million people work in these estab-
lishments, of whom over 518 thousand people have a scientific degree.
In 1986, Soviet scientists made up one-quarter of the total number of
the scientists in the world.
During the period 1971-1985, a total of 306.1 billion rubles were
drawn from the state budget for the development of science. These
expenditures represented 4 percent of national income in 1970 and
5 percent in 1986. By the year 2000, a goal has been set "to guaran-
tee the fulfillment of key political and economic tasks to accelerate
technical progress, to raise the role of science and technology in the
decisive transformation of productive forces, to transfer the economy
in the direction of intensive development, and to raise production
efficiency." The R&D potential of the country will playa major role.
Soviet foreign economic relations with capitalist countries are reg-
ulated by long-term intergovernmental agreements and programs of
trade, economic, industrial, and scientific technical cooperation. The
necessity to develop economic relations between countries with differ-
ent social-economic systems has a direct influence on the development
of Soviet foreign trade with these countries.
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Table 8.2. Volume of exports and imports from 1970-1988 (in mil-
lion rubles).
(In million rubles)
Turnover
Exports
Imports
1970
4,694
2,154
2,540
1980
31,583
15,862
15,721
1985
37,875
18,581
19,294
1986
28,989
13,136
15,853
1987
32,861
14,830
18,031
1988
30,987
14,666
16,321
The volume of USSR trade with the capitalist countries in 1985
was nine times higher than in 1970. The volume of Soviet exports and
imports increased accordingly (Table 8.2). The country's production
and R&D capacity is also increasing with the conversion of defense
industries to civil production.
Nevertheless, in 1986-1988, there was a reduction in the volume of
trade with this group of countries, due in part to the fall of world price
levels for raw materials and power goods (80 percent of Soviet exports
to capitalist countries). Prices for agricultural goods and food, the
main articles of Soviet imports also fell. Shortages in foreign currency
derived from exports appear to be the main reason for the decline in
Soviet imports.
At the same time, the trade policies of the capitalist countries
(embargoes and licenses) may be regarded as a main restrictive fac-
tor. These policies and the overall price deterioration on the world
market led to stagnated trade relations between the USSR and these
countries.
All of this reduced the volume of mutual trade during 1984-1986
by 11,939.3 million rubles (exports by 8,213.4 million rubles and
imports by 3,725.9 million rubles), which resulted in reducing the
volume of foreign trade in 1986 to 22.2 percent of the total Soviet
exports.
The dynamics of turnover with different Western nations varies
from country to country and is closely related to the achieved levels of
mutual trade, economic, scientific, and technological relations as well
as to the specifics of economic development, and overall directions of
government policy of these countries toward the USSR.
The leading partners in USSR trade with Western countries are
the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Finland, Japan, Italy,
France, UK, USA, and Austria.
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In 1986, USSR foreign trade with these countries was 78.2 percent
of total USSR trade turnover with Western countries (about 11.0
billion rubles or 82 percent in Soviet exports and 12.5 million rubles
or 80 percent in imports).
Soviet exports to the industrialized Western countries are made
up mainly of fuel and electric power including crude oil and oil prod-
ucts, other types offuel, natural gas, chemical products, round wood,
machines, equipment, and vehicles. Soviet imports from the industri-
alized Western countries consist basically of machines and equipment,
chemical products, and grain. In addition, paper and cardboard, cel-
lulose, wool, clothes, footwear, and food also were imported during
this period.
Beginning in the 1970s, new forms of economic relations between
the USSR and Western countries came into practice. During the pe-
riod 1976-1986, more than 100 industrial projects with compensation
agreements were constructed in the USSR. Some are in the chemi-
cal and oil industry (49) and the production offertilizers (31); other
projects are in gas, coal, and the wood processing industry.
A recent phenomenon in the development of trade and economic
relations between the USSR and the Western countries is the signing
of mutual long-term trade, economic, industrial, and scientific and
technical cooperation programs. The first of these programs was
signed between the USSR and Finland in 1977, and was based on the
issues of the Final Act of the Meeting on Security and Cooperation
in Europe.
Production cooperation, which includes the supply of components
and complete Soviet-made sets of equipment for the manufacture of
products imported to the USSR or components for future Soviet ex-
port, became widespread. Simultaneously, more sophisticated forms
of cooperation such as coordination on the volume and types of com-
ponents as well as conditions for final deliveries were developed and
put into practice. Industrial cooperation based on component ex-
change and technological specialization is very common. The main
partners of the USSR in this form of cooperation are firms from Fin-
land, FRG, Italy, and France.
The construction of big industrial projects also may be regarded
as an important form oflong-term cooperation among countries. This
form combines conventional commercial deals (for the delivery of
equipment and materials) with bilateral and multilateral contracts
V. Ranenko and A. Soloviev 147
to carry out research and development activities, as well as techni-
cal help including feasibility studies, training of personnel, and other
forms of cooperation. Examples include the construction of a major
car manufacturing plant in the USSR with the assistance of the Ital-
ian company Fiat, and the construction of a nuclear power station,
Lovisa, in Finland with Soviet assistance.
During the five-year period of 1981-1985, USSR export of ma-
chinery increased by 26 percent (7.8 billion rubles in 1980; 10.1 bil-
lion rubles in 1985). But the average rate of growth per year was
4.7 percent and the volume of export of these goods was reduced to
0.5 percent per year. During 1986 and 1987, the USSR export of ma-
chines and equipment increased to only 4.5 percent, while the volume
of exported machinery and equipment during this period was reduced
to 1 percent. As a result, the share of machines and equipment in
USSR exports was reduced from 15.8 percent in 1980 to 15.5 percent
in 1987. In currency, the share of these goods in the total volume of
USSR exports in 1987 was only 12.5 percent as compared to a share
of the same type of machinery on the international market of over 30
percent.
The existing production structure is regarded by Soviet
economists as a considerable obstacle, preventing the growth of USSR
machinery and equipment exports. In 1987, six groups (out of a to-
tal of 63) made up 53 percent of the entire range of the machine-
building industry. These six groups include energy and metallurgical
equipment, tractors, garage equipment, cars, aviation engineering,
motorcycles, and scooters.
During that period, the volume of exports increased 4.8 times.
This rate of growth was higher than the total growth of USSR ex-
ports of machines and equipment. At the same time, four groups
of goods - cars, energy equipment, railway trains, laboratory instru-
ments and equipment - made up 70 percent of USSR exports to the
industrialized Western countries.
Perestroika in economic management and dramatic changes in
managerial and planning methods are leading to greater autonomy
for enterprises. The greater independence also calls for changes in
the management of foreign economic relations.
Taking all of this into consideration, the decision On Measures
for Improvement of the Management of Foreign Economic Relations,
adopted by the Party Central Committee and the Council of Ministers
148 East-West Joint Ventures
of the USSR, provides more responsibility and greater interest of
branch ministers, associations, and enterprises to enhance production
of high quality export goods that will be competitive in the world
market.
By this decision, more than 20 ministries and government depart-
ments and about 80 major manufacturing associations and enterprises
were granted the right to direct transactions. These ministries now
have incorporated the self-supporting associations whose primary aim
is to assist parent ministries in foreign trade. Science and industry
pools and industrial associations also have foreign trade firms of their
own. The number of organizations involved directly in trade is in-
creasing continuously.
Additional regional foreign trade associations were established un-
der the Councils of Ministers of the Union Republics. These associa-
tions will be in charge of dealing on external markets with commodi-
ties manufactured in the Union Republics.
The above-mentioned measures in no way undermine the state
monopoly on foreign trade since the central state bodies exercise gen-
eral guidance over foreign trade activities, planning and utilization of
hard-currency funds. These measures, however, change the monopo-
listic trade relations in the USSR to a certain extent.
With the adoption by the Decision of the Central Committee of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Council
of Ministers of the USSR of Additional Measures to Improve Eco-
nomic Activity Under New Economic Conditions in September 1987,
broader rights in external economic relations including the use of
hard-currency funds received from the export of produced goods were
granted to enterprises.
To boost business initiative and strengthen self-sufficiency, Soviet
producers are entitled to pool their funds to implement joint projects,
transfer funds to other producers and associations under mutually
beneficial conditions, and invest abroad. The most important feature
of the 1987 decisions is the opening for new and effective forms of
external economic relations by permitting joint ventures with foreign
firms to be established on Soviet territory.
New opportunities for trade, economic, and industrial cooperation
between the USSR and foreign partners were provided by Decision
No. 1405 of the Council of Ministers on December 2, 1988, which
in fact granted the right of direct external transactions to all Soviet
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producers of goods and services, while regulating state auditing and
control mechanisms. Along with the formation and development of
new elements of organizational infrastructure in external economic
relations, the process of restructuring the steering bodies of foreign
trade was initiated.
To ensure general guidance of the entire complex of foreign eco-
nomic relations, a State Foreign Economic Commission was estab-
lished under the USSR Council of Ministers. A primary aim was to
elaborate relevant legal and economic measures aimed at the most
efficient use of external economic activities to accelerate the devel-
opment of the national economy. This commission is responsible for
mapping out and implementing the country's external economic pol-
icy and supervising its fulfillment, and for coordinating the activity
of Soviet ministries, government departments, and organizations on
foreign markets. The commission's major functions are to provide for
the development of the Soviet export basis, to assist producers in ob-
taining information, and to arrange for the training of personnel and
other aspects of adjusting the new mechanism of foreign economic ac-
tivity including implementation of export/import quotas within the
whole complex.
At the same time, further steps have been undertaken towards in-
creasing the role of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations as the
key state instrument in maintaining control over the level and quality
of commercial operations. In this connection, the USSR Council of
Ministers granted the right to arrange for the recording of all partic-
ipants involved in foreign economic activities.
8.2 Legislation for Foreign Investment in the
USSR: Dynamics and Development
In the process of Soviet economic reform, substantial efforts have been
made through legislation to encourage new forms offoreign economic
activities. The legislation is aimed at creating favorable conditions
for gradually developing relations in foreign economic activities to
achieve the following goals:
• Enhance USSR participation in international business relations
by developing new forms of industrial cooperation together with
conventional trade relations.
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• Broaden the involvement of Soviet enterprises in foreign economic
relations.
Joint ventures in Soviet territory are the principal new form of
foreign economic relations between Soviet organizations and foreign
companies. All questions regulating creation, activities, and oper-
ations of such joint companies are stipulated in the complex set of
legislative documents.
A decree on related issues such as the establishment of joint ven-
tures, international associations and organizations in the USSR is
considered a major step among the complex set of legislative docu-
ments issued so far in the country. The decree defined the legal pro-
cedures for establishing joint ventures as well as the conditions for the
use of natural resources in the USSR and the taxation structure. A
procedure for arbitration was also considered. The stipulations have
been further developed by several decisions of the USSR government
and governmental agencies.
On January 13, 1987, Decree No. 49 on the Establishment and
Activities of Joint Companies on the Territory of the USSR with
Participation of Soviet Organizations and Companies from Capitalist
and Developing Countries was adopted by the USSR Ministry Coun-
cil. This decree defined the status of joint companies as juridical
persons according to Soviet legislation and set the following goals:
• Satisfaction of demand for certain industrial goods, raw materials,
and services.
• Technological and managerial know-how transfer in the USSR and
attraction of material and financial resources.
• Development of export possibilities for Soviet industry.
• Changed structure and increased efficiency of Soviet imports.
The decree initiated the process of establishing joint ventures in
the USSR and granted them the following rights:
• Joint ventures have the right to be fully independent in their busi-
ness activities as well as in making decisions without the approval
of the governmental agencies managing the USSR economy.
• The share of the foreign partners should not exceed 49 percent and
the general director of the joint venture as well as the chairman
of the board should be Soviet citizens.
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• The joint ventures have the right to independent export and im-
port operations necessary for their business activities.
• On the domestic market, sales and supplies in rubles can be done
on a contractual basis, but the right to operate was not given to
the joint venture directly; this can be done through State trade
organizations.
• Joint ventures are obliged to cover their requirements for con-
vertible currencies including those for profit distribution among
partners only from their own income in convertible currencies, but
loans are also possible.
• After the first two years of operations, the joint companies are
obliged every year to pay a profit tax of 30 percent. The reserve
fund and funds for production development and R&D are to be
allocated before taxation.
• The Ministry of Finance reserves the right to grant taxation hol-
idays depending on the importance of the joint venture business
activities to the economy of the USSR. Exemption of the profit
tax is also possible. The regulations for taxing joint ventures,
one of the most important elements of foreign investment legis-
lation, were formulated in a way that stimulates reinvestment in
the joint venture. Furthermore, the State economic agencies and
ministries are empowered to regulate the process of establishing
joint ventures in national priority areas.
Decree No. 49 established import and export guarantees for the
foreign partners' share of the authorized fund. As long as other ar-
rangements have not been stipulated by bilateral agreements between
the USSR and the respective foreign countries, repatriated profit is
taxed at the rate of 20 percent. It is important to note that in this
decree the Ministry Council declared that labor conditions and pay-
ments of foreign citizens working in joint ventures will be based on
concluded individual contracts. Soviet labor legislation applies with
respect to Soviet citizens.
Experience gained while establishing the first joint ventures in
1987 demonstrated, according to Soviet and foreign specialists, that
the stipulations and provisions needed revision to overcome barriers
to joint entrepreneurship. On September 17, 1987, the Central Com-
mittee of the Communist Party of the USSR together with the Min-
istry Council adopted Decree No. 1074 on The Further Development
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of Foreign Economic Activities in New Business Conditions. The
changes thereby introduced in Soviet joint venture legislation were
substantial. Its basis revealed new opportunities for developing joint
ventures. It should be noted that the right to sell and buy within
the USSR in convertible currency as well as in rubles was granted
to joint ventures. This should be regarded as a step towards solving
some of the problems connected with joint companies in the Soviet
Union and has attracted the attention of Western companies. At the
end of 1987, a total of 23 joint ventures had been registered. In the
first half of 1988, the list gained 80 new companies.
This process became the subject of serious analysis by both sci-
entists and practitioners in the Soviet Union and abroad; here we
attempt to analyze the initial problems.
On December 2, 1988, the Ministry Council of the USSR adopted
a decree On the Development of Foreign Economic Activities ofState,
Cooperative and Other Public Enterprises, Associations and Organi-
zations, which continued the process oflegislation development in the
country. The 49 percent limit on the foreign partners' share in the
authorized fund of the joint venture was removed. Foreign citizens
were allowed to serve as general directors and chairmen of the board.
This important step is closely related to the following circumstances:
• The foreign partners' share in the authorized fund of the first 150
joint ventures registered in the country averaged about 37 per-
cent. But almost 20 percent of all joint ventures, especially those
created with partners from the FRG, Japan and Finland, have
shares equal to 49 percent.
• On the other hand, the minority share of a foreign partner in the
authorized fund decreased its role in the decision-making process.
According to our observations, Soviet representatives on joint ven-
ture management boards have generally respected the positions
of Western partners, but differences in opinions have been raised.
In such cases, the minority share of the foreign partner formally
appears to be a barrier to achieving one of the main goals of joint
ventures in the USSR, transfer of managerial know-how. Together
with the Decree No. 1405, practical observations have established
that key decisions should be taken by consensus, not based on the
percent share in the authorized fund.
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The decree granted all rights for personnel recruitment, salaries,
and employment conditions of Soviet citizens to the joint ventures.
The changes aim to equalize business activities and conditions be-
tween State, cooperative, and joint enterprises. According to the
law of State enterprises and the law of cooperatives in the USSR,
all juridical restrictions for salaries and wages of Soviet citizens were
removed. At the same time, all problems concerning labor conditions
and personnel were to be coordinated with the trade union. Decree
No. 1405 contains other provisions that further simplified the estab-
lishment and activities of joint ventures in the USSR (see Chapter 2).
In March 1989, the Council of Ministries of the USSR adopted
Decree No. 203 on State Regulations of Foreign Economic Activities.
This decree is aimed at creating a complex system of accounting, au-
diting, and regulating foreign economic relations of the Soviet state
and cooperative enterprises regarding conditions of independent ex-
port and import operations. Decree No. 203 restricted the export
operations of joint ventures only in volume and structure of their
own production. Imports are restricted to the goods and services
necessary for the joint venture production activities. During 1988,
tendencies to increase the joint venture profits based on trade with
Soviet raw materials and Western goods on the Soviet market were
observed. The new Law on Foreign Investment is now being elabo-
rated and considers various forms of foreign investment in the USSR
not only for joint ventures.
8.3 The Formation and Activities of the
Soviet East-West Joint Ventures
The first joint venture in the USSR was registered on May 12, 1987;
this was a Soviet-Hungarian enterprise, "Littara-Valanpac."
Figure 8.1 illustrates the dynamics of growth of joint ventures
established in the USSR. There are now nearly 1,000 joint ventures
in the USSR; 70-80 joint ventures are being registered monthly, by
the end of the second quarter of 1990, 1,800 had been registered.
Of joint ventures registered in the USSR as of September 1, 1989,
the total volume of the authorized fund was 2,412 million rubles;
Soviet enterprises and organizations have contributed 57.7 percent,
Socialist countries 6.9 percent, Western countries 34.1 percent, and
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Figure 8.1. East-West joint venture process in the USSR.
developing countries 1.3 percent. On the whole, approximately 57.2
percent of the joint ventures established in the USSR have authorized
funds of less than one million rubles, and approximately 6.6 percent
have more than five million rubles.
About one-third of the registered joint ventures operate in the in-
dustrial sphere (including transport and construction), 32.5 percent
are established in the social sphere (production of consumer goods,
health services, public food services, tourism, etc.), 31 percent in sci-
ence and research services (engineering, consulting, brokering, train-
ing personnel). Concerted investments (the sum of the authorized
funds and credits) in joint ventures are less than 1 percent of the
yearly investments in the Soviet national economy.
Figure 8.2 illustrates the dynamics of joint venture formation in
the USSR with partners from capitalist countries. The first of such
enterprises is a firm from Finland, registered in the USSR on July
22, 1987.
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Figure 8.2. Dynamics of East-West joint ventures in the USSR.
On September 1, 1989, the number of East-West joint ventures
registered in the USSR totaled 747. More than 300 Soviet State enter-
prises, cooperative associations, and organizations and their partners
representing more than 700 firms from 23 countries had contributed
a total amount of 1,939 million rubles (US$1,286 million) to the au-
thorized funds. Western partners contributed 34 percent of the total
sum of these investments.
Joint ventures with Western partners show rapid and intensive
growth (Figure 8.2, curve A); the total volume of Soviet and foreign
investments in these enterprises increases more slowly (curve B); and
the value of the average authorized funds of individual joint ventures
decreases (curve C). This is due to a large number of joint ventures
recently created in the spheres of engineering, consulting, brokering
and other services, where large investments are not required.
Most joint ventures are in the fields of consumer goods, health ser-
vices, tourism, services, hotels, restaurants, and also in engineering,
consulting, brokering, and information services. These enterprises
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promote the welfare of the population, create the infrastructure re-
quired for developing the national economy, and promote manage-
ment development and the use of modern management methods.
In 1988, several joint ventures began to produce consumer goods,
e.g., Lenwest (Leningrad) and Belwest (Vitebsk), whose foreign part-
ner is Salamander (West Germany), and Sovplastital (Tashkent) es-
tablished with the participation of Alma Rose (Italy).
A number of joint ventures have started activities in consult-
ing and engineering, e.g., the Soviet-Finnish Vneshkonsult (Moscow).
Demand for engineering services is much higher than the supply in
the Soviet market. This may be explained by a restructuring of the
economic mechanism in the USSR and the higher independence of en-
terprises, particularly in the field of foreign economic relations. Since
April 1, 1989, Soviet manufacturers are responsible for their export-
import operations, and they badly need to improve their decision-
making system to deal with this new function. Soviet producers also
have the right to participate in joint venture projects.
A number of joint ventures have been created in the USSR to
produce personal computers and software, for which there is great
demand. During the first stage of their activities, such enterprises
arrange for the delivery of personal computers manufactured abroad
or assemble personal computers from imported components. Under
these circumstances, local prices (in rubles) may be 10-20 times more
than prices abroad.
In this field, joint ventures also have an opportunity to use the
comparatively low labor costs of Soviet programmers, who are usually
engaged on a contractual basis. Therefore, the profitability of such
enterprises is very high. Two joint ventures that are now successfully
being developed to produce personal computers are Dialog (Soviet-
American) and Interquadro (Soviet-French-Italian).
About 45 joint ventures have been established in the chemical
sector. Some of them will be ready to start operation in the near
future: Petrokam (Soviet-West German) in Nieschnekamsk for the
production of ethylene-glycol, PRIS (Soviet-American) in Moscow for
engineering activities in the petrochemical industry, and others. As
of September 1, 1989, a total of 36 joint ventures had been established
in different branches of machine building (excluding computers).
These enterprises have wide product ranges (metalworking tools
and centers, machine tools for light industry, engineering services
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Table 8.3. Western countries' contribution to USSR joint ventures.
Foreign Share Share in
partner's of the total
Number total foreign amount
of Total" invest- invest- of foreign
joint funds' Averagea mentsb ments invest-
Country ventures A funds' B BfA ments
FRG 55 192.0 3.49 60.0 31.3% 16.6%
Finland 51 96.3 1.89 38.7 40.2% 10.7%
Italy 30 183.7 6.12 51.5 28.0% 14.3%
USA 30 41.7 1.39 21.4 51.3% 5.9%
UK 27 32.5 1.20 12.1 37.2% 3.4%
Austria 24 64.6 2.69 21.0 32.5% 5.8%
France 16 135.5 8.46 51.3 37.9% 14.3%
Switzerland 14 97.3 3.38 21.0 21.6% 6.0%
Japan 10 39.5 3.95 18.7 47.3% 5.2%
(lThese are a.uthonzed funds.
bIn million rubles.
in machine building, etc.). In many instances, the partners in these
joint ventures had been cooperating in R&D and technology develop-
ment long before the joint venture was established. Joint ventures in
the machine-building industry have much higher levels of authorized
funds than joint ventures in other branches.
At present, some joint ventures in machine building have started
production: Homatec (see Case Study H in the Appendix) in Moscow,
Tirpa (Tiraspal City) established with the participation of Italian
companies, KRANLDD with the participation of the Swiss company
Libherr, and the Soviet-West German MSZ Vendt (Moscow) in ma-
chine tools.
Joint ventures engaged in machine-building faced many sophis-
ticated problems, specifically with the supply of raw materials and
components within the domestic wholesale system, training of per-
sonnel, cooperation with state-owned enterprises, ruble nonconvert-
ibility, and interrelated issues.
The distribution of joint ventures in terms of partnership and the
contribution of various Western countries (as of April 1, 1989) can
be illustrated by the data given in Table 8.3.
Table 8.3 shows that the FRG ranks first in terms of the total
amount of invested capital. Almost 22 percent of FRG investments
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belong mostly to the machine-building field. Moreover, many of these
joint ventures were established on the basis of previous long-term
cooperation between the partners, e.g.: Homatec (Moscow)-machine
tools and manufacturing centers; MSZ-Vendt (Moscow) - polishing
machine tools; and Sedin-Shiss (Krasnodar) - carousel machine tools.
In the field of consumer goods and other social services, a total of
11 joint ventures have been established. Joint ventures in Leningrad
and Vitebsk started producing shoes with the participation of the
West German Salamander company.
Finnish companies participate mainly in the fields of consumer
goods (29 percent), engineering services (31 percent), and building
and construction. More than half of the Soviet-Finnish joint ventures
have individual authorized funds amounting to less than one million
rubles. Among the joint ventures in operation are: Vneshkonsult
(Moscow) and Consofin (Leningrad) for consulting services. Not far
from completion is the joint venture Infa Hotel in Moscow.
Italian companies participate in 30 joint ventures in fields such
as social services (40 percent of the total), machine building (17 per-
cent), and engineering (27 percent). In total, more than 180 billion
rubles were invested in these ventures, and their average authorized
funds amount to more than 6 million rubles. Italian investments
make up only 28.1 percent of all capital invested in Soviet-Italian
joint ventures. Some of the largest joint ventures in the USSR are
Soviet-Italian joint ventures, such as Sorplastital (Tashkent), plastics
and consumer goods; Sovitalrpodmask (Volgsk), refrigerating equip-
ment; Sorbutital (Western Siberia), gas polymers. About 44 percent
of the Soviet-Italian joint ventures have authorized funds exceeding
five million rubles.
US companies participate in 30 joint ventures of which 67 per-
cent have authorized funds amounting to no more than one million
rubles and only 18 percent have authorized funds exceeding five mil-
lion rubles. In total, US investments make up 35 percent of all in-
vested capital in Soviet-US joint ventures and amount to 21.4 million
rubles. About 50 percent of the US joint ventures are established in
technological, consulting, and engineering services and 33 percent in
the social complex. US companies have not yet participated in the
heavy machine- building industry.
Investigations are now under way within the framework of Soviet
and American consortiums. Among the joint ventures presently in
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operation, the joint venture Dialog in developing personal comput-
ers and software ought to be mentioned (see Case Study G in the
Appendix). The Soviet-American joint venture PRIS, which collabo-
rates in applied electronic control systems in the petroleum industry,
is ready to start production.
Almost all of the 27 Soviet-British joint ventures are small and
operate in the technological field (41 percent), social complex (33.3
percent), or computer production (10.5 percent).
Austrian companies are engaged in consultancy services (37.5 per-
cent) and in computer software (25 percent). Almost all of them (80
percent) have authorized funds below one million rubles.
French partners have invested in rather large-sized joint ventures.
They have the largest average authorized fund (8.46 million rubles)
and only 25 percent of them have authorized funds below one million
rubles. The French companies possess more than 38 percent of the
financial funds in their USSR joint ventures, which can be broken
down into the following sectors: engineering services (37.5 percent),
social (31.3 percent), and the chemical industry (12.5 percent).
Joint ventures established with the participation of Swiss com-
panies have a rather broad activity spectrum: consumer goods and
engineering (both 16.7 percent), tourist services, machine-building,
chemical industry including pharmaceuticals, agro-industry, and oth-
ers. Some 44 percent of all the Soviet-Swiss joint ventures have au-
thorized funds below one million rubles. At the same time, the total
Swiss contribution amounts to 21.6 million rubles and is even higher
than that of the US companies.
The Japanese contribution to Soviet-Japan joint venture is not
yet very large, only about 6 percent of total Western investments.
The Soviet-Japanese joint ventures fall within the following fields:
agro-industryor fisheries (40 percent), forestry, and tourist services.
One of the prominent Soviet-Japanese joint ventures Igizma-Tairiku
(Siberia, Irkutsk) is now producing approximately 90,000 cubic me-
ters of high-quality saw timber articles, more than 60 percent of which
is being exported.
At the first stage, the joint venture leaders in the USSR are the
companies and countries with highly developed trade and economies
and with some tradition in Soviet relations (FRG, Finland, Italy).
Improved international relations serves as a good basis for the further
development of US and British joint ventures. Practical experience
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gained in this rather new form of multilateral cooperation and im-
provements in the level offoreign investment legislation in the USSR
will facilitate the further development of joint ventures in the USSR.
8.4 Practical Experience and Problem
Analysis
To obtain sufficient current data on joint ventures with Western com-
panies, the most prominent joint ventures with the longest histories
were selected for examination: Dialog (Soviet-US); Homatec (Soviet-
FRG); and Technicord (Soviet-French) - all were registered in the
USSR in 1987. The carefully described process of their formation
reveals differences in motivation, level of previous cooperation, nego-
tiations, and concluded agreements.
The West German company Heinemann Maschinen und Anlagen-
bau and the Production Organization (P/0) Ordzonikidze machine-
tools plant had begun cooperation in the period 1986-1987, which led
to the establishment of Homatec. On the other hand, the establish-
ment of the Dialog resulted from occasional meetings of representa-
tives from MPI and P/0 KAMAZ at the American trade exhibition
in Moscow.
The scope and mode of activities with foreign partners from the
USA, FRG, and France differ, and the results of their activities can
be measured from different points of reference. There is no doubt,
however, that they possess certain common features, in particular:
• Relevant foreign technology is broadly used in the production
process.
• Foreign-made components and parts delivered by principal com-
panies normally provide the basis of the main production cycle.
• Soviet licenses and/or know-how are very often used in the pro-
duction process.
• Foreign managerial expertise is implemented in practice.
An analysis of establishing a joint venture in the USSR with part-
ners from Western countries was made by the authors in 1988.2
2Part of the results can be found in the IIASA Working Paper entitled "Joint
Ventures with Foreign Capital Participation in the Soviet Union: Experiences and
Future Outlook", Ranenko & Soloviev, WP-89-03, January 1989.
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The analysis generalizes the most typical problems that were ex-
plicitly described in interviews and questionnaires. The main groups
of problems are the following:
First Group: Problems provoked by differences between the status
and rights given to joint ventures and the character of internal man-
agement in the USSR.
Second Group: Problems provoked by the nonconvertibility of rubles.
Third Group: Problems arising from insufficient knowledge and lack
of experience of Soviet managers and specialists in the fields of eco-
nomics, organizational development, and management of interna-
tional operations.
When analyzing the first group, it is important to note that the
legislative framework for operating joint ventures in the USSR has
improved business economic mechanisms and produced economic re-
forms in the country. Joint ventures have been empowered to perform
business activities that their Soviet partners should also be allowed to
perform in the domestic market. The majority of goods are produced
by State enterprises under State orders or based on contracts that are
concluded in advance by higher authorities. The scale of supply is
not more than 15 percent to 20 percent of the total turnover of goods
in the country. Therefore, joint ventures face difficulties in obtaining
supplies of raw materials, components and parts from the centralized
distribution system.
Currently, the USSR lacks business and management infrastruc-
ture, specifically engineering, consultancy, information, and other sci-
entific services. This is also due to the previous economic mechanism
in the USSR, and was a source of problems for joint ventures in
market relations and daily market orientation. Joint ventures have
been created in the field of business and management infrastructures,
however, and these should help solve the problems mentioned above.
The second group of problems is connected with the nonconvert-
ibility of rubles. Currently, there is no doubt that in the course of
instituting radical economic reforms, it is necessary to achieve a bal-
ance between monetary funds and goods within the economy in order
to solve this problem. The main difficulty of joint ventures related
to nonconvertibility is the necessity to self-finance activities involv-
ing hard currency. The case studies show some practical solutions
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to this problem, both in exports and in domestic market activities.
The nonconvertibility of rubles, however, is not the most significant
problem during the initial stage.
Some additional opportunities provided by the right to indepen-
dent export and import operations for State and cooperative enter-
prises should also be considered. The amount of convertible currency
earned thereby may be used by these enterprises to buy goods and
services from joint ventures. It is also possible for joint ventures
to participate in currency auctions, which will be organized by the
Vnesch Economic Bank of the USSR in the near future.
The third group of problems is related to the insufficient experi-
ence of Soviet managers and specialists in the field of foreign economic
relations. This appears to be a problem not only for joint venture
activities but also for practical foreign economic activities of Soviet
enterprises.
The practical experience and knowledge of Western partners are
very often much greater than their Soviet colleagues can offer. Possi-
bilities for more intensive use of management methods and practical
experience, which as a rule are well known to the Western compa-
nies, have seen a remarkable increase. Options are greater now that
representatives of the foreign partners can be appointed general direc-
tors and chairmen of joint ventures. These decisions have gradually
changed the attitude of Soviet managers to the realities of the new
business environment.
The solution of the problems mentioned above lies in management
development. Many activities at different levels and in various orga-
nizations are being organized to create new management programs
and schools. Universities are taking part and so are institutes for
management development, joint ventures specialized in the field, and
consultancy companies. Publications on management and new meth-
ods and techniques are rapidly increasing. Seminars and conferences
for Soviet managers, including the participation of Western experts,
are being organized in increasing numbers every day.
Chapter 9
Current Issues and
Challenges in East-West
Joint Ventures: An
American Perspective
J. Morton
9.1 A Brief History of Change
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, it became increasingly evident
that the economic systems within the so-called "Socialist" countries
were not able to create the level of goods, food, shelter or techno-
logical progress that were evident in the industrialized, free-market
economies of the West. These increasingly apparent shortcomings
were exacerbated by an acceleration of technological achievement in
the West that not only threatened to diminish the relative global eco-
nomic, political, and military capabilities of the Socialist states, but
also threatened to undermine their very social and cultural structures.
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In the late 1970s, the prospect that these Socialist economies and
societies might virtually collapse became imaginable - not only be-
cause the Eastern economies were actually in a state of accelerating
decline, but also because technological changes involving the instanta-
neous transmission of data, images, printed materials, and voice were
facilitating enhanced global communications at a level never before
possible; it became increasingly difficult for governments to obstruct
the flow of economic bad news to their own populations. Accordingly,
Socialist countries confronted with a decline in their economic, tech-
nological, and political· structures, and increasingly unable to control
the flow of information within their own territory (information which
principally increased the expectations and heightened the frustra-
tions of their own people) were forced to permit change or confront
disaster.
For many reasons, some obvious and some less so, the People's Re-
public of China was among the first communist countries to adopt a
joint venture law. China, therefore, became something of an economic
"laboratory" within which systems were designed, modified, supple-
mented, repealed, and redefined over a period of more than a decade,
culminating in a system that, prior to the Tiananmen Square incident
in the Spring of 1989, was producing considerable wealth, foreign in-
vestment, consumer goods, export items, and technology exchanges
witrun the territory of the People's Republic of China. On the dark
side of the Chinese "experiment," however, were increased corruption,
escalating inflation, widely disparate shortages, local grass-roots re-
sentment toward an emerging entrepreneurial class, and a growing
discontent in urban centers relating to repressive laws and practices
restricting individual freedom. Despite these problems, the Chinese
experiment produced many demonstrable economic benefits within
China, giving rise in Eastern Europe to fears that the Chinese might
have rut upon a formula that could accelerate the decline and isola-
tion of the Warsaw Pact Nations.
The relative success of the Chinese experiment was predicated on,
among other things:
(1) The concentration of economic development (and infrastructural
development) within certain special economic zones.
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(2) The willingness of the Chinese to permit the operation of
wholly owned and majority-owned foreign subsidiaries on Chinese
territory.
(3) The creation of special regulations permitting the purchase and
sale or transfer of foreign exchange among East-West joint ven-
tures situated in China.
(4) The willingness of a large number of Chinese to accept the new
entrepreneurialism and the new entrepreneurs in a cultural and
social context (although this acceptance was not universal, nor
was it without specific and sometimes violent local consequences).
(5) The creation of a "total-cost" system (taking into account the ag-
gregate real costs of capital, labor, taxes, duties, transporting raw
materials and the like) which permitted Western-style businesses
to set up quality-oriented, efficient, profit-oriented manufacturing
facilities able to produce cost-competitive, world-quality products
for the global marketplace.
(6) The creation of mechanisms for ameliorating (if not resolving)
problems of sourcing and pricing raw materials, parts, space and
labor, as well as mechanisms to ameliorate problems relating to
management and capital accumulation, and to the distribution,
transportation, sales, and marketing of goods and products of the
China-based venture.
Despite all of the continuing political and social problems in
China, billions of dollars of foreign investment poured into the Peo-
ple's Republic of China during the first nine years of the 1980s. The
technological and production infrastructure within China was sub-
stantially enhanced. One of the most obvious and most serious con-
sequences of the enormous economic changes that swept the People's
Republic of China during this period was an increasing discontent
among the Chinese population, particularly in urban centers. This
discontent derived, in part, from frustrated consumer expectations
and, in part, from a growing dissatisfaction with the increase in cor-
ruption at every level of Chinese society and with the burdensome
encumbrances on personal liberty and political freedom imposed by
the government.
This discontent led to a series of demonstrations that ended on
June 4, 1989 with the Chinese military intervention in Beijing's
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Tiananmen Square. The events that led to the Tiananmen upris-
ing and to the infamous suppression of the Tiananmen demonstra-
tion were closely observed by both Easterners and Westerners wi th
concern and consternation. The immediate reaction of the Western
business community was to review existing Chinese business relation-
ships and to postpone new or proposed business relationships. East-
West business projects in China were substantially retarded following
the Tiananmen incident and they have not fully recovered from the
negative consequences of that event.
While it is difficult to understand fully all of the factors that led
to the Tiananmen incident, perhaps the most obvious conclusion to
be drawn from those events is simply that one of the inevitable conse-
quences of rapid and substantial change in any society is widespread
discontent, demographic restructuring, and an increased level of so-
cial disorder, all of which are exacerbated when a program of eco-
nomic reform is launched in the absence of political and social re-
forms.
With this concern clearly in mind, the Soviet Union in 1987 em-
barked on a concurrent program of political reform (perestroika), cul-
tural and social change (glasnost) and economic reform (the USSR
Joint Enterprises Decree of January 13, 1987). These reforms have
progressed simultaneously and have produced profound changes not
only in the Soviet Union, but also in those Eastern European nations
that have been within the Soviet Union's sphere of influence since the
late 1940s. The changes wrought by these reforms have been so dra-
matic and so fundamental that it is both astonishing and gratifying
(and perhaps a tribute to Soviet leadership) that they have not been
accompanied by violence and revolution on a broad scale.
9.2 Lessons Learned From Recent Changes
As in the case of China, the lessons learned from the experiences in
the USSR and in Eastern Europe over the past several years depend,
in large measure, upon the personal perspective of the beholder. From
my perspective, several conclusions seem justified:
(1) No nation - however vast and however rich in human and natu-
ral resources - can survive unless it establishes and maintains an
economic system that can produce a surplus of goods and services
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that are available and attractive, both to its own population and
to the external world market. Otherwise, such a nation has noth-
ing of value to trade for those essential goods and services that it
cannot produce at home.
(2) To be successful, the mechanisms for creating a surplus of goods
and services must be predicated upon some system that provides
incentives for individuals to express their creativeness, industri-
ousness, and enterprise. Otherwise, experience demonstrates that
individuals have no incentive to work hard to produce quality,
cost-competitive goods.
(3) Individual creativity, industriousness, and enterprise in business
and industry must be encouraged in a political and cultural envi-
ronment that values and rewards (rather than represses) personal
liberty and that does not impose long-term unpopular choices
on indigenous populations. Otherwise, plant managers and en-
trepreneurs, who are expected to be bold, creative and innova-
tive, will find themselves instead, timid, unpopular, suspect, and
intimidated.
(4) To encourage and reward individual initiatives within its political
and economic system, a nation must place significant value upon
the role of the individual (as well as upon the value of the group)
within both its cultural and economic systems. The inevitable
consequence will be that individuals will press for increased per-
sonal liberties well beyond the economic sphere. In short, the
inevitable result of encouraging individual initiatives in the busi-
ness and economic spheres is to create irrepressible popular de-
mands for increased personal liberties in the political and cultural
spheres. In the case of the Chinese, the inevitable demands for
increased personal liberties were forcibly repressed, at least in the
short term. In the case of the USSR, these demands have been
anticipated, encouraged, directed, and - at least up to now -
accommodated.
All of this, of course, is relevant to an examination of East-
West economic ventures situated in the Socialist countries because
the long-term stability of the political, cultural, and economic condi-
tions within any prospective host country is a necessary precondition
to the long-term success of a business venture there. While insurance
may be available to protect Western businesses from certain foreign
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losses arising from specifically defined political risks, such policies de
not compensate the Western investor for the loss of the enormous
"soft costs" of unsuccessful foreign activities. Such soft costs include
the time, energy, and lost opportunity that are consumed in the nego-
tiation, creation, operation, and eventual failure of a foreign venture.
National stability is also important to Westerners, who do not want to
become economically involved with a country that provides unhappy
- even bitter - employees, or that is the subject of angry protests, em-
bargoes, or boycotts back in the West. Such problems have occurred
in the United States with respect to China and South Africa because
of widely perceived repressive policies in these countries toward their
own people. All things considered, therefore, a rational program for
national economic reform must include provisions for political, cul-
tural, and social changes, all of which are designed to increase the
level of individual initiatives, participation, and prerogatives within
the changing society.
9.3 Significant Infrastructural Issues
Confronting East-West Joint Ventures
At conferences, seminars, round-table discussions, and strategy meet-
ings throughout the world, lawyers, policy makers, accountants, and
business people spend a great deal of time talking about legal struc-
tures, tax laws and tax treaties, accounting principles, and economic
strategies that will position East-West joint ventures for success
within their host countries. These discussions are certainly vital to
the success of any joint venture but, in my view, the issues that most
likely will affect the ultimate success or failure of a joint venture can-
not be found in legal papers, accounting rules, or economic strategies.
It is useful to conceptualize the productive aspect of any manu-
facturing business as a lock in a river-based transportation system
through which all ship traffic must pass. In building the lock, a great
deal of attention must be given to the size, configuration, cost, pricing
(if tolls are to be charged for passage through the lock), taxes (if taxes
are to be paid by the lock), business structure, and capital structure
affecting the construction, operation, and maintenance of the lock.
Certainly, the construction and operation of the lock should not be
undertaken on a for-profit basis unless its physical construction and
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function are permitted by both the laws of man and nature, or unless
there is some demonstrable need for its services, or unless there is a
permitted form of business structure that accommodates the needs
of all of the business participants, or unless the entire project is eco-
nomically feasible by some external standard. On the other hand,
in planning the business of establishing and operating the lock on a
for-profit basis, considerable attention must also be paid to the feeder
and receiving systems, which supply necessary materials to the lock
and which receive those materials after the lock has performed its
function. In short, the lock is not an independent, free-standing en-
tity that, if managed efficiently and effectively, will succeed without
regard to a multitude of external forces that affect it. It is, instead,
one essential piece of a continuum of pieces, events, and conditions,
all of which are necessary for the proper function of the lock and the
larger transportation system of which it is just one component. The
best designed lock will not be commercially viable if the river runs
dry or if there are no ships to use its services.
The degree to which one must consider these external pieces in
planning a business varies both with the nature of the proposed busi-
ness and with the nature of the particular input and outflow net-
works within which the proposed business is to be embedded. For
example, computer manufacturers, food processors, or clothing man-
ufacturers are critically dependent upon the accessibility to inflow
channels that feed into the business a large number of necessary ma-
terials, parts, components, supplies, utilities, equipment, machinery,
and other items. Such businesses are heavily dependent upon the
accessibility of critical outflow channels that receive and dispose of
finished goods. These outflow channels include facilities for trans-
portation, distribution, sales, service, market information, and the
like.
It is helpful to imagine that a modern production business, like
the hypothetical lock itself, must have a relatively secure inflow of
supplies and services to sustain its core business and must be able to
transfer its products into a distribution system that is prepared to
accept, transport, display, demonstrate, sell, and service those prod-
ucts in an efficient, market-oriented, cost effective manner. It has
been the downfall of many ingeniously conceived, cleverly structured,
carefully planned and generously financed East-West joint ventures
that they have inadequately assured the supply of necessary inputs
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and/or failed to pay adequate attention to the mechanisms and chan-
nels of product outflow.
East-West ventures in China and in the USSR are particularly
vulnerable to inflow and outflow deficiencies because the Western
business people who are involved in the design of these ventures
have not had to pay such careful attention to these aspects of their
businesses in the West as they must in the East. In most Socialist
economies neither the inflow ("sourcing") nor the outflow ("distribu-
tion") channels are as clearly defined as they are in most Western
countries. In fact, in most Eastern countries neither channel may ac-
tually exist in any form relevant to a market-driven economic system.
9.4 The Sourcing Channel in Socialist
Countries
As stated above, sourcing channels in Socialist countries are, at best,
undefined and, at worst, nonexistent. The response to (or perhaps
the cause of) sourcing problems in most of the Soviet Union's major
domestic industries has been vertical integration. To assure a source
of supply for essential raw materials, parts, and supplies, local So-
viet industries almost universally have developed in-house capacity
to manufacture or supply their own needs without regard to cost or
efficiency.
The tendency to integrate vertically is evident in virtually all of
the Soviet industries that I have toured. Because Soviet industries
tend to develop dedicated, in-house manufacturing capability for all
of their required parts and components, it is not uncommon for an-
cillary manufacturing and fabrication centers within Soviet umbrella
industries to operate at efficiencies of 30 percent or lower. This ineffi-
cient vertical integration is the inevitable consequence of an incentive
system that has rewarded Soviet managers not for quality or produc-
tivity but for meeting centrally mandated production quotas without
regard to cost, quality, or efficiency. Soviet managers whose career
paths have depended upon meeting such quotas have gone to great
lengths to assure that the materials and supplies necessary to meet
those quotas will be available to them when they are needed, notwith-
standing - in fact, without regard to - the enormous costs associated
with unnecessary and inefficient vertical integration.
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Even the current trend in the Soviet Union to hold managers
accountable for profitability does not adequately address the cost
consequences of unnecessary vertical integration. Soviet accounting
rules do not yet adequately account for the capital costs of running
a business and not enough attention is being paid to encouraging a
broad network of specialized support industries to meet the diverse
and changing needs of major production facilities.
In planning an Eastern Europe-based manufacturing enterprise,
very little should be assumed in the area of sourcing. In the West, of-
fice furniture, telephones, and other routine office supplies and equip-
ment are available from a large number of competing suppliers at
competitive prices. These suppliers are keenly aware of the need to
meet or beat the pricing, quality, and service policies of their respec-
tive competitors, and they are willing to work hard to assure that
their customers are well served and satisfied. Similarly, in the West,
there are a large number of competitive sources available to most
businesses for raw materials and production machinery.
In the East, however, the supply of raw materials, machinery,
equipment, and other necessary items has been constrained histori-
cally by political rivalries between the central planning agency and
end-users over the allocation of the available (and insufficient) sup-
ply of necessary resources. While the control of central planning
agencies is diminishing rapidly in the East, the allocation of essen-
tial raw materials remains essentially the prerogative of Central or
Regional authorities. It is rarely possible for the local partner of any
East-West joint venture (or, for that matter, any Eastern contract
manufacturer) to assure with any degree of certainty the availability
of essential materials. It is therefore advisable for Western partners
to examine the sourcing channels in the host country for essential
raw materials and to involve in the negotiations leading to the joint
venture Or manufacturing agreement any additional ministries, au-
thorities, or business entities that are essential to the sourcing issue.
9.5 The Disposition Channel in Socialist
Countries
For the past several decades, most businesses in Eastern Europe (par-
ticularly in the Soviet Union) have had a single customer: the Central
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government or entities assigned by the Central Planning Authority of
the Central government. In this assigned customer context, market-
ing and sales efforts by Soviet manufacturers have not been required,
and customer satisfaction has not been a major factor in the success
or failure of any particular business entity.
Again, on the theory that a system becomes what it rewards (and
does not become that which it fails to reward or that which it actively
discourages), it is not surprising that an efficient distribution system
has failed to develop in most Eastern European nations. Most East-
ern European manufacturers have no reason to be concerned about
advertising, transporting, distributing, displaying, or servicing their
products. Instead, their responsibility has been to produce certain
specified products and deliver them to their loading docks for pickup
by a customer whom they may never have seen and whom they may
not even know by name.
While Eastern sourcing deficiencies impose formidable obstacles
to operating an East-West venture, the outflow or distribution side
of any such business may be a more serious impediment to success.
Because the customers of an Eastern business have traditionally been
assigned by a central planning authority, notions of competitive sales
and marketing or product innovation have not been relevant to East-
ern managers. Furthermore, because most Eastern products are not
manufactured until they are sold or assigned to the ultimate cus-
tomer, there has been no need to develop a wholesale distribution
network for most products. Finally, because the ultimate customer
has been assigned to the supplier and because the supplier has been
assigned to the customer, there has been no perceived need in Eastern
economies for market information, service or warranty agreements,
or for competitive transportation alternatives. The result is that
there has developed within Eastern countries a network of distinct
and noncompeting dedicated distribution, transportation, and ware-
housing systems that relate to long established and centrally-dictated
relationships between specific producers and specific customers. Al-
though these networks may be operating at substantially less than
full capacity, it is extremely difficult (if not impossible) for unrelated
third parties (such as new East-West businesses) to break into the
systems and use their excess capacities. Even if a Western company
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could penetrate one of these dedicated distribution networks, fur-
thermore, the resulting market access would be limited to those few
end-users around whom the distribution network has developed.
Problems on the distribution side may begin very early in the
manufacturing cycle. During my recent tour of Soviet manufacturing
facilities along the Volga and Don Rivers, e.g., we were frequently
told that certain existing businesses had excess capacity that they
would like to dedicate to an East-West joint venture involving an
appropriate Western partner. In attempting to work out the mechan-
ics of assuring the dedication and availability of this alleged excess
capacity, it became clear that the alleged excess capacity was only
available to the extent not required, from time to time, by the pre-
existing customer base and, further, that this excess capacity was
available to the Western partner fully burdened with the myriad of
problems affecting the preexisting underlying production base. Even
if all other problems could have been overcome, the critical problem
remaining for the proposed East-West joint venture wishing to use
this excess capacity was to identify or develop mechanisms for sourc-
ing raw materials marketing, transporting, displaying, servicing, and
selling within the USSR all or some portion of the goods produced
by the proposed joint venture.
9.6 Top-Down Versus Bottom-Up
Economies
It is fashionable for Western observers to characterize the East-
ern economies as top-down (centrally planned) rather than bottom-
up (market driven) systems. From a producer's point of view, a
top-down system is more predictable and more comfortable because
producers in a top-down system do not have to worry about the
shifting desires of consumers and can attend, instead, to meeting
their assigned production quotas for standard, specifically desig-
nated products. In a top-down system, however, consumers and end-
users inevitably fall victim to the ineptness of central planners and,
even worse, to the corruption and shortages that centrally planned
economies tend to spawn.
Producers in a bottom-up economy operate in a much less secure
environment. Bottom-up producers tend to be highly specialized,
174 East-West Joint Ventures
intensely competitive, highly innovative, and very cost, quality, and
service oriented. In a bottom-up system consumers tend to be the
group that actually controls the entire production system through
their responses to market surveys and through their purchases of (or
refusals to purchase) the wide variety of products available to them.
The differences between top-down and bottom-up systems extend
far beyond the matter of who decides what is produced and what is
consumed. The two systems require, and inevitably produce, a very
different infrastructure of support mechanisms on both the sourcing
and distribution sides.
As previously noted, in a top-down economy, distribution mecha-
nisms most often take the form of very specific and exclusive arrange-
ments between a single designated producer and a single designated
end-user and involve a single product or a single family of products.
In such systems raw materials are either locally manufactured or are
assigned by the central planning authority. Accordingly, generalized
sourcing and wholesale distribution mechanisms are not required and
do not develop in top-down or centrally planned economies.
In a bottom-up economy, on the other hand, extensive product
differentiation is required by the sheer volume of market segments
identified by consumers. The result is that bottom-up market seg-
ments and products become so diverse that only a generalized sourc-
ing and warehouse-based wholesale distribution system can serve the
marketplace.
The lack or presence of a generalized wholesale distribution
system is not the only infrastructural difference between those
distribution-side systems that are available in the East and those
that are available in the West. Of equal importance is the lack in the
East of any established market feedback mechanisms that are so vital
to the long-term success of Western consumer goods manufacturers.
Central planners, however capable and well-intentioned they
might be, are simply not capable of determining (much less reacting
to) sudden changes in true market needs because of the sheer magni-
tude of the task with which they are confronted. To do a thorough
and accurate job of understanding consumer needs, they would have
to consider tens of thousands of products and hundreds of regional,
ethnic, or religious variations affecting local preferences. Even if they
had access to all of the necessary market data (and they assuredly
do not), it would not be possible to process it all in a meaningful
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fashion and come to useful conclusions within the time allocated to
the planning process.
During my recent trips through the Soviet Union, I have had
lengthy and candid discussions with shopkeepers in a variety of state-
run retail stores. They unanimously stated that they had little or no
control over the products that were assigned to their stores by the
central planners and that they felt it futile to attempt to request spe-
cific products from their government supplier because such requests
went unheard and unfulfilled.
In a bottom-up economy, on the other hand, systems for deter-
mining market needs are grossly decentralized and because they are
so critical to business success, they are highly developed. These mar-
ket survey systems utilize the most sophisticated psychological and
statistical data available. In addition, bottom-up economies typically
generate whole industries devoted specifically to understanding and
influencing consumer preferences to produce goods that respond to
market needs and to incline existing market demands toward a par-
ticular manufacturer's products. These market analysis industries
rarely exist in Eastern economies.
9.7 Conclusions
Over the past several years, I have written a multitude of papers an-
alyzing the legal, accounting, and tax implications of doing business
in Socialist countries, such as the USSR and the People's Republic
of China. My focus has been on an analysis of the legal mecha-
nisms available in these countries to accommodate East-West eco-
nomic transactions and on the difficulties that may arise because of
deficiencies or ambiguities in the existing legal structures.
I remain convinced that a careful analysis of existing legal struc-
tures within any target country is a necessary prerequisite to planning
a business venture in such a country. On the other hand, it is becom-
ing clear to me that the Socialist countries are rapidly developing legal
systems that permit rather traditional business structures, joint ven-
tures, contract manufacturing agreements, and the like within their
territories, and that the substantive legal work relating to most East-
West ventures actually can be reduced to assuring that the final doc-
uments fairly reflect the intentions of the parties, do not run afoul of
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any particular local idiosyncrasy, and are properly authorized, signed
and recorded with appropriate authorities.
In addition, it has become clear to me that in most of the East-
ern countries at this stage in their development virtually everything
is negotiable, including tax rates, tax holidays, rights to use and dis-
pose of land and buildings, import duty rates, export permits, access
to raw materials, costs of raw materials, internal financing arrange-
ments, and the like. Almost all of these matters reduce, ultimately,
to a determination of the true cost of doing business within the East-
ern country. In this regard, Eastern countries have made a com-
mitment to make themselves attractive to foreign investors and are
willing to make substantial cost concessions to achieve that objective.
While these cost factors are extremely important and must be dealt
with, they will ultimately be fairly (if not favorably) resolved - with
patience and perseverance - because both sides understand that a
transaction must be competitively priced if it is to proceed.
After all of these very important matters are taken into account,
the principal remaining issues upon which the ultimate success or
failure of the East-West business venture will depend involve the
adequacy of the inflow (sourcing) and outflow (distribution) systems
within which the proposed East-West venture is to be embedded.
I can think of no other factors that will so profoundly affect the
ultimate outcome of the proposed venture as these.
Until local sourcing and distribution mechanisms are developed
within the Eastern countries, it will quite likely be necessary even for
East-West manufacturing ventures to integrate vertically to a much
greater extent than their counterparts in the West have found nec-
essary. It may be attractive for several Western manufacturers to
pool their resources to create certain vital sourcing and distribution
infrastructural mechanisms that might not otherwise be available to
East-West ventures. This linking of primary manufacturing invest-
ments with secondary and smaller infrastructural investments on both
the sourcing and distribution sides of the primary manufacturing fa-
cility may not only produce substantial ancillary profit centers within
the host country but also may ultimately assure the success of the
primary investment.
Chapter 10
Joint Ventures Beyond
Statistics: Current
Practices and Problems
E. Razvigorova and J. Djarova
International joint ventures had become a focus of world business
attention and were considered strategic alliances! even before the
recent developments in East-West economic relations. But so far
researchers and managers have come up with only a few limited the-
ories and empirical observations in this regard. International joint
ventures link two or more partners with different economic, organi-
zational, and managerial features to fulfill common and previously
agreed upon goals. The East-West type of joint venture presents the
most serious challenge to the scientific community and greatest mo-
tivation for business people in finding answers to many questions of
great importance to the future of both East and West.
1 Joint ventures have been described as options to avoid mergers or long-range
strategic alliances (1972 Business International).
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The beginning of the 1980s was marked by a new form of relations
between the two economic systems, equity joint ventures. The num-
ber of joint ventures escalated and in less than two years increased
ten times. It is obvious and understandable that this short period of
existence does not permit strong final conclusions. But the current
tendencies and main problems can be elaborated.
To appreciate the risks and opportunities inherent in joint ven-
tures, partners must begin to develop a viable joint orgallization.
Combilling the property, technology skills, and know-how of two or
more parties and making them profitable is neither an easy nor a
quick job. Doing this in a turbulent economy with often changing
rules is even more complicated. Local traditions, rules, and adminis-
trative practices influence the process of developing joint enterprises
and change the scope of their activities, affecting the success of the
joint companies. Organizations can survive only with a supportive
environment that cannot be created without an understanding of the
business conditions in the host country.
The results reported in this chapter are based on national analy-
ses and are supplemented by questionnaires and interviews conducted
jointly by IIASA staff members and national experts connected with
50 different joint ventures. Twenty-five Western partner orgalliza-
tions, 20 of which are from Austria were also interviewed.2
The new legislation introduced in all CMEA countries at the be-
ginning of 1989 triggered a rapid growth in the number of joint ven-
tures. For example, in Poland, 61 joint ventures were registered in
four months; in Czechoslovakia, 25 in three months; in USSR, 600 by
the end of August 1989; in Bulgaria, 25 through the end of June; and
in Hungary, nearly 500.
The type of business conducted by joint ventures varies by country
and industrial sector according to the partners' priorities, it became
more diversified after the new legislation was adopted. The majority
2 At the time the study was conducted, three joint ventures were in operation in
Czechoslovakia and another nine were in the process of being established. A total
of 282 had signed contracts in Hungary, significantly fewer were in operation,
of which 10 percent were "sleeping" and 25 percent just recently established;
Bulgaria had 16, of which 13 were in operation; USSR had 15-20 in operation;
and Poland had 12. That produced a sample of about 160 joint ventures in
operation. Statistical data for the total sample of registered joint ventures were
analyzed.
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of joint ventures are still in the chemical, machine-building, trans-
port equipment, and light industries. The service sector is rapidly
attracting investments in Hungary and in the USSR and, to a lesser
degree, in Czechoslovakia and Poland. Generally, East-West joint
ventures located in the CMEA countries concentrate their activities
in industry, but 26 percent of the joint ventures studied in Hungary
are in service sectors. Czechoslovakia is oriented towards hotels and
tourism and already has numerous spas organized as joint ventures.
Engineering, consultancy, and training organizations have been estab-
lished in Hungary and the USSR and, to a lesser extent, in Bulgaria
and Poland. Joint ventures in R&D are very rare; R&D activities are
usually related to the needs of the joint venture's production, which
with few exceptions is on a large scale.
One most important factor for the establishment of joint ventures
and their development concerns the many changes involved in re-
structuring the economic organization in general and foreign trade in
particular. Greater freedom of action is being accorded to individual
enterprises in all CMEA countries with regard to foreign trade opera-
tions. The state monopoly in industry and economic management is
being removed. Administrative procedures are being simplified. All
of these changes improve the environment of joint ventures.
Many similarities are found in joint venture legislation, partic-
ularly with regard to foreign participation in equity joint ventures,
repatriating earnings in convertible currency, and the nationality of
managers. There is, however, an appreciable diversity of tax rates On
profit earned and repatriated and a variable scope for negotiations of
local salaries and access to domestic markets. The experience accu-
mulated over the past years has obviously shown the importance of
making legal conditions to establish and operate joint ventures clearer
and easier for the partners involved.
All countries are trying to encourage joint ventures in different
branches of industries. Countries have introduced incentives on tax-
ation for defined priority areas. Different reductions and even exemp-
tions from the profit tax are possible. For example, if the company
carries on an activity of special importance to the Hungarian and
Polish economies different deductions for a tax holiday are granted.
Bulgaria decides this on a case-by-case basis, which make the situa-
tion more uncertain. The USSR and Czechoslovakia allow exemption
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from taxes to all joint ventures for the first two years. The only coun-
try that has incentives on regional basis is the USSR, with the Far
East.
10.1 Joint Venture Description
The study equally represents joint ventures from industrial and ser-
vice sectors. The contract duration varies from country to country.
According to the study, the majority are open-ended or long-term
(30-year) contracts.
Some of the joint ventures (especially those in the service sector)
have a large range of activities. As a rule, a joint venture begins
business with a few activities and gradually develops others. This is
typical for a number of Bulgarian joint ventures and some Hungarian
ones. Trade joint ventures are very widespread in all countries, which
can be explained by the lower costs of trade activities through a
joint venture, compared to the cost through trade representatives
in some CMEA countries. Another reason is the previous relations
between the partners, which tend to be transferred to the new joint
company. Next in the sample of studied service joint ventures (in
order of prevalence) are hotel, tourism, restaurant, and spa activities.
Management consultancy and software development together with
system engineering services rank third. The industrial joint ventures
studied are mainly in the chemical and machine-building industries.
In all CMEA countries, contributions to the joint venture's au-
thorized fund are permitted in capital stock and in kind. The stud-
ied sample showed that the partners' participation in a majority of
cases is in capital stock (50 percent of the Western and 51 percent of
the Eastern partners). The Western companies contributed machine
tools, and the Eastern companies, buildings and offices. The latter
is due to legislative provisions on the use of real estate in CMEA
countries. In only about 36 percent of the cases, the Western partner
participates with technological know-how; in only one case is tech-
nology made available by the Eastern partner.
Before establishing a joint venture, the partners in the majority
of cases have had traditional trade relations. Less often are joint
ventures previously unknown partners; this happens most frequently
in the CSSR. Previous relations through licensing and conventional
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trade are typical for Hungarian joint ventures. Relations through
delivery are most typical for the USSR. The Western partner tends to
be smaller both in terms of turnover and personnel. The tendency to
concentrate vertically prevailed in all CMEA countries that permitted
large companies.
10.2 The Partners' Motivations
The main motives for entering into a joint venture differ between
partners. Eastern partners are motivated mainly by undertaking
large-scale production of complex products previously imported or
by developing new products and sectors of industry while obtain-
ing hard currency. Western partners are motivated by enlarging the
scope of their markets and encompassing new market and marketing
channels. To a lesser extent, the motives of obtaining a cheaper la-
bor force or new sources for product supply or expanding production
capacity come into play.
The only common motives for both partners are in marketing
and realizing the effects of synergy. To access market opportunities
in the West is more important for the Eastern partner, while the main
target for Western companies is the huge CMEA market. These op-
portunities and the fact that 57 percent of the joint ventures studied
are selling their products to host markets, 25 percent to home ones
and only 8 percent to new markets show the difficulties joint ventures
have in attaining the objectives of both partners in their first years of
business activity. The sales volume of joint ventures on the Western
market is relatively much smaller than sales in other markets. This
increases the gap in fulfilling the objectives.
It should also be stressed that the products and technologies in-
troduced by the Western partner are predominantly in the saturation
phase in the Western market. In the Eastern market, the products
and technologies are mainly in the introductory phase. This demon-
strates the difficulties in realizing one of the most important objec-
tives of the Eastern countries - technology transfer and increased
product quality. It also decreases the competitiveness of the joint
ventures in the Western markets.
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10.3 Negotiation
East-West Joint Ventures
The joint venture is an agreement, the results of which are uncertain
and highly risky. Part of the uncertainty can be removed during the
process of negotiation. Negotiation demands strategy, skills, and in-
formation, and should aim to coordinate goals, activities, and shared
interests. Negligence and lack of attention, external difficulties, and
heavy administrative procedures can make the negotiation process
unnecessarily long, unproductive, and unsuccessful despite the signed
agreement.
The spirit of collaboration and creative partnership should be
established during negotiations and realized in the operation stage.
Because of this, it is very important that the future joint venture
management team participate in the negotiations. In many cases, the
process of negotiation has been enhanced by consulting governmental
agencies, banks, or consultancy organizations. Fifty percent of the
joint enterprises studied have had special consultancy help of some
kind.
Despite recent attempts to decentralize management in CMEA
countries, partners and negotiators from the host country are usually
ministries of various types and/or planning authorities. The Western
partners are represented in the first place by a board of directors and
in the second place by bank representatives and middle management.
As a rule, no third parties are involved in the negotiation process.
According to the study, the initiative to start negotiations for
a joint venture has come from either side. In many cases, despite
the rights legislatively granted to Socialist companies, the initiative
for joint undertakings of this type comes from higher governmental
levels.
The study proved that market research and product selection are
highly important elements for successful negotiations, followed by
availability and content of internai policy decisions. The quality of the
feasibility study, agreement, and other document preparations rank
third. The main criterion for selecting a partner is the credibility of
the company.3 This criterion ranks nearly equally with the project's
3Both Eastern and Western partners are reporting difficulties in obtaining data
for assessing credibility.
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Table 10.1. Duration of stages in setting up a joint venture.
Stages Months
Pre-negotiation research 10.0
Partner selection 5.5
Feasibility study 4.0
Signing agreement and registration 5.5
Begin production 10.5
First earned profit 27.0
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Total
Source: IIASA MTC data base.
62.5 '" over 5 years
importance and the capacity for international development of the
local labor force.
The availability of natural resources or raw materials and the exis-
tence of contracts with the administration or government supporting
the joint venture's activities are considered less important. Tech-
nology, availability of financial resources and management as well as
marketing capacity, on the other hand, are considered of highest im-
portance. Intermediate priorities concern the partners' knowledge of
the business environment, the company's image, price structure, local
supply channels, and qualifications of labor force.
Interestingly enough, the number of firms ranking the price struc-
ture as being of high importance equals the number ranking price
structure as being of medium importance. Local supply and qualifi-
cation of labor are considered as medium importance.
Long procedures and bureaucratic difficulties have been shown in
many cases to be one of the main problems in the process of nego-
tiating and establishing joint ventures. The average duration of the
different stages of the process is shown in Table 10.1.
The table shows that the time that elapses from the moment a
company reaches a decision to look for joint venture opportunities in
East Europe until the first profit is earned is, on average, over five
years. This should not be considered an excessively long time. Delays
can occur in stages where the external environment has a greater
impact (signing the agreement and registration, production start-up,
etc.). Differences among countries in the duration of these stages also
have been registered. The prenegotiation stage on average takes two
months longer in the CSSR and two months less in Hungary. Partner
selection is again two months shorter in Hungary, but three months
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longer in the CSSR. Hungary also has a shorter production start-
up (by five months) and Hungarian joint ventures earned their first
profit, on average, a year earlier. In the CSSR, the first profit usually
comes one year later than the average, and the production start-up
is also three months longer than the average. The latter applied to
USSR joint ventures as well.
10.4 Operation
To become a viable organization, each joint venture needs to develop
an effective and creative partnership and cooperation. High flexibil-
ity and the ability to innovate have to be promoted from both inside
and outside the enterprise. A company's good image, organizational
culture, and social and communicative competence are highly impor-
tant in reaching viability. Some of these matters were highlighted as
a result of the study.
10.4.1 Objectives of the joint venture
The study has shown that no joint venture has fully attained the
partners' objectives. Seventy percent of the joint ventures studied
(including the Austrian study) declared that the partners' objectives
had been partially fulfilled. It can be assumed that, according to the
partner's motives, the operational objectives of each joint venture will
be set in the following main areas:
(a) In production:
Rank 1: Increasing scale of production (71 percent).
Rank 2: Earning profit and maintaining production capacity
(24 percent).
(b) In technology development:
Rank 1: Transferring technology (57 percent).
Rank 2: Developing own new technologies.
(c) In marketing:
Rank 1: Maintaining existing markets (62 percent).
Rank 2: Penetrating new markets.
Among the production objectives, "increasing scale of produc-
tion" is ranked first. In technological development, more preference
is given to technology transfer. The opposite is true in Hungary
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where a majority of the joint ventures are aiming at technologies to
develop within their own company. The most common objective in
the market field (with the exception of the CSSR) is to maintain the
existing market.
According to the responses, the current success of joint venture ac-
tivities is mostly connected with manufacturing (well-organized pro-
duction activities), secondly with product selection, and thirdly with
technology or marketing (both are equally ranked).
10.4.2 Supply, procurement, and marketing
Local supply in terms of delivery time, availability, quality, and stan-
dards appears to be the main problem in joint venture operations. It
is reported to bring a high level of environmental uncertainty. This
is partly due to the lack of some goods and raw materials in host
markets, to the monopoly still existing in the CMEA countries, and
to quality problems.
The main barrier to joint enterprises in marketing their products
is the lack of market information. In most cases, this information has
been obtained by the joint venture itself, a process that is reported
to be rather difficult. The absence of a developed infrastructure in
most of the CMEA countries (consulting companies, market research
institutes, etc.) also has contributed to the problem.
Foreign sales are a great difficulty for joint ventures. Reaching
the markets of other CMEA countries is prevented by existing trade
quotas. Lack of competitiveness and absence of distribution channels
are the two main reasons for not selling to the Western markets. The
products manufactured by the joint enterprises usually hold major
shares in their home markets.
10.4.3 Finance and pricing
No difficulties in obtaining loans from banks in host and home coun-
tries are reported. About 22 percent of the Western partners inter-
viewed told of difficulties in obtaining a loan because of a lack of
guarantee facilities and high interest rates in CMEA markets. Sev-
enty percent of the joint ventures studied set prices for products in-
dependently on a contractual basis. Pricing is the second operational
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area in which more than 80 percent of the joint ventures have not
reported difficulties.
The vast differences in accounting and bookkeeping between East-
ern and Western partners have been reported as a problem by the
majority of joint ventures. In their opinion, training soon could help
to overcome the problem. Closely related are problems stemming
from differences in economic development indicators.
Problems in the areas of investment and planning also could soon
be overcome. No difficulties concerning salaries and profit repatri-
ation have been reported. Bearing in mind the nonconvertibility of
local currencies, this is very surprising.
10.4.4 Personnel and labor issues
Controversial opinions about labor qualifications and personnel mo-
tivation have been published. The study has shown that the host
country's specialists and workers, in most cases, can be defined as
very good or good. Only in five cases are qualifications reported to
be bad.4
Most of the Western partners tend to consider travel abroad and
high salaries to be the main motivation factors for the local labor
force. The study has shown that professional prestige, self-realization
and larger possibilities for professional contacts are the main motives
(at least in Hungary and Bulgaria).5
10.4.5 Management and organization
Difficulties in the area of management are mainly related to establish-
ing appropriate management style and methods and organizational
structures, and less to the decision-making process. Modern meth-
ods and techniques of management are used in many joint ventures.
Mixed management styles and systems dominate, not only because of
the environmental conditions of the host countries, but also because
the new organizations need new forms of management, neither East-
ern nor Western. The organizational structures are simple, mainly
'Razvigorova et al. (1989).
1) A study based on special methodology investigated the motivation structure
of Hungarian and Bulgarian joint ventures. The study was first reported in the
Bulgarian journal Management and Self-Management, May 1990 (in Bulgarian).
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Table 10.2. Level of environmental uncertainty involved in joint
ventures.
Market and customer preferences
Supplier competence
Competitor's actions
Governmental actions
Relevant partner resources and skills
Local society
Regional authority
High
High
Medium
Medium
Medium
Low
Low
due to the small scale of business activities. In general, both partners
decide upon company strategy, investment and reinvestment policy,
and, in some cases, bookkeeping and accounting. Daily operating de-
cisions are made by the joint venture. The decisions made separately
by one of the partners are insignificant in number. The organiza-
tional innovations most in demand are the implementation of EDP
and telecommunications, reduced bureaucracy, and better training.
Only two joint ventures have foreign partner representatives on
their staff. This small number means limited progress in the transfer
of managerial know-how. According to the Western partners, addi-
tional incentives should be given to personnel of the home country to
work in the joint ventures (see Chapter 4).
The short but very dynamic experience of the joint ventures un-
der study is summarized in their appraisal of the environmental un-
certainty involved in their operations (Table 10.2). Customers and
markets present a high level of uncertainty. As noted above, supply
is another uncertainty for joint ventures. With very few exceptions,
local regional factors are rarely considered as high in uncertainty.
The joint ventures have different rates of operating success and
cite a diverse number of contributing factors. In fact, all factors
mentioned in the questionnaire are reported to have a strong influence
on success, specifically:
• Strategic fit of joint venture and achievement of partners' goals
(over 60 percent of studied companies).
• Control of key aspects of the joint venture agreement.
• Start-up and learning.
• Quality.
• Technical capability and technical standards.
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Table 10.3.
Advantages
(> 50%)
East-West Joint Ventures
Advantages of joint ventures.
Possible disadvantages
'" or less 30%
4
5
6
7
8
9
Note: The areas are ranked
according to the results of the
questionnaires (% of answers)
1 Management skills (100%)
2 Marketing
3 Market expansion
Ownership
Joint venture control
Updating of transferred technology
Quality control
Joint venture capital
Return on investment
Risk sharing and pricing
Research and development (44%)
1
2
3
Western partner fe-payment
Joint venture duration
Risk sharing
Less influential are the following factors:
• Synergies of combining the partners' contributions.
• Resolution of managerial and functional conflicts.
• Complementary contribution by partners.
• Supplementary agreements; licensing management contracts, etc.
The strategic fit of the joint company and the achievement of
both partners' goals are seen as high risk areas. Nearly all success
factors also involve risk, as do joint management responsibilities and
decisions on product pricing.
The escalating number of joint ventures can be seen as a sign
of euphoria in East-West economic relations. In terms of goals and
scope of activities, some of the contracts could be easily performed
through other forms of industrial cooperation. Joint ventures, how-
ever, allow better control of operations by both partners, options to
overcome nonconvertibility of local currency, etc. The advantages of
joint ventures are listed in Table 10.3.
Finally, the study looked at the main attitude of joint venture
management (Table 10.4). The table shows the percentage of all re-
sponses. The answers have been distributed among different degrees
of agreement/rejection. Tlllrty percent of all answers are decisive
agreements and 23 percent are decisive disagreements. In the ab-
sence of a unified opinion, it is difficult to draw conclusions.
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Table 10.4. Attitudes of joint venture managers.
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DA AR CC RR DR
Partner has a pronounced interest in 28 28
improving his technical level
24 24 24
in common opinion
45
36 27
26 38
29 33 25
38 24 20
32 24 44
Partner's management operates less
effectively than one's own
Partner's interest in cooperation is
greater than that of superior responsible
organizations, authorities and ministries
The cooperation has a decisive influence on
the following areas of the partner company:
(a) internal organization
(b) product range
(c) quality of production
(d) technical standard of resources
for means of production
(e) work force qualifications
(f) export share of production
(g) foreign currency earnings
The cooperation ensures the sales of
goods already at the saturation stage
and eases pressure to look for new
products and processes
DA = Decisive agreement.
AR = Agreement with reservations.
CC = Depends on concrete circumstances.
RR = Rejection with reservations.
DR = Decisive rejection.
37
67
29 25
22
10.5 Conclusions
Joint ventures are slowly taking their place in CMEA economies. De-
spite an escalating increase in their number, there is a tendency for
the average capitalization fund and the average foreign capital share
to decrease in all countries. This can be explained partly by the West-
ern company's strategy to enter the CMEA market with long-term
perspectives. Profit is not an immediate goal of the Western partner
in many cases. Most of the joint ventures began to realize profits
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during the third year of their operation, but their total contribution
to the country's national economy remains insignificant.
Repatriation of profit and convertibility issues are not the main
problems of any joint venture. This is partly due to the small profits
and capital availability. Problems in this area are overcome through
different options provided by the joint companies themselves. With
the accumulation of profit and capital in the future, these issues will
urgently call for solutions. The increased number of East-West joint
ventures will aid the process of attaining full convertibility, but in
the near future nonconvertibility will increasingly have an inhibiting
effect on joint undertakings.
Local supply appears to be the main current problem of joint
ventures. Hard currency supplies to replace unreliable deliveries and
unavailable materials are only a short-term solution to the problem.
Difficulties in creating the company's image are due to the fact
that joint ventures are still new organizational entities in the CMEA
business environment. Joint ventures are an excellent means for
transferring managerial know-how, but this is not happening exten-
sively in practice. Managerial problems and the need to create a
unified management system and an appropriate management style
require training, consultancy, and greater emphasis, even during ne-
gotiations and the signing of the contract.
Joint venture managers have been praised for their achievements
and this has motivated them to work harder. A misunderstand-
ing of the motivation structure could lead to conflicts and lower
productivity.
Although similar to multinationals in many ways, joint ventures
will raise other issues in the future such as environmental protection,
harmonized economic indicators, labor, safety, and unemployment.
Chapter 11
Executive Summary:
Policy Recommendations
E. Razvigorova and F. Schmidt-Bleek
A new industrial revolution has begun to influence the world economy.
The increasing pace of technological transformation led by the micro-
electronic sectors calls for worldwide institutional changes, in both
centrally planned and market economies. For CMEA countries where
economic difficulties necessitate urgent attempts to reform manage-
ment systems, measures envisioned include moving away from over-
centralization and state monopolies, promoting market forces, and
partially privatizing the economy. These changes also may call for
the adaptation of political and institutional structures. Considerable
movements along these lines already are apparent in most European
Socialist countries. For Western Europe and North America, the rise
of Japan to international economic leadership and the aspiration of
newly industrialized countries pose serious challenges that will un-
doubtedly spawn institutional adjustments.
The rapprochement in economic theory and practice has spe-
cial significance for the development of international cooperation.
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Changes in the economic policies of Socialist countries and their ap-
proaches to international relations already have profoundly influenced
the climate of East-West relations and collaboration. These new and
exciting opportunities for developing improved economic relations far
exceed what seemed possible only a short while ago. Even so, dif-
ferences in social, economic, and cultural traditions will continue to
have strong influences on national and regional socioeconomic choices
as well as on technology trajectories.
During the last decade, a new institution helped to push East-
West economic relations onto a new stage: East-West equity joint
ventures in Socialist countries. Under the umbrella of perestroika,
state authorities promulgated guidelines under which joint ventures
could be established and operated, leaving negotiation and partner
selection to individuals and companies. Governments also have sup-
ported the process by granting advantages to some sectors and na-
tional areas through special economic laws, tax holidays, and other
relief. Some very important changes in the laws of almost all CMEA
countries during the last two years, and especially since early 1989,
have profoundly influenced the joint venture process. These changes
have been followed by a rapid increase in the number of established
joint companies. Countries such as Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hun-
gary, Poland, and the USSR no longer have any restrictions on the
Western partner's share nor on his participation in management or
as employee. The state supports its efforts by giving enterprises op-
portunities to decide upon the main questions of joint venture ne-
gotiation, establishment and operation: type of company, scope of
activity, partners' shares, management systems and methods, etc.
While considerable legislative efforts are evident in Eastern Eu-
ropean countries, foreign investment in them still is made in an envi-
ronment that is often unpredictable. Rapid changes, both economical
and political, still are occurring and will likely continue for some time.
The more Western companies can be certain of the environment in
which they are considering an investment, the more likely they are
to invest. The risks still evident have fostered a "foot-in-the-door"
approach to CMEA markets by making small investments in joint
ventures. Of course, the opportunity to penetrate a market of nearly
400 million (together with China over 1.7 billion) consumers is ap-
pealing. The trend appears to be toward decreasing average funds
per joint venture and toward lowering foreign capital shares; this is
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happening despite the fact that most barriers against majority foreign
shares have now been removed.
Even though some of the difficulties originating from legislative
provisions are sometimes exaggerated by Western partners, much re-
mains to be done to improve the situation. Procedures to appeal
against denied requests should be put in place. Authoritative written
commentaries and interpretations of laws, regulations, and admin-
istrative procedures should be issued to help foreign and domestic
investors. Interpretations should include such issues as tax statutes
and profit repatriation. Frequently, the situation is sufficiently un-
clear to prevent boards of Western companies from deciding to invest
in joint ventures in CMEA countries.
Economic information, both on the macro and micro level, could
increase the clarity and certainty of the investment environment. Re-
spected Western accounting and consulting firms should be encour-
aged to open branch offices in Eastern European countries and to ana-
lyze the available economic information and the accounts of potential
Eastern partner companies. Joint venture accounting companies also
should be established.
Meetings and investigations have shown that foreign investors are
not sufficiently informed about the opportunities available in CMEA
countries. Setting clear priority areas for investment in all Eastern
countries will attract investors and help the process of negotiation
and partner identification. Countries willing to attract foreign cap-
ital should make determined efforts to disseminate appropriate in-
formation among potential investors, work out new channels beyond
traditional options, and possibly enter into joint ventures with West-
ern advertising firms.
IIASA's empirical comparative international study has shown that
joint ventures are a big challenge in East-West economic relations.
Despite their growing number, they still are newcomers in the eco-
nomic environment of the host country. The findings show that:
• The process oflegislative improvements will likely continue in the
future in the direction of simplifying and clarifying provisions and
procedures as well as equalizing conditions for joint ventures with
those of national companies.
• Despite their growing number, joint ventures so far have had very
little impact on the macroeconomic situation of those countries,
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as their total contribution is still very small. They may, however,
have an important catalytic effect. East-West joint ventures are
the playing field upon which new ideas and approaches are tried
out, where new skills are acquired.
• Advantageous to governments and business people, joint ventures
still are strangers in the business environment of CMEA countries.
In many cases they do not compete well with purely Western
companies simply because they are joint ventures.
• Lack of sufficient infrastructures to support joint ventures con-
tributes to the problems they face and has considerably delayed
the achievement of initial profits in some countries.
• Even joint ventures that are facing difficulties provide channels
for the transfer of managerial know- how. This partly fulfills one
of the goals of CMEA countries to enrich and adapt Western
management methods and techniques. Surprisingly, this issue is
neglected by partners in most cases. It is advisable that more
attention be paid to management development during the process
of negotiating joint venture contracts.
• Concentrating on such important matters as convertibility, finan-
cial and investment issues in the initial stage of the joint venture
often causes partners to pay too little attention to the human side
of the joint undertaking; the human side has frequently proven to
be very important for joint success.
• Matching two economic systems in everyday operations proves
to be a difficult and long-term process. Major difficulties are
encountered in bookkeeping and accounting, both of which are
completely different in the two systems. Calculation of profits,
profitability, and efficiency are difficult; thus controls and com-
parisons are complicated.
• Auditing control is inefficient in all Socialist countries (and in
some cases not even established).
• The convertibility issue has impacts on profit repatriation, supply,
and marketing.
The history of East-West joint ventures is too short a period to
permit definite conclusions in all areas of their operation. The fact
that most of them earn their first profit in their fifth year means
that more than two-thirds are still in their initial phase. Therefore,
participants in the study and several workshops on the subject, have
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suggested that an appropriate organization (possibly IIASA) should
further monitor the development of joint ventures with regard to:
• Changing conditions for investments.
• Reasons why firms invest.
• Managerial aspects.
• Business experiences (documentation) beyond legal administra-
tive provisions.
• Failures.
Future attention should focus on the human factors involved in
establishing and running joint ventures, intellectual property pro-
tection, and differences among Socialist countries with regard to
joint ventures, particularly the convertibility of currencies in Socialist
countries.
Policy makers, governmental agencies, and other responsible
groups should consider the lack of information in the following ar-
eas, and make serious efforts to improve the situation:
• The actual experiences and contractual arrangements (beyond le-
gal provisions) of joint ventures and special economic zones should
be documented.
• The disclosure of reasons for official approvals and disapprovals
should become a routine matter.
• The provision and updating of practical information for potential
investors are essential.
• Governments of Eastern European countries, Chambers of Com-
merce, etc., should actively advertise advantages, conditions, and
other pertinent information concerning joint ventures and spe-
cial economic zones, domestically and abroad. The availability of
this information could also lead to a better understanding by the
Western partners of the interests of the host country.
• CMEA countries should make more economic information avail-
able to potential investors, banks, and consulting firms so they
can better assess the chances of success for joint ventures.
• Information on the role and opportunities of small and medium-
sized companies should be collected and made available.
• Multilateral tax agreements need to be established to avoid un-
certainties about potential or double taxation.
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• Tax holidays for joint ventures should begin when the first profits
are earned and made clearly and definitely known to the potential
investors.
• Patent rights, property know-how, and software must have better
legal protection in CMEA countries.
Western governments should support the creation of joint ven-
tures in CMEA countries by offering special credit lines and extending
the privileges of most-favored trading status. Some Eastern experts
insist that trade barriers exist, preventing access to Western markets
and thus lowering the chances of hard-currency earnings for joint
ventures. Eastern countries should give preferred treatment to those
joint ventures that make special efforts to protect the safety of their
workers and the environment.
Conclusions
Political and economic reforms in Socialist countries will further in-
crease the opportunity for joint ventures to develop and prosper.
Market orientation of the economy and other improvements in incen-
tive systems will help accelerate the reorientation process. The focal
issue of the reforms will be currency convertibility, which should be
solved by a carefully planned, step-by-step approach to avoid unnec-
essary economic risks. Full convertibility can hardly be reached in
less than ten years. Improved efficiency in manufacturing and higher
quality and broader spectrum of goods and services are necessary con-
ditions of the process. Effective devices should be adopted to permit
access to hard currencies as an interim step to convertibility; these
include permits to convert soft to hard currencies at negotiated ex-
change rates where joint ventures replace quality products previously
imported for hard currency.
Further decentralization of management in CMEA countries and
reduced central control of industrial projects and enterprises are nec-
essary. This should be accompanied by a sharp reduction of the ver-
tical structure of industries. The creation of wholesale distribution
capabilities that are not confined within specific industrial groups,
ministries, or special areas should help develop market connections
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further. The encouragement of private sector initiatives in establish-
ing small manufacturing and service-oriented infrastructure to sup-
port and complement the operations oflarge companies and multina-
tional joint ventures is essential. A rapid move away from centrally
controlled to market-price structures also is necessary. Beyond this,
nations should adopt income tax systems that, beyond raising rev-
enues, could also be the principal vehicle for the redistribution of
wealth, especially during the early stage of market pricing, and pro-
vide the mechanism to detect and control the illegal accumulation of
wealth.
Benefits now given to joint ventures should be extended to other
forms of East-West economic relations such as license agreements,
contracts, manufacturing, and buy-sell agreements. Special atten-
tion should be paid by both East and West to develop new styles
for cooperative management and creative partnerships in a world of
growing interdependence. This also calls for the careful collection
and analysis of case studies, the development of teaching materials,
and the creation of appropriate international arrangements to make
courses on East-West economic relations available to business peo-
ple. Among the most critical issues facing economic reform in Eastern
European countries and worldwide integration are the following: cre-
ation oflabor and capital markets, privatization, monetary policy and
state budgets, prices and taxation, indexation, currency convertibil-
ity, inflation control, and construction and housing. These and other
issues are the subjects of a new research project at the International
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.

Part III

Chapter 12
International Cooperation
Management and the
Success of Joint
Undertakings
G. Wolf-Laudon
In turbulent times, the first task of management is to make sure of
the institution's capacity for survival, to make sure of its structural
strength and soundness, of its capacity to survive a blow, to adapt
to sudden change, and to avail itself of new opportunities.
Drucker, P., 1985
Siemens was the first Western company to take advantage of the
1974 joint venture legislation in Hungary. The joint company called
SICONTACT KFT was founded that same year, with 51 percent of
the shares owned by Hungary and contributed by Intercooperation
AG for the development of trade, and 49 percent contributed by
Siemens AG. The Headquarters of the joint venture are in Budapest.
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With each subsequent liberalization of the law, Siemens has fur-
ther developed its joint venture activities, becoming a resounding suc-
cess and a respected elder to 2,500 (December 1990) newer joint ven-
tures in Hungary. Drawing from this experience, the enterprise has
developed a basic philosophy and strategic concept useful for other
firms when considering joint ventures with East-European partners.
The success of strategic alliances in general and of East-West joint
ventures in particular lies in the creation of joint responsibility.
Business contacts between Hungary and Siemens began in 1894.
Two years later, Siemens and Halske Vienna planned the under-
ground railway in Budapest, the first on the Continent, and pro-
vided the electric installations and systems. Within 14 years after
the joint venture SICONTACT was established, more than 25 pro-
duction cooperations with about 20 Hungarian companies had been
realized. Siemens played a significant part in the transfer of modern
techniques and technologies, especially in the field of mosaic tech-
niques and current redressers. The latter contributed the modern
outlay and finish of the underground in Budapest and also of the
Hungarian aluminium industry. Hungarian participation and input
were also very important. Similar cooperation followed with a num-
ber of other techniques, such as power engineering, communications,
and measurement and control.
In the 1980s, two more partners, the Hungarian companies REMIX
and EMO, joined the venture. As a result, there was a remarkable
increase in the authorized fund, while maintaining the initial propor-
tion of 51/49. Siemens transferred the license for producing passive
electronic components and also brought in a leasing contract. This
contract enabled REMIX to start production of modern condensers
for the Hungarian market and also for export. Other areas of cooper-
ation include numeric control systems for portal cranes. It is obvious
now that cooperation contracts (e.g., mutual supply or existing busi-
ness contacts) have a positive effect on business activities.
In 1986, the authorized fund was raised once more when PSZ, a
fourth Hungarian partner, entered the venture. Presently, the com-
pany's fund is 15 times higher than originally. Since its establishment,
SICONTACT has shown consistently positive results.
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12.1 East-West Joint Venture Challenge
Begins with New Thinking
Even before considering sucb factors as product or service or produc-
tion targets, five key basic elements must be available if an East-West
joint venture is to succeed. Each of these elements involves people:
(1) Special discipline.
(2) International joint venture contract negotiations.
(3) Cooperation management.
(4) Customer orientation.
(5) Innovation management.
12.1.1 Special discipline
This is demanded by both those who will negotiate and those who
will subsequently manage the joint venture. Both assignments re-
quire a synthesis of cooperation and competition that is difficult to
achieve but essential for the success of the joint undertaking. Expe-
rience shows that 70 percent of failures in joint undertakings can be
attributed to behavioral problems among those assigned to negotiate
and manage the venture (Figure 12.1). New ways of international
thinking, new kinds of managers, and an effective management style
are required. While the Western partner must bring something that
the East European partner needs, a "one-way street" cannot lead to
success over the longer term.
Thesis 1:
Fundamental to the success of a particular venture for each parent
organization is achieving a high degree of correlation between the
intensity with which the joint venture pursues the parent's strategy
and the degree of strategic control that the parent retains over its
resources, such as funds, proprietary technology, and critical human
resources. When the parent enters into a cooperative venture in which
the overall strategy is crucial to success, it must retain the necessary
degree of discretionary control over its strategic resources.
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70% can be attributed 10 problems in the
behavior patterns of thosa
assigned 10 negotiate and
manage Ihe schemes
30% can be attributed
10 the problems in strategic planning,
financing, know-how transfer, etc.
Figure 12.1. Failures of joint undertakings.
Thesis 2:
The role of "cooperation" management is not to spot and solve prob-
lems. Rather, it is to create an organization that can spot and solve
its own problems. First of all, it is management focused on human
resources management and seeks to:
• Be effective, i.e., to do the right thing in an efficient and appro-
priate way.
• Be innovative, i.e., to increase constantly its capacity for self-
criticism and renewal by knowing more, being capable of more,
wanting more, and having more courage of its own convictions.
• Challenge the mental abilities and talents of its leaders.
• Concentrate its own motivation and that of all joint venture em-
ployees on strategic concerns and specific demands of the new
joint venture market and competition.
As we have pointed out, joint ventures demand a cooperative,
moral consciousness and behavior, i.e., putting a high ethical value
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on the undertaking. Joint ventures also demand reciprocal under-
standing and recognition of the partner's logic in thinking as well as
the development of a joint logic in thinking.
Thesis 3:
Human beings respond in similar ways when presented with the same
situation, but each culture presents its people with vastly different
situations. So, although the same principles of behavior may be pre-
served across cultures, the social structures and patterns of behavior
that evolve because of local conditions may vary greatly.
Managers in a joint East-West corporation need to learn, first
of all, how to manage a very new social system and how to man-
age themselves. Joint management practices have to be focused on
joint effectiveness. Effectiveness is not a quality a manager from
the East or West brings to a joint situation. Effectiveness is best
seen as something joint management produces as a common task or
goal. Effectiveness represents output, not input. An effective com-
mon management practice must:
First of all:
- do the right things
- produce creative alternatives
- optimize resource utilization
- obtain results
- increase profit
- strategic thinking:
Know why, know what
Thesis 4:
Later:
- do things right
- solve problems
- safeguard resources
- follow duties
- lower costs
- tactical thinking and operation:
Know how
Basic political and philosophical statements clarify the organization's
values in such areas as customer relations, growth, strategic mission,
social responsibility and community, and - most importantly - man-
agerial style.
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12.1.2 International joint venture contract negotiations
Joint ventures, a form of partnership, are as old as commercial re-
lationships. Precedents can be found in Roman law and in English
common law, but such customs also can be found in earlier societies.
Thesis 5:
Technology, techniques, and innovative ways of thinking move across
national boundaries more readily than ways of perceiving, believing,
and behaving.
We may define a joint venture as a productive partnership agree-
ment, the result of which is uncertain because there is risk of loss or
failure as well as the chance of gain or success. Special problems have
to be managed when a joint venture is negotiated and initiated, e.g.,
in a country that may have different laws, customs, commercial prac-
tices, and political and social institutions. Besides acknowledging the
problems, the parties must deem them worth solving.
Negotiation is a process in which the parties (larger social sys-
tems, individuals, groups, organizations) exchange and communicate
knowledge, skills, motivation, resources, and information in order
to make goal-oriented decisions - e.g., the joint venture. Decision
making and negotiating are not identical, but there is a consider-
able overlap. Negotiations for joint ventures are a flexible activity
in which elements of interpersonal and interorganizational contacts
are amalgamated according to patterns that differ from situation to
situation. No elements should be neglected.
Certain aspects of negotiations for joint ventures attract more
attention:
• Negotiating style (individual, group, organization, larger social
system, national governments).
• Substantive long-term and short-term aspects (political, opera-
tional, strategic, tactical, methodological objectives).
• Complexity of negotiation situations (political, technological,
economic, and social changes, problems, decisions, potential
problems).
It is important to negotiate different issues for joint ventures only
on the levels listed in Figure 12.2.
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In negotiations with politicians or top management, basic political
and long-term strategic questions should be discussed. Details should
be delegated, as these are the business of middle management. Con-
crete business strategies, objectives, and planning questions should
be discussed with the responsible division management. The results
should be passed on to top management as information.
Tactical, methodological, and technical questions should be dis-
cussed with those responsible or with representatives of all depart-
ments affected by the decision. All detailed questions or questions
concerning know-how and the completion of certain activities should
be discussed with those who will carry them out.
Thesis 6:
Typically, cooperative ventures are poor at addressing conflict issues,
allowing such issues to linger for too long, with weakening and demor-
alizing results. It is necessary to have a planning and control process
that counteracts problems in this area, resolving conflicts early and
ensuring that a relatively low amount of organizational energy is lost
to friction within the cooperative network.
A favorable new joint venture environment (strategy, culture,
structure) places great emphasis on compromise and consensus, avoid-
ing unnecessary disputes. Differences of opinion between partners are
rarely fought out legally; a consensus is usually sought. It is impor-
tant to collect and analyze information and data. Preparation for
the talks is therefore just as important as careful preparation for the
decision.
Thesis 7:
Organizations in general and especially strategic alliances need to de-
velop an ability to deal with changes in complexity of products, ser-
vices, cultures, technologies and environments. Organizations that
are proficient in information technology will be in a better position
to cope with these changes than those that are not. Productivity
is heavily influenced by information technology, which can provide
ways to reduce the number of hierarchical levels from entry to chief
executive, expand the span of control of managers, effectively link in-
dividual units into a whole, and refine the relationship of line to staff.
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Advanced information systems can radically change the dynamics of
an organization.
Social hierarchy and courtesy: Effective negotiations for East-West
joint ventures should have a highly developed social hierarchy and
system of courtesy in mind. They should not only be outwardly
polite at contract negotiations, but should also bear in mind that the
person leading the discussion is not necessarily the highest ranking
member of the group; his position as leader might be determined by
linguistic ability or technical knowledge.
Language: Negotiators from both sides should speak slowly, in short
sentences, and use simple words. All picturesque expressions and un-
common idioms should be avoided. Effective negotiators hear and
think selectively; they are masters of ignoring what seems to be su-
perficial.
Translation and interpretation: Negotiators for joint ventures should
take an experienced interpreter with them. It is not useful to rely on
the other side's interpreter for the entire negotiation. Apart from the
fact that interpreting is difficult and exhausting, one's own interpreter
should better know and interpret one's own position, which requires
thorough preparation.
Behavior: A calm and relaxed attitude indicates seriousness to the
negotiating partners. Hyperactive, partly aggressive behavior and
impatience can be interpreted as a lack of discipline or untrustwor-
thiness. Negotiators do not often take notes during negotiation; if
one side does not, it is often better not to do so at all.
12.1.3 Cooperation management
Thesis 8:
A joint venture is not a "zero sum" exercise where the gains of one
partner offset the losses of the other. A better result for all part-
ners is obtained by uniting forces, i.e., benefiting from synergy rather
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than acting just for oneself or even against one another. Joint man-
agement in a real sense will lead to creativity, innovation, and joint
effectiveness.
What does cooperation management mean in a joint venture?
Above all it means focusing on people. Everything that is done in
a company as well as in a joint undertaking should aim at solving
problems related to products, systems, and services for other people.
Thesis 9:
Today a company's competitive situation depends on the quality of
the alliances it is able to form. In the future, most companies will be
members of teams that compete against other teams. Companies that
try to go it alone will find themselves on the bottom of an emerging
two-tier system.
The joint venture company is shaped by the way that its man-
agement and employees think, decide, and act. Their ability to offer
special advantages to customers - thereby distinguishing themselves
from their competitors - can only happen as a result of human in-
dividuality, Le., the company is set apart only by its people as the
material products become more and more alike. Even a perfect or-
ganization can never compensate for or replace the human qualities
necessary for successful cooperation.
Thesis 10:
In contrast to a high-volume, standardized enterprise organized into a
pyramid of hierarchical tiers, a flexible joint venture company should
have a flat structure. It should be organized as a set of relatively
stable project teams that informally compete with one another for
resources, recognition, and projects.
Job satisfaction and the all-out effort needed to accomplish many
tasks flourish only when certain qualities and ways of behavior are
a matter of course. On one side is professional talent and expertise;
on the other side, character and willingness to cooperate. Both are
important for the smooth running of an organization (Figure 12.3).
The following barriers to effective cooperation can be observed
usually at the beginning of a joint undertaking:
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Joint Wanting
Joint Ability
JOINT VENTURE GUIDELINES
JV-Ieadership spells responsibility-for JV-projects and for JV-people-
and tha demands of this role are greater today than in the past
PERFORMANCE AND COOPERATNE EFFORT
• establishing clear JV-objectives
• partk:ipation in decision making
• delegating responsibility
• discussing performance
• activating cooperation
• information exchange
ASSIGNING AND PROMOTING EMPLOYEES
• task assignments - custom-made
• frankness in assessment
• training does not end at thirty
• promotion through new tasks
• salary geared to performance
SOCIAL AND POLICY RESPONSIBILfTlES
The JV-company has a social responsibility to lis employees.
II is imperativa that this be raflected in the dealings of the
manegament wllh tha staff.
Figure 12.3. Main criteria for effective joint venture management.
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Knowing'!
~ Lack of knowledge about the tasks
of others (30%)
- Insufficient market and customer
orientation (45%)
- Lack of input of instruments and
methods (15%)
Being Able?
- Insufficient ability to
cooperate (20%)
- Separation of function areas (20%)
- Communication barriers caused by
different education/tasks (10%)
- Differing values (30%)
Thesis 11:
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Wanting?
- Joint venture partner and/or
department egoism (50%)
- Insufficient recognition of
cooperation (30%)
- Unequal recognition of
results (10%)
Being Allowed?
- Conflict of goals (area goals -
overall goals) (45%)
- Superiors often a poor
example (20%)
(Motivation is what managers
allow subordinates to do
themselves)
If it were possible to unite people in a joint undertaking with a spirit
of teamwork and exercise to the fullest extent their technological
abilities, such an organization would offer untold satisfaction and
benefits.
An effective joint venture manager must have the ability to lis-
ten and observe, to understand a person from another group, orga-
nization, a different culture and mentality. Effective joint venture
management should be based on a consensus-oriented style that em-
phasizes the following:
The will and ability to coopemte: In general, the joint venture phi-
losophy demands that all those working on a joint project or within
a joint corporation cooperate intensively. An open interchange of
ideas, which includes taking the trouble to appreciate the way the
other side is thinking, is a basic requirement.
The balance between adaptation and innovation: One should strive
to behave in a way appropriate to the situation while endeavoring
to improve and use human capabilities. Joint venture groups are an
expression of a culture geared to adaptation and innovation through
cooperation.
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The ability to participate: Full participation in decision making and
implementation by working together are characteristics of effective
joint venture management.
High motivation through target-setting by consensus: The strategy,
culture, and structure of joint ventures have to be defined. Synergy
can be achieved through negotiations in which all partners contribute.
When there is agreement on targets, motivation of the participants
is high.
Capability to cooperate and integrate: Harmonizing demands and ex-
pectations through strategic thinking based on consensus is crucial.
Effective joint venture managers must think in terms of performance
and not personality. What the joint venture manager does is less
important that what he and his colleagues achieve together. Effec-
tiveness should be measured by the extent to which the joint venture
management achieves the output requirements - synergy effects - of
their joint position.
Thesis 12:
In strategic thinking, one first seeks a clear understanding of each
element in a situation and then makes full use of human brainpower to
restructure the elements in the most advantageous way. Phenomena
and events in the real world - especially in an East-West joint venture
- do not always fit a linear model. The best solution can come only
from a combination of rational analysis and imaginative reintegration
of different items into a new pattern.
The above-mentioned bases of a joint enterprise give strategic
venture management the chance to:
• Solve country-specific tasks and diverse problems more expedi-
tiously due to a common legal basis.
• Achieve joint intent, target, and strategic planning as well as a
methodical employment of all resources.
• Appraise and calculate more realistically the possibilities and risks
of new areas of cooperation.
• Achieve more satisfactory solutions of large and complex technical
and economic problems more quickly.
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• Extend the application of cooperation to synergy areas of ad-
vanced technology.
• Choose, train, and further educate suitable staff in a target-
oriented way.
• Communicate continuously and hold coordination meetings that
will enable conflicts of interests to be discussed daily.
Joint ventures that are oriented toward their customers' needs and
future market demands require creativity, motivation, and optimism,
and thereby also increase their ability to use joint synergy effects.
Thesis 13:
Only people can recognize and solve novel problems; machines can
merely repeat solutions already programmed within them. Industries
of the future will not depend on hardware which can be duplicated
anywhere, but on the software to which human brainpower can con-
tinue to give a new technological edge. Financial capital formation
is becoming less important than human capital formation. Produc-
tivity and effectiveness can be increased by improving performance
with human resources from joint venture partners. A mechanism
for achieving a strategic long-term increase in joint productivity and
effectiveness is shown in Figure 12.4.
12.1.4 Customer orientation
Thesis 14:
A cooperation manager with a long-term view of customer relations
sees a sale as the beginning, not the end, of the marketing process.
An effective joint venture management should answer the question:
"Who are our customers and what do they need today and in the
future; what will be their problems that we can help to solve?" After
all, with no customers, there is no business and no income.
Thesis 15:
Analysis shows that the long- term strategies of successful and fore-
sighted entrepreneurs can almost always be characterized in a very
simple and natural way. This should not be surprising, for strategy is
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really no more than a plan of action for maximizing one's strengths
against the forces at work in the business environment.
In SICONTACT KFT, we began with a customer-oriented mar-
keting concept: "To solve customer problems and to create a joint
organization to meet joint strategic goals," following these guidelines:
• Joint venture philosophy: to understand our customers' needs and
benefits.
• Joint venture strategy: to create, innovate, and produce the best
possible solutions to the problems of our customers.
• Joint venture management style: to intensify and deepen a new
way of joint venture thinking and acting.
Customer orientation is not a function. It must be digested like a
vitamin by all those responsible for each function in the joint venture.
That means thinking and acting for the benefit of the customer. In
other words, he who understands the customer problem better and
solves it, profits.
The selection and segmentation of the market into crucial service
areas is of vital importance in the development of joint venture strate-
gies. Since strategic shaping of the future means mental preparation
for the future, it becomes a central demand on all management, es-
pecially in East-West cooperation management. It is the customer
who determines the success of a joint venture through his buying
and repeated buying. He must, therefore, be brought into the cen-
ter of the thoughts and actions of all managers and employees. The
better the cooperation between all partners and functions of a joint
undertaking, the greater the success (see Figure 12.5).
12.1.5 Innovation management
Thesis 16:
Innovation does not necessarily mean research, for research is only
an innovation tool. Innovation means, first, the systematic sloughing
off of yesterday. It means, next, the systematic research for innova-
tive opportunities in the vulnerabilities of a technology, a process, a
market; in the lead-time of new knowledge; in the needs and wants
of the market.
Through effective management of innovation, corporations can
foster business development and harness the entrepreneurial energy
G. Wolf-Laudon
S~uation analysis 1--------,
and the future
2li
Realising
and checking
Interlock:
Strategies and
measures
USTOMER (MARKET-) DEMAN
CUSTOMER ADVANTAGE
Setting
the aims
Marketing
strategies
EFFECTIVENESS OF JV-MANAGEMENT
GOOD
• work input
• doing things right
• solving given problems
• activities
• reducing costs
BETTER
• achieving the joint goals
• doing the right things
• finding creative alternatives
• results
• increasing profits
It Is not that JV-efficlency is bad, but that JV-effectlveness Is more Important
Figure 12.5. Cooperation - acting together in a market-oriented
way and clistomer advantage.
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of their employees to the mutual benefit of employees, the enterprise,
the joint venture partners, and the surrounding community.
The managerial policy that best encourages viable new internal
or external ventures is based on human qualities and on technology.
Management of innovation requires a special viewpoint, from which
human beings are seen as unique partners in the production process.
Thesis 17:
One should recognize and manage innovation as a tumultuous, some-
what random, interactive learning process, linking a worldwide net-
work of knowledge sources to unpredictable customers and uses.
Innovation management can be seen mainly as a socio-technical
process. The innovation manager is not a conventional project man-
ager but rather a combination of employee and independent entre-
preneur. Consequently, his position within the organization is some-
what paradoxical - he is an employee but also independent and free
to pursue new ideas. The innovation manager has a special organiza-
tional role, does not engage in routine operations, and follows rules
differently from those governing the established activities in the en-
terprise. Within a large corporation, the innovation manager has a
well-defined "space" in which he acts to enhance the creative produc-
tion of ideas and programs.
12.2 Example: Conclusions From
SICONTACT KFT
The obligations and rights of the executive branch of a joint East-
West enterprise are characterized by the following: joint basis in law,
joint staff, joint management, joint capital basis, joint management
organization, and shared risks and benefits. This organizational in-
novation shows the synergistic effects of successful cooperation and
co-venturing (see Figure 12.6). The synergism comes especially from:
• Joint management and highly qualified full-time joint staff con-
tinuously present and available for services and problem-solving.
• A normative basis for systematic, non-bureaucratic cooperation
formed in all agreed-upon areas of cooperation.
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• An information and communication center in daily use where mar-
keting and other production-related activities can be conducted.
• The creaton of a pool of knowledge, the potential of which multi-
plies through long-term joint activities and internal innovations.
Thesis 18:
The circumstances of the ever-changing market and ever-changing
products are capable of breaking any business organization if that or-
ganization is unprepared for change. A joint venture organization has
to be kept lean and muscular, capable of taking strain, but capable
also of moving fast and availing itself of opportunities. Unless chal-
lenged, every organization tends to become slack, easy-going, diffuse.
It tends to allocate resources by inertia and tradition rather than by
results. Above all, every organization tends to avoid unpleasantness.
The synergistic effects of cooperation have resulted in:
• The establishment and extension of lasting partnerships in sci-
entific, technical, economic, organizational, and legal areas of
activity.
• The development of new areas of cooperation between those enter-
prises having a share in the joint company and the other economic
organizations and associated companies connected with those en-
terprises, thus forming part of a worldwide business network.
• The more realistic appraisal and calculation of the possibilities
and risks in new areas of cooperation.
• The achievement offaster and more satisfactory solutions to large
and complex technical-economic problems.
• The extended application of cooperation to areas of advanced
technology.
• The selection, training, and further education of suitable staff in
a target-oriented way.
Joint capitalization extends the partner's freedom of movement
for which business practices can be selected effectively and quickly,
and transacted efficiently. A better knowledge and understanding of
the business environment is created by the continuous presence of the
partners in the joint organization. By developing quality promotion
measures, both management and staff are continuously being devel-
oped. The innovation potential can be increased rapidly through the
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SYNERGY
WEST EAST EAST
WEST
know-how
effectiveness
Achieving the goal
Doing the right things
oaveloping creative anernatives
Resuns
Increasing proms
JV-STRATEGY
joint knowledge
joint ability
joint wanting
joint chances and
joint risks
EAST
creativity
efficiency
..-t--
Work input
Doing things right
Solving problems
Activnies
Reducing costs
SYNERGY EFFECTS
joint results
Figure 12.6. Creating a favorable negotiating environment through
synergy effects.
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pooling effect of a joint organization in which joint resources can be
optimally employed, opportunities maximized, and risks minimized.
Finally, the time needed for preparing and executing different pro-
grams can be shortened substantially while reducing costs (travel
allowances, visas, etc.).
12.3 Merger of Interests
The chances of success for an East-West joint venture are determined
well before the joint venture is set up. I conclude that it is possible
to have a successful commercial relationship in the form of a joint
venture in another country if certain conditions are met, including
knowledge of that country's legal system, cultural norms, political
and social institutions, and business practices. It is always much more
than just a matter of understanding commercial practices alone.
We are familiar with Thomas Alva Edison's recipe for inventive
genius: "1 percent inspiration, 99 percent perspiration." The same
ratio holds true for creativity in any endeavor, including the devel-
opment of a joint venture strategy.
In considering a joint venture, first of all, the partners must find
the areas of synergy - those areas where mutual interests in technol-
ogy, organization, production, sales, and legal aspects coincide. Then
success is based on excellent negotiating by both partners. Both sides
must be willing and able to analyze, to seek synergy, and to create
and manage a favorable new environment until the joint venture ob-
jectives are realized. Working from these points of understanding,
the joint venture negotiators first and the joint venture cooperation
managers later must innovate to overcome inevitable differences.
The difficult part is finding and training effective cooperation
managers with the skills to reduce the gap between "is" and "should
be" (Figure 12.7). Here, joint venture leaders are needed who are
willing to listen and observe as well as to change their attitudes and
adapt to the thinking processes of the other joint venture partners.
"How should joint venture managers today be trained to guarantee
the success of a joint undertaking?" To give a useful reply to this
question one must look carefully at the criteria of joint venture goals
(see Figure 12.8).
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Figure 12.8. Every person, organization, and country strives for
security and success.
The common joint venture management profile of the next decade
will be branch-specific and oriented to such facts as continuous glob-
alization and strategically planned international innovation and busi-
ness competition. This requires more than just talented managers; it
also requires the efforts and persistence of all employees. In addition,
market and innovation power must be present, i.e., the ability to do
something unexpected, to surprise the competitors. It is necessary to
apply the available resources and concentrate them on certain target
markets and customers at the right time, thereby forming strategic
reserves for the future and creating permanent surplus values.
Parallel to competitive thinking, i.e., the "zero sum game think-
ing" where somebody's profit always means someone else's loss, it is
of great importance to understand the value of cooperation, and it is
necessary to create a favorable new joint venture environment while
managing in an unfavorable one.
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The mobilization of human resources and their mental poten-
tial for successful joint ventures should be given greater emphasis
in the future. The driving forces in the structural economic and so-
cial changes in the industrial countries of both East and West and
also in the developing nations, especially those of the Pacific, will be
directed into new channels by increasing:
• Internationalization and globalization (market demand and tech-
nology push).
• Information and communication (know-how transfer).
• Humanization in the sense of a balance between human nature
and automation (office, network, and factory of the future).
• Flexibility and mobility (synergy effects, creativity, innovation,
etc.).
• Freedom in the sense of an ethic of responsibility (the ability to
do more than we are asked to do).
At the same time, there is a new holistic consciousness that is
developing and can be observed worldwide. This way of considering
matters as a whole characterizes the behavior of many politicians
and managers, especially in internationally oriented institutions and
enterprises, of which the International Institute for Applied Systems
Analysis is a prime example.
Chapter 13
East-West Joint
Ventures: A Tool for
Technology Transfer
J. Hentze and R. Wiechers
Close business relations between individual enterprises involved in the
export of technological know-how have become very common within
Western organizations such as the European Community.
Due to peculiarities and diverging frameworks set out by two dif-
ferent political and economic systems, cooperation between Western
private enterprises and CMEA organizations, however, is still con-
sidered exceptional, despite the growing number of contracts. As an
outcome of political developments in East-West relations during the
early 1970s, business activities between the two sides have increased
despite differences in scale due to specific national demands. No-
tably, the recent past has shown that the CMEA countries have made
enormous efforts to modernize their industries by applying Western
technology.
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The new industrial revolution under way in the world today calls
for methodological and institutional changes in both economic sys-
tems. Accelerating technological advancement and bridging the tech-
nological gaps in some branches of industry are a top priority in
CMEA countries. Technology transfer is one of the main goals pro-
moted by the economic reforms and legislative changes taking place
in almost all these countries.
Technology transfer itself originates from cooperation. One can
distinguish the various business instruments, e.g., acquisition of plant
or individual technological items or large-scale cooperation between
two or more business organizations. The concept underlying the term
cooperation comprises various meanings and consequently manifold
understandings. To avoid confusion, it is necessary to first give a
general outline of the term leaving out its role in the field of tech-
nology transfer. This chapter will present joint ventures as a special
form of cooperation and will also give details about the meaning of
technology. The framework of international technology management,
the life-cycle approach, methods of strategic technology planning,
and also the practical application of technology management theo-
ries through joint ventures will also be discussed.
13.1 Transfer of Technology as a Part of
East-West Economic Relations
A number of different mechanisms are at work in the relations be-
tween two or more business partners in the field of technology trans-
fer, and the main difference lies in the diverging planned intensity
and duration of business links. Some widely used mechanisms are:
(1) Delivery of plant for immediate use (export).
(2) Sale of licenses.
(3) Joint ventures.
(4) Direct investment.
(5) Exchange of technical personnel.
(6) Instruction in advanced technologies.
(7) International cooperation in the field of research and development
networks.
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13.2 The Concept of Technology and
Cooperation
Technology as a concept can be used with two different meanings.
One needs to distinguish between production technology, on the one
hand, and information technology, on the other. Production technol-
ogy is defined as the methods actually applied in the production pro-
cess. Information technology also has a two-fold connotation: firstly,
the methods actually applied to data processing, and secondly, the
scope of knowledge about such methods. This chapter focuses on the
term technology in its strict sense of production methods.
Generally, the term cooperation is associated with the idea of long-
term business relations between two or more partners. In CMEA
countries, cooperation is mainly seen as a certain kind of trade link
usually referred to as a compensation trading deal: technical equip-
ment delivered by the Western partner is exchanged for goods of
Eastern production. Such procedures are favored because they help
to make up for the scarcity of hard currencies.
The major characteristic of cooperation is that it is meant to be a
long-term partnership. There is a free choice of goals for either of the
participating parties. The cooperation contract should be formulated
to secure mutual benefits. Such cooperation may also entail changed
perspectives concerning the individual business organizations. Again
it is the contract that must secure successful results. Adjusting orga-
nizational activities to the given new conditions can help the individ-
ual enterprise work out its strong points and advantages. Productive
resources can be more effectively used because doing business on an
international scale implies a higher quantity of products ordered for
a new larger market (economy of scale).
The cooperation of two or more partners in one economic field or
segment will inevitably lead to a division of tasks. Basically, East-
ern and Western enterprises have diverging reasons for embarking on
a cooperative business partnership. Cooperation, however, presup-
poses common points of interest. The different CMEA countries are
characterized by different stages of economic development. Conse-
quently, the goals of cooperation vary a great deal. Due mainly to a
lack of competition and motivation, innovation activities in CMEA
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organizations are low. Permanent deficiencies in the supply of pro-
duction materials, obstacles caused by vast bureaucracies, and the
lack of capital account for delayed innovative processes. To compen-
sate for these deficiencies, at least in part, the CMEA countries have
been trying to enhance business contacts with Western enterprises.
Western companies, in most cases, venture into cooperations with
Eastern partners in their constant search for new markets. Moreover,
they consider it more profitable to transfer part of their production
facilities to the East.
Low product quality is often considered the main obstacle to a
successful business operation, especially on the part of the supplier.
Unlike simple trade links, close and intensive cooperation intensifies
the often slow and low-level exchange of information. By cooperating
with a domestic Eastern business organization, the Western partner
earns a reputation and gains an advantage when considering new con-
tracts. Cooperation can also help an enterprise to secure long-term
access to market segments to which competitors have little access.
13.3 Cooperation Through Joint Ventures
Joint ventures are business cooperations of two or more indepen-
dent organizations that result in the foundation of a third enterprise
and are marked by the capital investments of at least two founding
partners. In contrast to mergers, creating a joint venture is more
like stepping into unknown territory. One aim is to secure access to
government-controlled markets. Since joint ventures are long- term
partnerships, entering into such a cooperation is a risky endeavor.
Consequently, choosing the right partner is crucial. Companies, how-
ever, do not always proceed with sufficient care. It is important to
follow certain steps in choosing a partner for a joint venture type of
cooperation: strategy development, partner evaluation and selection,
implementation, and controlling.
Successful joint ventures are based on a particular strategy. The
term strategy comprises the fundamental and conceptual means of
determining, pursuing, and putting into effect fixed corporate objec-
tives. Strategy consequently implies the determination of an objective
and the necessary steps to achieve it. Pursuing a strategy presupposes
that a certain objective should be achieved by following a series of
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decisions made when the basic direction is affirmed. The strategy can
later be adapted to consequent developments, if necessary. It becomes
obvious that no strategy can exist without objectives. An individ-
ual strategy is necessary for planning activities because it comprises
acting instructions suited to a certain point in time relevant to the
decision-making process. Of course, the amount of resources avail-
able to meet the corporate objectives needs to be determined. There
are several important principles to keep in mind when conceiving a
strategy:
• Centmlizing coordination of potential: This means that there is a
need to select carefully how to allocate a given enterprise's per-
formance potential in financial and human resources and in other
productive means. It is advantageous to spend most of the pro-
ductive means in fields where competition is weak. Such knowl-
edge presupposes profound analyses of given competitors.
• Emphasizing strong points and avoiding weaknesses: This princi-
ple always requires a strategy to be built on the strong branches
of an enterprise.
• Taking advantage of positive environmental and economic devel-
opments: An enterprise needs to take advantage of given oppor-
tunities; possible dangers must be avoided.
• Innovation processes: Within a strategy, major attention should
be given to the innovative element. Innovative activities may
cover a variety of fields such as new products, new modes of ser-
vice, new markets, new production methods, or new forms of
corporate structure.
• Using synergetic potential: As a rule, the strategies that are most
likely to prove successful are those that are profitably drawn from
existing business facilities.
• Harmonizing objectives and instruments: Objectives and instru-
ments are carefully chosen to complement a given successful strat-
egy. Being overly ambitious may cause the whole strategy to
collapse completely by overestimating the given resources. Very
modest objectives, on the other hand, are not likely to provide
sufficient challenge, which is of utmost importance for long-term
business activities.
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• Creating a meaningful and manageable corporate structure: This
principle is vital for the successful implementation of a given
strategy.
• Balancing the portfolio: Following a given strategy always implies
certain risks. A wise businessman will always avoid risk except
in cases of emergency. It is common to choose a moderate and
balanced approach, including an appropriate amount of available
resources.
• Developing a back-up strategy: The given strategy needs a back-
up, both with a clear-cut and easily understandable outline.
• Persistence: Firm decisions are always challenged by more short-
term considerations, while business efforts are meant to provide
long-term profits. It requires some amount of persistence to put a
strategy successfully into effect. This means that once a strategy
has been established, it should be adapted to consequent circum-
stances only for fundamental changes.
The development of a strategy is often understood as a simple act
of planning. What people fail to notice is that integrating a given
strategy into the already existing business structures may cause a se-
rious gap that can be bridged only through project-related planning.
Search, Evaluation, and Choice of the Appropriate Partner
In searching for a business partner there are basically two alterna-
tives from which to choose, either the offensive or defensive approach.
Operating defensively means waiting for the right opportunity. It is
an inexpensive approach, but may not prove successful. Proceeding
offensively requires a strategy. A list of potential business partners
is made and later classified according to preference criteria such as
cooperation and production potential. To avoid unnecessary waste
of time through negative reactions, more than one enterprise at a
time should be approached. Professional consultants may contribute
valuable advice. The offensive approach is more likely to find an ap-
propriate business partner. Moreover, there is a chance to compare
potential partners and make a choice. Experience acquired during
the searching phase may contribute to a more successful partner-
ship. The offensive partner may also determine the rules according
to which business is done. In evaluating potential business partners,
the following criteria must be kept in mind:
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• Complementary partners: A joint-venture type of partnership re-
quires that partners complement each other. Thorough analysis
at the initial stage should provide information about the weak-
nesses and strengths of a potential partner. Only synergetic po-
tentials can be useful along these lines.
• Compatible partners: Successful partnership also presupposes that
both partners develop a corporate philosophy and mutual under-
standing.
• Confidence in a partner: Within a joint venture, confidence in a
partner, as well as openness about the motives for entering the
partnership and plans for proceeding need to be worked out to
guarantee positive results.
Once the cooperation contract is signed, the choice of a partner
is completed. A carefully designed contract needs to provide a firm
outline according to which the business should be carried out. At
the same time, it also needs to guarantee flexibility. Major attention
should be paid to the following:
• The objectives, purpose, and strategy of the joint venture should
be clearly defined.
• The modes for integrating potential new partners have to be
developed.
• To avoid lawsuits arising from business conflicts, the contract
should provide modes of mediation.
• "Divorce" procedures or the right to separate from the partner-
ship, if necessary, should be stated and the price clearly fixed.
Implementing the joint venture implies: the waiting phase, the
construction phase, and the actual operation phase. Technology trans-
fer is an issue mainly in the last two phases.
13.4 Framework for the Successful
Management of Technology Transfer
13.4.1 Acquisition of background information
Before going more deeply into the subject of technology transfer, at-
tention must be paid to the particulars of new markets in which the
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joint venture is supposed to profit. Entering a foreign market resem-
bles the exploration of a new land; it requires firsthand preknowledge
and perfectly reliable information about the language and the cultural
and political background. Profound background knowledge helps in
finding marketing strategies that are perfectly tailored to the market
in question. The following questions can serve as a useful guideline.
• What kind of information is actually needed and relevant in con-
nection with the particular project?
• Who or what institutions can provide such information?
• Are these sources reliable?
From the information gathered, a general pattern reflecting the
current economic, technological, and political situations of a given
market should be revealed. It is only by this general pattern that a
business organization is in a position to make valid predictions about
future developments and launch promising strategies.
Gathering useful information of the type described may some-
times turn out to be a difficult undertaking for various reasons. In
the past, government authorities were often very uncooperative when
asked for relevant information. Recently, their attitude has started
to change. The joint venture partners should focus on the education
level of the country (important for recruiting employees), the over-
all legal situation with emphasis on the granting of patents, and the
existence of standards and technological resources such as research
facilities and plants. There are various reasons for an enterprise to
start doing business in Eastern countries on a joint venture basis.
Impulses may go back either to internal or external sources (Figure
13.1). After completing the primary checking phase, business trips
should be undertaken to include practical experience in the decision-
making process. At this point, information from outside sources is
taken into account. Strategic decisions are usually influenced by in-
formation from secondary sources whereas results from primary anal-
yses are applied to operative decisions. Figure 13.2 summarizes the
relevant details of country analysis.
The peculiarities prevailing in the host country should be con-
sidered thoroughly. It is equally important to check the domestic,
legal, and political situations. Problems also may arise when co-
operating with managers from different political, cultural, and eco-
nomic backgrounds. Government regulations for technology transfer
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Pol~ical s~uation of Cunurai background of
host country host country
Legal system of
host country
Total range of information required
Technology Competition
Legal reqirements Customer's behavior
Figure 13.2. Scope of information for successful analysis of the
potential partner country.
through joint ventures sometimes result in economic strains: produc-
tion on domestic territory to augment the gross national product and
government-determined and fixed prices.
The availability of the necessary technological resources plays an
important role in technology transfer. An underdeveloped infras-
tructure may force a new business to provide its own technological
resources. Technical standards are also significant. If not available,
it is necessary to introduce foreign norms that may enforce the posi-
tion of the Western enterprise. The major risks of a joint venture are
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Improved grenting 12%
235
Technological
innovations 44%
Figure 13.3. Rate of gain in productivity. (Source: Bothe, 1985.)
commercial and political in nature. Minimizing these risks is of ut-
most importance (see outline for cooperation contracts). Particular
parameters may provide the necessary assistance.
13.4.2 The life-cycle model
The greater portion of increased production can be traced back to
the innovative process (Figure 13.3). Like individual products, tech-
nologies and industries are subject to what is referred to as a life
cycle. This cycle can be divided into five phases; four of which are
considered very important: emergence, growth/expansion, maturity,
and decline.
As shown in Figure 13.4, there is a chance for technologies to drop
out of the regular cycle prematurely if they do not reach their maxi-
mum competitive value. The most significant criteria for classifying
different phases are also given in this figure. It is during the expan-
sion phase that the most positive effects of the cost-production ratio
are noticeable. The life-cycle model is not valid in all instances, how-
ever. Due to the rather vague criteria, the lines separating the vari-
ous phases tend to blur. Consequently, the succession of the phases
may vary under the influence of various factors. In analyzing the
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Exhaustion of
competition
potentials
Pacemaking
technology
Key
technology
Basic
technology
Obsolete
technology
Figure 13.4. Technological life cycles in relation to exhaustion of
competition potentials. (Source: Schneider, 1984.)
life cycle, it is necessary to clarify which factor is being referred to.
The more general a factor is, the more plausible the model appears.
The life-cycle model, moreover, is counted among the integral parts
of strategic planning as there are no scientific methods to predict ex-
actly the durability of a certain technology. Neither is there a way to
determine precisely the current position of a technology within the
life cycle.
13.4.3 Development of new technologies
Figure 13.5 shows a close, two-fold correlation between technology
and an individual product. The combination of different technologies
may contribute to the creation of an individual product. On the other
hand, an individual technology may contribute to a whole variety of
products.
Innovative processes can involve high costs. In Figure 13.6, the
costs for research and development are contrasted with the total sales
of a product. Research and development costs cannot be charged to
one product only; certain technologies may have contributed to the
production of various different products.
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Technologies
Products
Figure 13.5. Relation between products and technologies.
13.4.4 The life cycle of technologies on an
international scale
To be valid also on an international scale, the life-cycle model as
presented above needs to be enlarged. Depending on the country
in question, technologies can already be obsolete or just expanding
(Figure 13.7). This state of affairs entails both opportunities "and
risks. The internationalization of markets, on the one hand, may
help to prolong the life cycle of a product or technology. On the
other hand, it can stimulate international innovative competition by
making the re-import of technologies into the home country possible.
Figure 13.8 shows how the diffusion process works:
• A new technology is employed in a domestic enterprise.
• Domestic markets face complete saturation, and export activities
are undertaken.
• The exported technology is taken over, and production starts to
supply the domestic markets and secure hard currency.
• Competition in foreign markets becomes keener; the domestic
market increasingly faces pressure from imported products. Low
wages call for lower product prices, which Can only be reduced
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Figure 13.6. Costs for research and development in the course of a
particular product's life cycle. (Source: Beckurts, 1983.)
by implementing new advanced technologies. According to the
above decision, the following phases emerge: innovation, expor-
tation, imitation, and importation.
Differentiation between the so-called high-tech and low-tech coun-
tries results in a varied pattern of technological diffusion. In high-
tech countries, diffusion is faster whereas in low-tech countries, the
necessary resources need to be provided first. One can easily no-
tice the striking differences traceable to political, cultural, or other
influences. Positioning within the life cycle varies as well (see Fig-
ure 13.8). A given technology may have already become obsolete
in one of the high-tech countries, while still expanding in one of the
low-tech countries. If a technology faces slow diffusion in one coun-
try while simultaneously being superseded in others, its life cycle
has been longer in the country where it was first applied. Low-tech
countries may possibly spend a great amount of money creating an
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t Domestic production ...-~~
----
Figure 13.7. International technological life cycle in relation to
production input, both domestic and foreign.
adequate infrastructure without being able to take advantage of the
imported technologies. High-tech countries, however, gain quicker
access to various markets and can thus keep prices up for at least
a certain period of time. The majority of technology transfer cases
through East-West joint ventures fall into the above description (see
also Chapter 10).
13.5 Implementation of International
Technology Management
The transition of business corporation activities from a national to
an international scale presupposes the application of special methods
in strategic planning, e.g., the strategic alliance. The joint venture
is among such alliances. They help in minimizing corporate risks by
collaborating on the use of resources. Front-ranking international or-
ganizations in research and development face the following phases:
organization of local development and application of systems in sig-
nificant markets, establishment of information retrieval systems in
important high-tech countries, and completion of domestic research
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activities through a network of decentralized research and develop·
ment units.
International research and development activities focus on the
objectives of marketing, technology, and innovation_ Decentralized
research and development networks aim at the following:
• Better access to new markets to solve user problems.
• Representation in significant high-tech regions.
• Creation of connections between the positive effects of interna-
tionalization and the innovative potential of decentralized research
and development units.
Economic steps are often taken at random instead of purposely
applying strategic planning and internationalizing the research and
development fields. Solving short-term problems often prevents long-
term planning.
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13.6 Problems Likely to Arise from
Joint Ventures
Apart from problems such as the nonconvertibility of currencies and
diverging objectives of joint venture partners, there are some addi-
tional problems related to the process of technology transfer. The
Western partner typically keeps entire control over the technologies
in order not to stir competition in its own market, a position that is
completely contrary to that of the Eastern partner. Very often only a
segment of certain technologies is available, and some joint ventures
are completely dependent on Western supply. To keep competition
from increasing, the Western partner is likely to bar his markets.
Technology transfer is more a concession from the Western point of
view because of cost reduction, easy access to large new markets, and
the realization of economies of scale. CMEA countries may find the
integration of new technologies into the current structures difficult.

Chapter 14
Joint Ventures: Bridge
Between East and West
R. Pry and 1. Faminsky
14.1 Western Point of View l
In Western countries, joint ventures were once a common form of
cooperation in cases where complementary assets were identified or
where it was possible to capitalize on economies of scale. More re-
cently, the size of some projects has surpassed the potential of a
particular company and even that of an individual country. This has
led to the creation of joint bilateral or even multilateral ventures.
Examples are the Siemens-Philips megachip project and similar ones
in South Korea and Japan, where several companies are combining
their complementary assets.
The way in which these organizational structures are created and
phased out is an important component of present-day free-enterprise
economy. It is therefore a subject of economic research.
IThis section was written by R. Pry.
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Particular problems emerge when individual economic agents en-
gaged in joint venture activities operate in dissimilar economic envi-
ronments. This is the essence of the East-West joint venture problem.
Because of the rapid political, economic, and social changes in most
of the CMEA countries, the study of joint ventures in an East-West
context sometimes seems to be like "shooting at a moving target."
14.1.1 Development of East-West cooperation
Before World War II, several Western companies (Siemens, Philips,
Tungsram, etc.) had subsidiaries in places that now belong to East
European countries. These subsidiaries were usually dependent tech-
nologically on the parent company. After World War II, these sub-
sidiaries were nationalized and obliged to develop independently of
their Western mother companies. With relations between East and
West interrupted, the subsidiaries had to build their own R&D base.
During the Cold War, only very limited economic contracts be-
tween Eastern and Western companies were maintained, mostly in
the form of the direct purchase of strategically insignificant goods.
With the emerging detente at the beginning of the sixties, mutual re-
lations improved and economic contacts developed further, not only
in the trading of goods, but also in license sales and mainly turnkey
capital purchases. The most representative of these activities are the
production of Fiat cars under Italian license in the USSR and Poland,
the license for the British float glass process arranged with Czechoslo-
vakia, the license from Control Data (USA) for the production of 50
megabyte disk storage for computers in Rumania, and petrochemical
facilities supplied by British, Japanese, and West German corpora-
tions to most CMEA countries. Western capital investment in the
East represented more than 50 percent of all investments in the chem-
ical industry in some CMEA countries for a number of years.
With the advent of perestroika and economic reform, which has
done away with the autarkical tendency of Socialist economies, room
for a more advanced form of cooperation, including joint ventures,
was created. This new challenge evoked many hopes and expecta-
tions that are not easy to meet, as the relatively brief history of
East-West joint ventures has shown. The sweeping changes that have
taken place in the past few months have brought with them political
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preconditions for still further development in the economic environ-
ment. In time, these changes may lead to a situation similar to that
in the Western countries. In other words, the legal, economic, and
institutional differences between, West and East European countries
may be no more significant in the future than the present differ-
ences between individual West European countries. Then the topic
of East-West joint ventures will lose its peculiarity.
14.1.2 The present situation
The number of meetings devoted to East-West joint ventures has
been steadily increasing over the past few years, but very few of these
events have stressed the relationship between this fashionable form
of entrepreneurship and the priorities of the national economic or in-
dustrial policy of a particular Socialist country. When we look at
the problems that Hungary, Bulgaria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and
the USSR face at the present time, we see that they are trying to
bridge the gap between the past, centrally administered, system and
the more market-oriented, free-enterprise system. This brings with
it the necessity to change the structure of the national economy as
well as of industrial production within certain sectors, and to carry
out corresponding shifts in employment. It is important to compre-
hend the positive role that joint ventures can play in the efforts to
accomplish this immense task.
Over the past few years, the number of regulations and decrees
related to joint ventures formulated in CMEA countries has been
rapidly increasing, as have the changes that have subsequently been
made in them. This development seems to have led to a certain
homogenization of the regulations in those CMEA countries taking
part in joint ventures.
In fact, in 1988, at a meeting organized by IIASA and the Hungar-
ian Chamber of Commerce,2 the opinion was voiced that this volatile
legal and business situation might have a negative effect on joint ven-
tures by delaying the decisions of Western companies. It also may
have resulted in certain drawbacks for early joint venture agreements,
which were unable to capitalize on the benefits introduced later on.
2Meeting on Managing East-West Joint Ventures: Practical Experiences, Bu-
dapest, October 3D-November 2, 1988,
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Sooner or later the process of change in the business environment
will become more regular than it is now. When the legislation for cre-
ating and operating joint ventures finally has been firmly established,
the possibility of making them more attractive by creating still more
agreeable conditions will end. In fact, it already may be easier to
start a joint venture in some CMEA countries than in Western ones.
It stands to reason that the governments, which put a great deal
of effort into creating a favorable environment for joint ventures, will
want to see results. A few months ago at a meeting organized by
IIASA and the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, a
Soviet reporter characterized the joint venture situation as follows:
"The time of euphoria has come to an end, and the time of hard
reality now prevails."
In spite of the growing number of registered joint ventures in
many CMEA countries, their economic significance, measured by the
volume of production or share ofthe GNP, remains small. The Soviet
Union currently has over 800 joint ventures registered with an inte-
grated investment of about US$1 billion. (To put this in perspective,
US$l billion is somewhat less than SONY of Japan offered in the sec-
ond half of 1989 for Columbia Pictures in the United States.) This
does not mean, however, that in some branches or national markets
the share of a particular commodity produced through a joint venture
is not substantial.
One of the appropriate ways of changing the situation might be
to make joint venture activities more consistent with the national
economy of a particular country. This presupposes a knowledge of
the national economic policy, assuming that such a policy exists at
all.
The process of designing an economic policy is not simple. It must
include the identification of realistic and compelling goals and ways to
achieve them. On the volatile domestic and foreign markets, a "top-
down" approach, as used by the CMEA countries for many decades,
may not work. One also has to devise a strong "bottom-up" compo-
nent. One has to analyze what assets a particular country, economy,
industry, and branch have, whether these are material endowments,
skills, accumulated capital, infrastructure, etc., and where the com-
parative advantages, leading to competitive advantages on the world
market, can be developed. Even if a comprehensive economic policy
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does not exist, the priorities of individual countries, stemming from
their present situation and needs, should be known.
What are the common needs of the CMEA countries? The East-
ern European countries (wi th the exception of the Soviet Union) can
be described as small, more or less open economies, that in the past
pursued more inward-oriented policies than foreign-trade ones. Now
this orientation has shifted to more open policies, which is why such
importance is attributed to joint ventures.
A consequence of the autarkical orientation is a more vertically
integrated production organization, usually leading to the establish-
ment of large enterprises that are less adaptive to change because
of their vested interests. This problem has been accentuated by the
lack of small and medium-size enterprises in most of the CMEA coun-
tries. The result is a major hindrance to the functioning of the market
mechanism that these countries are trying to introduce.
All the European CMEA countries (except for the Soviet Union)
are deficient in raw materials and fuel. Previously, because of a con-
trolled price structure and pricing of exports to other CMEA coun-
tries, oil and gas energy was cheap - favoring heavy-equipment indus-
tries and high-energy consumption activities. As one approaches a
more international market with convertible currency, world energy
prices will prevail. The emphasis should be shifted thereafter to
a more intensive type of development (resource-saving, high value-
added production). A radical structural change in products (light in-
stead of heavy manufacturing) and processes (resource-saving instead
of traditional ones) must take place. Here one would expect joint ven-
tures and other forms of cooperation to have a more significant pos-
itive effect than they have had up to now. Shifts in employment are
an inevitable byproduct of structural changes of the macroeconomic
proportions mentioned above. These shifts may be the most difficult
problem to solve in the course of restructuring, because the countries
involved have little operating space in which to provide a solution.
They cannot relocate a large amount of manpower fast enough. This
means they will be obliged to find ways to requalify people and create
new jobs, whereby investments in retraining the work force should be
considered as part of capital assets and not as an added cost. Joint
ventures in the service industries can playa useful role here.
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In the strict sense, a joint venture is legally, financially, organiza-
tionally, and even culturally, the most complicated form of coopera-
tion. If one wants to penetrate the foreign market, and that is indeed
what CMEA countries want to do, there are simpler ways to do so.
lt is instructive to observe how the Japanese entered the steel and
electronics market in the United States. They supplied unsophisti-
cated, low-profit products that created little defensive action on the
part of companies already present in the US market.
Because of their past priorities, all Eastern European countries
have less well developed service industries than Western countries.
This includes services for the public at large and also services for
industry such as communication, distribution, and financial services.
Although in most Socialist countries some form of joint ventures has
been started in the services sector - predominantly in tourism - joint
ventures still remain extremely limited in this sector.
Many opportunities are open for industry in services. Out sourc-
ing and even global sourcing, which are part of the strategy of many
Western companies, are embryonic in the CMEA countries. There
are many explanations for this situation, the most common being
the lack of convertible currency and of logistic support and services.
Closer scrutiny, however, reveals that a possibly even larger barrier
is the lack of managerial skills to find a viable business and respond
quickly to market needs, a lack of market knowledge and, of course,
the vertical integration of most enterprises in the CMEA countries.
Above all, the will and determination to get things done in spite of or-
ganizational obstacles is largely missing. International marketing of a
concept or a product is not achieved merely by opening one's door and
installing a phone. Because of their organizational complexity, joint
ventures preclude fast success. Simple production cooperation may
have a better chance. An exchange of components avoids the prob-
lem of nonconvertible currency. More emphasis needs to be placed
upon becoming reliable high-quality component suppliers to foreign
specifications through close cooperation agreements for supply at low
cost. Again, many examples can be found in Japan 20 years ago and
in the newly industrialized countries of the Pacific Basin now.
Another problem common to all industrialized countries is envi-
ronmental pollution. Some Socialist countries (notably Czechoslo-
vakia) have doubled the investment designated to combat pollution
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in each five-year plan. One can, in fact, speak of an emerging en-
vironment industry in both East and West. This creates a natural
basis for joint manufacturing or joint ventures. Several agreements
have been signed between Western companies and companies in So-
cialist countries in the area of environmental protection, with more
certain to come. Some CMEA countries have transferred part of the
manpower that has become available through the reduction of the
armed forces to this emerging industry.
During the meeting that IIASA organized on this topic in 1988 in
Budapest, one participant, who earns his daily bread by organizing
joint ventures, said that he had more than 100 proposals for joint ven-
tures, half of which were from agriculture. The statistics of success-
ful joint ventures so far, however, do not confirm the preponderance
of agriculture. Furthermore, agriculture in some CMEA countries
leaves much to be desired. In September 1989, IIASA organized a
small workshop on "Low-Energy Agriculture" in Ceske Budejovice
(Budweis) together with the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences. On
this occasion, it was pointed out that agriculture today may be at a
crossroad because the energy-intensive way of farming practiced up
to now is reaching its technical, economic and, above all, environmen-
tal limits. Several alternatives - referred to as "sustainable," "soft,"
"chemical-free," "natural" or "biological" agriculture - are being ex-
plored. Many new processes are being developed and tested within
Socialist countries for biological pest control, plant protection, hu-
mus production, etc. These would constitute a basis for future joint
ventures or other business forms. Because agricultural complexes in
CMEA countries tend to be much more vertically integrated than
in the West, opportunities are more easily developed for providing
a full service for pest and plant disease control rather than just a
particular product. This development could be used to establish and
franchise service companies in the West, offering the control products
manufactured in the East.
At the same time, public awareness of the overuse of chemicals in
food is increasing. This has led to the growing popularity of health
foods. Such foods also would offer a potential opportunity for joint
ventures. Eastern European authorities, even the political ones, are
very active in their efforts to assist this desirable development.
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14.1.3 Integration trends in Europe and joint ventures
The deficiencies of small national economies are one of several reasons
why economic and political measures supporting integration have be-
come a major trend, specially in Europe. The best-known result of
this endeavor is the year 1992, when the unified European Commu-
nity market is due to come into being.
The CMEA countries also have passed several decrees and resolu-
tions on the integration of both production and markets. Substantial
differences between these two economic systems, however, have led to
different results on the way to integration. The main differences, as
identified at a CMEA-EC Meeting held in Moscow on October 14-15,
1989, are summarized below:
EC
Supranational
Coordinating authority
Multilateral
Convertible currency
Transnational corporations
Active
Integrating
Booming
Structurally more balanced
CMEA
Nonsupranational
Coordination through 5-year plan
Bilateral
Nonconvertible currency
Transnational corporations
Nonactive
Disintegrating
Crisis-ridden
Structurally unbalanced
It is apparent that the situations in these two economic systems
are diametrically opposed to each other in some areas. Most of the
terms are self-explanatory. The term structural balance refers to the
fact that while the EC has several large economies of similar size, the
USSR is about an order of magnitude larger than any other CMEA
country. The private sector of Western European countries has re-
sponded with various activities such as:
(1) Preemptive European mergers and activities.
(2) A profusion of consultancy offices for corporate strategies for 1992.
(3) The attracting of capital for 1992 portfolio strategies.
(4) The establishing of corporate headquarters and offices in Brussels.
R. Pry and 1. Faminsky 251
The increase in the number of mergers by the largest 1,000 EC
firms provides an illustration of this development: 1982-1983 - 117;
1984-1985 - 208; 1986-1987 - 303.
It is interesting to note the reasons behind these mergers. EC
sources indicate that these were: rationalization and restructuring -
30%; expansion - 22%; synergies - 12%; reinforcement of market po-
sition - 12%. This also could be an additional incentive for launching
joint ventures.
Individual industries have developed various types of strategies
for 1992. Thus, e.g., traditional industries are rationalizing their
production lines and locations. The most prominent merger to date is
that of ASEA and Brown Boveri. High-tech industries try to reduce
their large R&D costs so as to enhance their competitive position.
To achieve this, companies competing in an end-product market may
join forces to develop an important component. One such case is
that of Siemens and Philips, who have agreed to collaborate on the
development of megachips.
A different approach is taken by the producers of consumer goods,
specially in the food and beverages sector. Here marketing operations
are usually integrated, and the market presence throughout the entire
EC is considered. Some companies have changed management struc-
tures to assure "European" rather than national marketing strategies
(e.g., Colgate-Palmolive and 3M).
Several banks have announced mergers, and others have agreed
to share the control of subsidiaries.
Multinational firms, and particularly the investments effected by
them, have a significant impact on the economic situation in the EC.
As a result, the 1989 private capital formation rate was raised and
presently is estimated at 7 percent (the average for 1982-1987 was
1.5 percent).
The situation in the CMEA countries is different, but this does
not mean that the development in the EC region are irrelevant to
them. Several Socialist countries have established missions in Brus-
sels and, in December 1989, the Soviet Union signed a special coop-
eration agreement with the EC. This will certainly create a still more
favorable economic environment for joint ventures.
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14.1.4 Opportunities brought about by new
technologies
Sooner or later the impact of all "megatrends," which already is be-
ing felt in more developed Western economies, also will be felt in
East European countries and will lead to the creation of a new eco-
nomic and technological environment. Joint ventures could facilitate
the adaptation of enterprises to this new environment. To illustrate
this point, let us examine briefly what it means to say that the world
is adding intelligence and speed through telecommunications, infor-
mation processing, transportation and logistic networks to existing
strengths of energy, power, and control.
Until recently, although we had the energy and power literally to
move mountains and travel faster than a speeding bullet, we nonethe-
less had to rely on inventories at all stages of our economy to make
up for a lack of information and communication. We not only had
to rely upon inventories of goods but also on inventories of services,
called "readiness to serve," and on inventories of money "in transit"
between investments.
We now are entering a period that, within the next few decades,
will make an immediate response practicable in the provision ofgoods
and services. Inventories or excess capacities will then be minimal,
as shown by the following examples:
• "Custom orders" by customers through computers or teleorders.
• Immediate availability of goods.
• Shorter delivery times.
• Automated financing and accounting.
How does this affect the focus and direction of an enterprise?
First, if telecommunications are cheap, fast, and accurate and if lo-
gistics are rapid, reliable, and low-cost, materials and components
can be sourced worldwide, depending upon lowest materials, capital,
and labor costs.
If manufacturing is automated and flexible, one can make a vari-
ety of high-quality, customized products cheaply; "economy of scope"
will replace "economy of scale." Regional plants of broad scope (pro-
ducing a small quantity of each product) with world sources for com-
ponents will replace large, high-volume, single-product, vertically in-
tegrated plants.
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If one has flexible, automated manufacturing plants with well-
defined manufacturing process rules and controlled quality, customer
orders, custom design, and customer delivery and service can be sep-
arated from manufacturing.
If finance and accounting transactions are immediate and low cost
and if financial information handling and storage are cheap and im-
mediately available anywhere in the world, finance can be separated
from either manufacturing or engineering/sales or connected to ei-
ther, depending upon coupling of sales and financing as a package.
Logistics and telecommunications already are mostly separated but
will become increasingly separated and privatized.
If the above comes to pass, and I believe it will, then the trend
will be toward marketing/engineering companies, toward manufac-
turing companies, toward distribution companies, and toward finan-
cial companies. This implies that industrial companies would restruc-
ture along horizontal lines of integration versus the present vertical
lines of integration.
If this occurs, sales/marketing firms, manufacturing firms, finan-
cial companies, logistics and information/telecommunication compa-
nies will find, in fact are already finding, additional economies of scale
by internationalization.
One should note that each of the above steps demands increased
management concentration upon the relationship between internal
units and between firms within the total systems to obtain the needed
costs and efficiencies. That requires that the systems aspects and the
services and quality improvement aspect of management will dom-
inate in the future. If the evolution to horizontal integration and
internationalization occurs, and this is very likely, the objectives of
the enterprise and the objectives of the nation-state become less and
less congruent.
What are the consequences of all this? A growing divergence of
nations and enterprise objectives is created:
(1) Nation (tied to geography, including resources, labor, capital
infrastructure).
(2) Enterprise (when internationalized and horizontally integrated
- not tied to any land area, labor market or, unique capital
infrastructure).
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With the assumption that this evolution proceeds inevitably for-
ward, no nation will be able to pursue a protectionist or commercial
isolation policy without inevitably destroying its standard of living.
Any nation pursuing such a policy does not compete with each other
country; it must compete with the best and cheapest of all countries
together, simultaneously, since all, or almost all, will be linked by a
set of universal enterprise systems.
14.1.5 Conclusions
The economic development of nations will inevitably lead to increased
possibilities for cooperation including joint ventures, that can play
a significant role. As the practice of joint ventures becomes more
widespread, the problem of devising methods and tools for launching
and operating East-West joint ventures will diminish and leave room
for the skill of discerning branches and enterprises where opportuni-
ties for combining assets exist. Then the long awaited positive-sum
game situation will prevail.
14.2 Eastern Point of View3
An analysis of the status and development of joint ventures in East
European countries shows that this new form of international eco-
nomic relations has become widespread, in a comparatively short pe-
riod of time, and assumed great significance in East-West economic
relations.
This may be explained, first of all, by the fact that the economic
strategies of most of these countries are connected with programs of
radical economic reforms, based on a deep democratization of man-
agement. Producers are being granted more and more independence,
including the possibility of direct cooperation with different foreign
partners. The management of trade and industrial cooperation thus
becomes one main element of the general economic mechanism and is
exempted from excessive dictates of the state administration. Coop-
eration is accelerated, and the process of harmonizing goals, interests
and possibilities of the cooperating partners becomes more active,
increasing the efficiency of joint activities.
3This section was written by I. Fa-minsky
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New political thinking is now being introduced into the field
of international relations. A main component is the formation of
open economies in certain countries, including countries with differ-
ent social-political systems. Joint ventures in the CMEA countries,
established with the participation of Western partners, are a striking
example and form a firm basis for the further mutual development of
economic potentials between East and West.
Administrative methods of management are gradually being re-
placed in the USSR and other Eastern countries by economic meth-
ods, ensuring a decentralization of management and of the main eco-
nomic elements, the development of horizontal integration, and the
formation of internal markets. It is undoubtedly recognized in eco-
nomic circles of the USSR and most East European countries that
the radical economic changes require highly developed technological
and managerial units, such as joint ventures, which have the ability
to be competitive in the international market.
In the USSR in particular, the successful economic activities of
joint ventures are ensured by the decisive implementation of the fol-
lowing main principles:
• Legally recognizing different forms of property.
• Granting producers the right to operate independently on a self-
supporting basis according to market requirements.
• Establishing free contract relations with different producers of
goods and services.
• Implementing a new effective taxation system to promote flexible
differentiation of tax relations with state budget authorities.
• Establishing a market environment of competition and promoting
a sharp increase in business activities.
In Soviet and other economic circles before 1980, it was believed
that the presence of foreign investments in the country would con-
tradict the very nature of a centrally planned economy. At the end
of the 1960s, however, some East European countries, first Hungary
and Rumania, introduced legislation to allow joint ventures with the
participation of Western firms in their territory.
The most active process of establishing joint ventures in East
European countries took place in the 1980s. Active state support to
establish joint ventures in the USSR is now a part of the country's
economic policy. This is seen as one solution to the problems of
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restructuring the economy and of more completely integrating it into
the international market.
The successful move towards the main principles of a market econ-
omy and the development of these principles in certain Eastern coun-
tries will promote joint venture cooperation under conditions required
by the world market. The organizational and managerial principles
used in Western countries and applied in joint ventures will facilitate
the Eastern countries' adaptation to conditions of a market economy.
The presence of foreign capital in a joint venture promotes an
effective interaction with the financial environment of the world mar-
ket. The activity of the joint venture in its host country also promotes
an adaptation to conditions of the world economy among the numer-
ous local suppliers and consumers and develops their contacts with
external markets. Such contact provides the local enterprises with
more information about technical standards and prices on the world
markets and also exposes them to new elements of technological and
managerial know-how. The experience of international large-scale
production and scientific-production cooperation shows that includ-
ing local enterprises in the division of labor on the microeconomic
level is the determinant condition for expanding the country's partic-
ipation in the international division of labor. East-West joint ven-
tures permit increased opportunities for foreign economic relations
and also encourage integration into the world economy.
It is quite obvious that joint ventures have certain advantages
compared to other traditional forms of cooperation, specifically pro-
duction cooperation and deals on a compensation basis. Joint ven-
tures provide access to advanced technology and managerial experi-
ence as well as the possibility to use loan capital, currency resources,
and a large-scale network. It is clear, e.g., that Western firms that
have agreements on production cooperation with organizations in So-
cialist countries tend to grant their East European partners only
second-rate technology. The agreements themselves sometimes ex-
clude access to Western markets. This can be explained by the fact
that Western partners are not as committed by joint property as they
are in joint ventures. Therefore, they are not interested in maintain-
ing technological standards that are competitive in world markets.
In contrast, joint ventures imply that the partners from both sys-
tems own common property and run common commercial risks. The
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Western firms, therefore, have a vested interest in maintaining a com-
petitive technical level in the international market.
East-West joint ventures are a new phenomenon and represent a
different stage of economic cooperation, possibly because of the new
economic mentality recently introduced in East-West international
relations. The obvious advantages for both sides are clear. In this
connection, it is important to examine the legitimacy of a Western
thesis that joint ventures are one of the few remaining means for the
CMEA countries to address problems in the current economic situa-
tion. In the author's view, this thesis is not in full accordance with
the facts. The specified goals of joint ventures in Eastern countries
are essential, recognized by the Socialist countries themselves, and
interpreted in all official publications. But the assertion that joint
ventures are the only means to solve their economic problems is far
from reality.
Joint ventures as well as other traditional forms of economic re-
lations are efficient ways to effect technology transfer and capi tal
investment. But to consider joint ventures as a panacea for all the
economic troubles of the CMEA countries or as the only means to ad-
vance to a higher economic level would be certainly wrong. This fact
is demonstrated by the other forms of East-West economic relations
that were introduced at the beginning of the 1960s.
It is equally untrue to assert that the Socialist countries derive
more benefits from joint ventures than do their Western partners.
Most Western businessmen clearly realize that this new form of eco-
nomic relations brings them some unique important advantages such
as:
• Immediate participation in the manufacturing process, which al-
lows them to control quality and technology standards.
• More flexible regulation of pricing and marketing, which allows a
higher level of profitability on capital investments.
• Access to a comparatively cheap, highly skilled workforce and
engineering services.
• Possibility of using material resources of the host country as work-
ing capital on a long-term basis.
• Additional possibilities to market their products (machinery,
equipment, basic technology and services, etc.).
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• Broadening their own production and financial basis by increasing
sales for export on the local domestic markets.
• Stable sources of components and semifinished products, both for
their own production and for local markets.
• Exclusive position in the local market and in some cases in other
Eastern European markets as well.
The above factors make East-West joint ventures the most at-
tractive option for rapidly developing Western firms whose economic
strategy relies on an effective, long-term production cycle.
The study conducted at IIASA revealed the factors that can slow
down the development of this new, mutually beneficial form of East-
West economic cooperation. This study presented first of all a full pic-
ture of joint venture legislative developments in many CMEA coun-
tries and clarified the reasons behind the updated legislation. This
allows a more in-depth understanding of the changes in the basic reg-
ulations in the various countries, the essence of which is improving
the investment climate for joint venture activities.
The problem of the nonconvertibility of Socialist currencies has
emerged as one of the main barriers to cooperation and currently
is the most difficult to overcome. For instance, the joint venture
partners can agree (usually during negotiations) to include in their
agreement a special clause concerning the Western partner's obliga-
tion to sell a part of the joint venture's products on the world market
for hard currency. This option is particularly acceptable for Western
partners, especially when the joint venture is dealing with materials
or semifinished production. In some CMEA countries, there are spe-
cial conditions that allow delivery to the Western partners of goods
not produced by a joint venture, but considered as a payment for
profits that the Western partners are to receive in hard currency.
Production subsidiaries of the joint ventures founded in countries
with convertible currency also could play an important role as an ad-
ditional source of hard currency. In the USSR, e.g., the sale of joint
venture products to Soviet enterprises is widespread to ensure the
required earnings as well as to purchase hard currency at auction.
The results of the IIASA study have shown that this new effec-
tive form of joint East-West activity is gaining popularity among
businessmen, in both East and West European countries, including
those CMEA countries where the process is being introduced rather
R. Pry and 1. Faminsky 259
slowly. The obvious advantages of joint ventures for Europe, as well
as the possibilities for overcoming existing trade barriers, present new
possibilities for future multilateral activities.
The most attractive possibility would be to develop a broad pro-
graru under the auspices ofIIASA to study the problems of East-West
joint ventures, taking into account the specific nature of this inter-
national forum. Such a program could investigate East-West joint
venture activities on a systematic basis as an important component
of the European global economies and could analyze the conditions
of joint venture activities as a large economic system functioning
as a new element in a market economy. Such a project prepared
by IIASA could significantly supplement some prospective research
projects that are being implemented under the auspices of various
European Community institutions.

Appendix:
Case Studies
The following case studies have been prepared based on information
presented by the respective companies or elaborated by the authors
themselves through research. The case studies have been chosen by
the national groups with the agreement of the joint companies.
We think they can be a good lesson for managers and future
investors in the field. Difficulties and problems are shared together
with achievements. Failures and unsuccessful stories also would be
good lessons, but companies as well as individuals are less willing to
share unpleasant experiences. Moreover, joint venture history is very
short, and clear cases of unsuccessful joint ventures have been very
few. A number of joint ventures have not been profitable in their first
few years or have been "sleeping" during those years, but these are
not necessarily unsuccessful cases.
A. Polish Case Study by R. Maciejko
Furnel International Ltd: Institutionalized Barter Trade
A.I Background
The name Fumel is an acronym created by merging the first few
letters of two main activities of the firm, "Fum" for fumi ture and "el"
for electronics. The firm also has plans in the tourism industry. To
date, Fumel is by far the biggest production joint venture established
in Poland. It accounted for 75 percent of all Polish joint venture sales
in 1988, and exported five times as much as the second largest joint
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venture. It employed by far the greatest number of employees (4,500),
all of whom are Polish nationals.
Furnel became possible after Poland passed its first joint venture
law in 1986. The current president of Furnel, Jan Bandurski, was
then an executive of PAGED, the Polish Foreign Trade Organization
that handles furniture exports. He organized a consortium of six firms
and government bodies in wood, wood processing, and furniture pro-
duction. This group accounts for about 10 percent of Poland's wood
and furniture industry. They have the advantage of being vertically
integrated and being up to 80 percent self-sufficient in raw materials,
something vital in Poland where unreliable supply lines are a chronic
problem. This by no means guarantees cheap and abundant inputs,
but it at least increases the chances of adequate supply on time.
This group had one major problem. They felt that furniture
and wood product sales and exports could be increased dramati-
cally only if they could afford a small hard-currency investment in
quality-improving foreign technologies and such things as better dyes
and varnishes. With the difficulty of obtaining government credits
and the virtual nonexistence of new Western financing in Poland, the
group decided to find a Western partner. One of the main advantages
of having a foreign partner would be to bring in hard-currency capi-
tal and acquire a credit rating by which the Polish group could have
better access to Western financing. Such a partner, therefore, would
have to be large and established. According to Mr Bandurski, the
partner's products also had to fit the demands of the Polish market.
Finally, the partner's products had to compete in a different market,
in which the Western partner would not try to lower the export prices
of the Polish producers.
The company that had the courage to take the risks involved was
International Computers Limited, ICL, part of Britain's Standard
Telephones and Cables. ICL already had been based in Warsaw for
25 years and had the largest representative office of any Western elec-
tronics firm. It also had gained experience in producing and selling
to the Polish market. Since the 1960s, ODRA computer systems had
been built in Poland under ICL license and used by Polish banks and
other institutions. In addition, ICL's general manager had worked
in the Polish market for ten years and could estimate the risks and
possible rewards of the venture. Mera-Elzab, an expanding computer
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company, and the electronics foreign trade organization Metronex
joined ICL to develop the export market.
A.2 Plans and actions
The furniture firm contributed 49 percent of statutory capital, mainly
in kind. This in-kind contribution included about 90 percent of the
production capacity for some firms. The two Polish electronic indus-
try firms, with a 16 percent share, and ICL, with a 35 percent share
investment of approximately US$2 million, together make up the re-
mainder ofthe company. STC-ICL's investments in Furnel are rather
small when compared with the firm's sales of US$3 billion worldwide.
ICL's main aim in establishing the venture was to circumvent the
single biggest problem of selling in Poland, the nonconvertibility of
the zloty. ICL could then enjoy a competitive edge over its computer-
selling rivals by selling to the Polish market for zloty instead of hard
currency. It could provide software and consulting services on a sim-
ilar basis. Its hard-currency profits would come from the sale of the
joint venture's furniture abroad.
Using its equipment and know-how, ICL and Mera-Elzab began
manufacturing in Poland. In the early phase, the production used
ICL's licensed technology and imported components and subassem-
blies. In the future, Furnel hopes to develop and produce more of the
products in Poland, first for the domestic market and, secondly, for
export within the CMEA.
The joint venture officially started operation on February 23,
1988. For 1988, its sales were almost 24 billion zloty (approximately
US$47 million at official rates). According to Furnel sources, its hard-
currency exports amounted to more than US$12 million. According
to President Bandurski, furniture exports were up 80 percent from
levels before the joint venture began. In the future, he predicted,
these exports would rise by 400 percent with a production increase
of from 50 percent to 100 percent.
A.3 Impressions and conclusions
Furnel owes its success to the use of advanced management tech-
niques, some of which were part ofICL's in-kind capital contribution.
The over 400,000 workers split earnings from finished products on a
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piecework basis. Together with a commission system, this is said to
have improved quality and reduced absenteeism by 50 percent. The
company tries to keep the wages of joint venture workers 30 per-
cent above wages earned by those outside the venture, but because of
Poland's wage-price inflation it is difficult to maintain this. For the
added wages, the employees are expected in many cases to be more
productive.
Mr Dolczewski, executive director of Furnel, emphasizes, how-
ever, that quality must be stressed over quantity to compete in tough
Western markets. In the future, Fume! wants to implement more
Western management techniques and hopes to start a Furnel Inter-
national Business School using rCL's experience in business training.
Although Furne!'s management admittedly has been creative in sev-
eral aspects, the joint venture basically was created to make business
work despite unavailable credits and nonconvertible currency. It can
better be described as an institutionalized barter trade in which Pol-
ish wood and furniture are exchanged for British electronics. If the
Polish wood and furniture conglomerate had been able to obtain hard-
currency financing from some other sources to fund improvements,
there would not have been the need for a joint venture. Likewise, if
the zloty had been convertible, ICL would not have had to join with
the furniture companies to have exportable profits.
B. Czechoslovakian Case Study by O. Becvar
AGROTOP Joint Stock Company
B.1 Background
Czechoslovakia has traditionally exported about 3 million cubic me-
ters of roundwood per year. Essentially it is an export of raw materi-
als. Human labor is limited to cutting, manipulation, and transport.
All other operations, such as sawing, drying, and planing, are done
abroad. The initiators of the established Agrotop joint-stock com-
pany are specialists in lumber processing and suggested that wood
processing be brought back to Czechoslovakia. They carried out all
the necessary calculations and studies, discussed the proposition ex-
tensively, with the appropriate official bodies, and finally achieved
the establishment of a specialized joint company.
Appendix 265
The successful operation of this joint venture was assumed based
on the following facts:
o The Czechoslovak partner had a secure supply of raw materials.
o The Austrian partner was well established in the wood market,
and a continuing demand had been verified by its marketing
activities.
o The production (with the small exception of substandard out-
put that is sold locally) would be destined exclusively for export
against hard currency.
o In the sawn-wood trade, long-term credits were not customary;
collection of payments would take place continuously.
o The energy and manpower were available in Czechoslovakia.
o The transport route was very short, with a view to the proximity
of both the works and the frontier for export.
o Capacity could be easily extended.
o The product would not be subject to frequent changes and price
fluctuation would very slight.
The benefits gained by the foreign partner consisted of obtaining
sale stock. The final purchasers also would be satisfied, as they could
profit from a larger offer on the market. Finally, the treasury of the
importing country could gain by imposing a higher rate of import
duties. The latter fact was taken into account, of course, in the
supply-chain calculations.
B.2 Plans and actions
In principle, the seat of the enterprise could be located near the ma-
terial resources, or near the most important forest plants, or near the
customers. The second variant was chosen, and the enterprise is be-
ing built near Straznice, 70 km from the Austrian border. This choice
shortened the transport route, which is paid for in foreign currency.
The plant is being built under Czechoslovak conditions and con-
struction should be completed in one year. Lightweight halls are
envisaged, in which only the staff workrooms will be heated. Com-
pleting the construction work within the indicated time was made
possible by giving the order to the Pozimos joint venture, and by
partial payment in freely exchangeable currency.
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The raw material, designated as industrial coniferous logs, is a
centrally budgeted item in the present planning system. The sit-
uation is complicated somewhat because the Czechoslovak partner
is subordinated to another branch involved in different activities.
Therefore, the centrally allotted supply and the planned sawn-wood
export function must be transferred to the branch to which Agrotop
is subordinated. Under the present planning system, wood supply
is ensured by the central authorities and, at the same time, an ex-
port obligation is imposed. The arrangement is an exception to the
principle that no state plan obligations are to be assigned to joint
ventures with foreign ownership participation. It also is a precedent
for handling similar cases in the future.
The possibility of processing imported raw materials also was
considered. The decision was postponed, however, and will be re-
examined after the plant reaches full operation. The up-to-date tech-
nology for wood processing - an automatic line for sawing, planing,
and milling - will be provided by lease from a Swedish supplier. The
payments will be spread over six years with the first installment due
six months after delivery. The plant also will be equipped with mod-
ern electronic facilities for fast communications.
The number of employees has been limited to a functional min-
imum, markedly smaller than usual for that branch in the country.
The administrative staff also will be kept to a minimum (only 13 per-
cent of the total). The employees are expected to show extraordinary
efficiency and self-reliance in unplanned situations and in executing
routine orders. This will require successive selection of high-quality
manpower and will entail a higher initial personnel turnover.
For greater efforts, including work outside of regular hours, higher
wages than the normal level are planned. For the variable wage com-
ponent, only one criterion is to be decisive: fulfilling export orders.
The number of employees is planned for one shift; a second shift
is possible if additional sources of roundwood are found. As far as
price relations are concerned, the actual wholesale price will permit
effective exports. To obtain complementary roundwood resources, it
will be possible to accept a contractual price (if permitted by official
methods at the given time) or to increase the delivery of raw mate-
rials by stimulating the interest of the supplier through offering to
share foreign currency income, I.e., making partial payment in hard
currencies.
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The increase of foreign currency income from sawn-wood exports
as compared with roundwood is 30 percent. In the calculations, prices
registered at the Holzborse (wood exchange) and published in the
Holzkurier journal have been used.
For economic considerations, the new joint venture broke away
from standard practice in the CSSR. The economic analysis of the
Agrotop Co. proved that their application to establish a joint venture
with foreign ownership participation should be approved. This is
further evidenced by the efficiency and effectiveness of the project in
making installment leasing payments.
B.3 Management
Some specific data of general interest, taken from the foundation
documents of the Agrotop Company, follow:
• The foreign trade company Transakta (see below) is included not
as a founder, but as a participant in negotiations; its function is
to realize exports and imports.
• Ten percent of the nominal value of shares taken over is to be
paid within one month, the rest according to regulation.
• The amount of basic capital of Kcs 20 million is distributed be-
tween the founders: Agropodnik (Czechoslovakia) - Kcs 12 mil-
lion, and Topham (Austria) - Kcs 8 million.
• The range of products and their specifications will be decided by
a two-thirds majority.
The statutes of the company stipulate that:
• Any increase in capital requires the approval of two-thirds of the
subscribed capital votes.
• The shareholders will obtain at least 50 percent of the net profit
after deducting taxes and appropriations stipulated by law.
• The members of the board of directors can only represent the
company collectively, unless individually authorized in writing.
It should be noted that the majority shareholder owns three-fifths
of the subscribed capital, which is less than the two-thirds specified
above. This means that fundamental decisions that are to be ap-
proved by a two-thirds majority require a larger number of votes
than those held by the majority shareholder.
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Foreign trade activities were entrusted to the very experienced
foreign trade company, Transakta. It will charge a mark-up for its
services, Le., for exports of sawn wood and boards as well as for
imports of technology.
This joint venture represents only a small production plant exert-
ing a limited influence on the structure of total Czechoslovak exports.
It will be possible, however, to apply the experience gained from its
operation to other territories and branches of industry.
C. Bulgarian Case Study
by W. van Campenhout
Atlas Consult: Finding its Own Way to the Market
C.l Background
In December 1986, three enthusiastic and experienced managers with
a great deal of training background founded Atlas Consult, a company
specializing in integrated organizational development projects: Total
Quality Control, Human Resources Management, Sales, Marketing,
and Export Management. After a year, in November 1987, four more
partners were incorporated, all of whom are experts in their own
field. In March 1988, Atlas Pharma NV, a distribution and marketing
company for pharmaceutical products was established. To allow for
faster growth, Atlas Organization Development Consult was split off
in May 1988, and the Sales Training Department remained under
the parent organization. Atlas Organization Development Consult
determines its own activities and outlines its overall and long-term
strategy. In August 1988, Atlas Pharma BV, a 100 percent subsidiary
aimed at the Dutch market, was set up. A branch company in the
USA (North Carolina) began operating in July 1989.
C.2 Mission and overall strategy
The objectives of the company are:
• To fulfill the existing needs of large and medium-sized companies
for Total Quality Control within their white collar environment.
• To comply with growing demands for professional support and
training for International or Export Management.
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Atlas Consult highly values its commitment to the results of im-
plementing its methodology. It believes it offers a unique approach to
the transfer of its know-how to the personnel of client companies. The
rapid development of the company can be explained by the interest
of its multinational customers, who pass on the successful programs
and formulas to their subsidiaries.
C.3 Actions
The company decided that any commitment should be focused on
establishing a long-term relationship. Believing that the Eastern Eu-
ropean economy could catch up easily with the more advanced West,
an action plan was worked out in the beginning of 1988.
An office base is essential for the services that Atlas Consult offers
its customers and requires:
• Efficient communication facilities (telephone, telefax, secretary).
• Address.
• Meeting rooms.
• Reception facilities.
• Training equipment (flip charts, overhead projectors, etc.).
To operate effectively, it needs:
• Ability to hire/dismiss local employees.
• Ability to invoice the client.
• Use of working capital.
In short, a legal entity was essentially needed to enter the mar-
ket. To meet the requirements, a theoretical plan was developed,
describing the following actions:
• Search for preliminary contacts.
• Organize product presentations (with the help of local organiza-
tions, if possible).
• Find the right local assistance.
• Investigate possible "legal frame" solutions.
• Prospect customers.
• Train local consultants at the Belgian headquarters.
• Choose the right legal entity and apply for settlement.
• Establish office base.
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• Start delivery to customers.
• Improve the organization, depending on local response of author-
ities, customers, and personnel, etc.
C.4 Reality and practice
The channels existing in Belgium proved to be unreliable, and the
company's plans were regarded with disbelief. Through a young en-
thusiastic diplomat of the Belgian Embassy in Sofia, initial contact
with the Institute for Social Management (ISM) in Bulgaria was made
during the first visit of one of the partners in May 1988. Efficient help
from ISM enabled the company's top management to present their
products only three months later to the right people in Bulgaria: top
management of companies and relevant authorities. The Director of
the Institute appointed his principal lecturer as the coordinator be-
tween Atlas Consult and ISM. Without this decision, Atlas Consult
would not have been able to accomplish so much on such short notice.
Due to the preliminary visits of a skilled local consultant, the
productivity of each visit to Bulgaria was over 100 percent. During
the third trip, in November 1988, contact with the first potential
clients were made on a business level. At the same time, different
possibilities to establish a legal framework for the activities planned
jointly with the Institute for Social Management were discussed.
Due to Decree No. 56, the establishment of the joint venture was
postponed until more information on the new legislation was avail-
able. The application procedure finally started on April 3, 1989.
C.S Impressions
The first visit to Sofia in November 1988 was a revelation. During
meetings with the different contacts, the Atlas Consult representa-
tives had a strong feeling of deja-v", which grew during discussion of
the possibilities of establishing an organizational base and the nec-
essary legal framework. Common factors in the respective systems
became more apparent. This point was stressed during one of the
first seminars held in Bulgaria: "Don't look too much at the differ-
ences, but focus on the common factors. People are people wherever
they live. Systems established by people cannot differ too much since
people think much in the same way."
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Another very important concern was to show that Atlas Consult
believes in what it intended to do. When a local company asked for
guidance in upgrading the quality of its products and organizations,
it was clear that a long-term commitment from Atlas Consult would
be required. Atlas Consult clearly demonstrated its confidence in the
proposal by accepting payment in local currency. Atlas Consult sees
the European market as an entity, not as a compilation of different
tax systems. As long as a country allows payment of the operating
costs with the earned money and reinvestment of excess cash, it will
make no difference in the long run which currency is used.
Atlas Consult believes that within five to ten years, the gravity
point of economic activity will start moving from Western to East-
ern Europe. The general education level and knowledge already are
at hand. University degrees are more than sufficiently available in
East Europe; they just must be directed to staff functions in the
companies. Motivation and responsibility will create middle manage-
ment in the new company structures. Once management becomes
responsible for profits and future investments, they will soon become
market-oriented.
The process of alteration is for the better and will prove irre-
versible. With the understanding that changes consist of adjusting
the existing system and not copying Western ways, results will be
successful in due course. Many "Western mistakes" can be avoided
by steadiness and caution.
Decree No. 56 and the new legislation on leasing confirm the de-
termination of the Bulgarian government. Still, much remains to be
done to motivate people to think and act accordingly. The mobi-
lization of entrepreneurship and inventiveness, on a daily basis, is an
enormous task. To select a more market-oriented economy without
sacrificing victims during the process is the government's responsibil-
ity and demands wisdom and caution.
C.6 The near future
Administrative regulations in the Eastern countries will become more
flexible and will allow Atlas Consult to act independently as a com-
pany within the different countries. By the time this book is pub-
lished the Atlas Consult office in Sofia will have been opened.
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In February and March 1989, three Bulgarian consultants were
trained in the Atlas Consult philosophy and its products. Total
Quality Control (TQC) and Export Management Programs have been
started at two companies in Tolbouchin, one in Sofia, and one in Sills-
tra. Together with IKO in Sofia, Atlas Consult will make presenta-
tions during the training programs. Programs soon will begin in two
other organizations - one in Sofia and one in Kazanlak. Residential
training programs are being organized for two headquarters of large
state firms and are being negotiated with another large company.
Today, 15 full-time and four part-time specialized consultants are
working to support the different programs throughout the company.
D. Hungarian Case Study by P. Szolnoky
Macon Ltd: Establishment of a Successful Joint Venture
D.I Background
Macon Ltd is the first Finnish-Hungarian joint venture. Its name
refers both to the founders and the activity and stands for MAnage-
ment and CONsulting. The founders are the Institute for Building
Economy and Organization (EGSZI), Budapest - 60 percent, and
Oy MEC-Rastor AB, Espoo - 40 percent. The initial capital of the
company is Ft 2.5 million. The capital increase in 1988 was Ft 0.5
million.
The main profile of the two founding companies is as follows:
• Institute for Building Economy and Organization:
Research and development, organization development, building
economy, honsing and communal economy, computer services, as-
sisting services, publications.
• Oy MEC-Rastor AB:
Management consulting, business strategy and organization de-
velopment, improvement of industrial productivity, project man-
agement, logistics, assisting central and local administrations.
The immediate precedent of the joint venture was a development
project conducted by the 'two founders in Hungary. In this way, they
became thoroughly acquainted with each other's activity; the for-
eign party also became acquainted with conditions and possibilities
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in Hungary and with possible opportunities for management consult-
ing services. Evaluating this information and analyzing the Hungar-
ian conditions and the experiments of the successful common project,
the two parties decided to establish closer cooperation through a joint
venture.
The founders believed that the success of the company would be
based on a well-developed strategy. One year before establishment,
they selected the future managing director, who was made responsi-
ble for the preparatory and strategic planning. The strategy outlined
the areas and activities on which the new joint venture should con-
centrate to hit the common targets and interests of the two partners.
The company's business philosophy is defined in the following three
principles:
• High-standard, client-oriented consulting services for both domes-
tic and foreign clients.
• Profit-oriented business from the start.
• Profit to be distributed among the founders and the consultants.
Based on these principles, the business strategy was determined
for approximately a three-year period, in which the main objective
was the introduction and stabilization of the company. The following
main targets were defined:
• At the end of the third year, the sales revenues should reach ap-
proximately Ft 11 million; the ratio of the gross profit to revenues
should range between 8 percent and 10 percent, and the ratio to
the initial capital should reach 20 percent. The initial staff should
have doubled (approximately 13 to 18 persons).
• Based on the building-industry customers, a continuous profile
diversification was to be started. The target was set for the size
of revenues from the building sector and from other sectors.
• The partners did not consider the payment of dividends as a pri-
mary target and would make decisions annually based on actual
results.
• At least 10 percent of the revenues had to be realized in hard-
currency exports, in order not to disturb either the company's
activities abroad or its relations with the foreign partner.
• The assets and equipment necessary for operation had to be
ensured continuously, partly through the partners' support and
partly through the company's own sources.
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• The income of the employees had to increase annually on an av-
erage of 10 percent to 15 percent.
The business strategy also determined that in 1989, with full
knowledge of the results of the first three years' development, a new
business strategy should be defined for the next three to four years,
aiming at the dynamic development of Macon Ltd. The targets of
the business strategy indicated a difficult challenge for the company,
but it was clear that the possibility for both asset investment and
increased income would result from profitable activities.
D.2 Events and action
The following events are the main milestones in establishing the joint
venture:
• Common development project in Hungary (EGSZI-MEC Rastor),
December 1983 to July 1986.
• Started negotiations to establish the joint venture, April 1985.
• Established procedure (based on the framework valid before
1986); obtained preliminary approval of the Professional Inter-
departmental Committee, July 1985 to November 1985; previ-
ous announcement of the intention to establish and its approval,
December 1985 to February 1986; signature of the Association
Agreement, May 1986; request for approval of the establishment,
June 1986.
• Approval of the joint venture's establishment, Bank of Finland,
Hungarian Ministry of Finance, July to August 1986.
• Statutory general meeting, September 3, 1986.
• Registration of the company with various authorities and with
the Court of Registration, September to December 1986.
These events show a very slow process but took place within the
legislative framework valid before 1986. New regulations were then
introduced and the establishment procedure began again in January
1986. Within one year, the joint venture was established and regis-
tered. In our opinion, this duration is fully acceptable compared with
the previous procedure. The activities of the Ministry of Finance and
the Inter-departmental Committee were similar in both procedures.
Registration was the slowest part of the procedure and needed
to be done with various authorities: register book office, tax office,
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statistical bureau, court of registration, without any coordination.
This process is extremely bureaucratic. It could be shortened with
suitable cooperation among the different authorities. In the case of
Macon Ltd, the registration took up much time so the association
agreement was checked with the different authorities before it was
signed.
D.3 Scope and essence of Macon Ltd's activity
Macon Ltd performs and offers its services in the following fields:
• Business development
Strategic planning and analysis.
Problem-definition, diagnostic, transexamination.
Development of contracting activities.
Marketing and market research development of companies.
Development of planning systems.
• Organization development, managing system development
Implementation of organizational structure development.
Wage development, compensation, and motivation systems.
Development of planning and controlling systems.
Development of human resources.
• Information and management system development
Management systems.
Management information systems.
Project management systems.
Problem-oriented developments.
Increased operational efficiency.
• Foreign trade-type services
Consultation for the practice of company foreign trade rights.
Formalization of the apparatus necessary for the practice of
foreign trade rights.
Improving the efficiency of a given working apparatus.
Market studies.
Preparation of contracts.
Searching for business partners.
Preparation of marketing and public relation plans.
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• Assisting services
Assisting in common contracting, including establishing joint
ventures.
Feasibility studies for joint venture organization.
World Bank development projects.
Implementation of professional seminars, conferences, study
tours, etc.
The following table shows the main figures of the firm's activity
to date.
Denomination 1986 1987 1988
Net Income (Ft '000) 1.349 100% 6.319 100% 10.300 100%
From this
Building trade 1.179 87 3.990 63 6.200 60
Export 1.040 16 1.300 13
Others 0.170 13 1.289 21 2.800 27
Gross profit (Ft '000) 0.207 641 717
Number of customers 6 100 14 100 19 100
From this
Building trade 4 67 6 43 4 21
Export 3 21 3 16
Others 2 33 5 36 12 63
Number of projects 10 100 25 100 28 100
From this
Building trade 8 80 14 56 13 46
Export 3 12 3 11
Otbers 2 20 8 32 12 43
Number of staff 7 10 13
The figures show that Macon Ltd reached its goals and, with
continuous business development, shaped new strategies.
Macon Ltd is an economical partnership operating in the form
of a limited liability company, and its activity is regulated by the
act concerning joint ventures in Hungary. The common rules, the
company's main document, do not contain any special provisions and
give a correct orientation to every point mentioned in the act. A
cooperation agreement was signed that contained the conditions of
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activity between the two founders and the joint venture in specified
areas. This additional document has proved to be advisable and very
useful. The organizational structure of the firm was formed according
to the legal regulations.
The general meeting is the main instrument of the association. It
is held annually, but can meet at any time upon the request of any
member. The general meeting is headed by the chairman, who is one
ofthe partner's representatives. The chairmanship changes every year
(after the acceptance of the balance sheet from the previous year).
In the first year of business, the chairman was a representative of the
Finnish partner.
The general assembly decides whether to increase or decrease the
basic funds of the association, to sell and purchase ownership, to
modify the common rules, to accept a new association member, and
to accept the annual balance sheet of the company. The general
assembly nominates the managing director and decides on his annual
salary. It also elects the members of the board of supervision and is
empowered to meet and decide on all questions referred to it.
The board of supervision consists of three members, although
this number is not obligatory. Its main duties are to control the
managing director, take charge of revising the association's balance
sheet, comment on the rules concerning the association's activity, and
revise proposals made by the managing director.
The managing director is an employee of the company, and his
duties and responsibilities are to ensure the company's successful
activity.
D.4 Impressions and conclusions
To summarize the experiences gained so far, the joint venture is de-
veloping according to its preliminary strategy and plans. The exter-
nal conditions are satisfactory. The foreign-trade activity (export-
import) is being managed without significant problems. Problems
have arisen in the specific areas of accounting for the settlement of
cost categories (representations) where the accounting rules and com-
petence of the partners had not been fully coordinated.
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A serious problem is the available infrastructure (office, telecom-
munications, car, etc.) in a country where the partners cannot pro-
vide much help and central settlements are very difficult and expen-
sive. The law concerning joint ventures (managing sectors or not)
was poorly coordinated, which posed a problem until 1989.
The unstable economic environment is the main problem because
it precludes the possibility of making correct forecasts. The joint
venture is a foreign body in the Hungarian economy, which causes
some problems in relations with other organizations.
Macon Ltd so far is a viable organization and there is great de-
mand for its activity. The firm has been profitable from the beginning
and, based on the clients coming from the building sector, has been
able to access the market as planned. The consulting staff is ca-
pable of high-level work and speaks many different languages. The
joint venture Macon Ltd can significantly contribute to developing
Finnish-Hungarian economic relations.
E. Hungarian Case Study by T. Benedek l
KEMIPUR: Harmonizing Partners' Relations Over Time
E.! Background
The KEMIPUR Polyurethane System Limited Liability Company
was founded in 1985 with central premises in Solymar, a village near
Budapest. The basic capital is Ft 1 million. The foreign founding
partner was Elastogram Polyurethane GmbH, Federal Republic of
Germany (FRG), with a share of 49 percent. The domestic part-
ners are the Plastic Industry Company of Pest County (PEMU) with
a share of 41 percent and the Chemolimpex Trading Company for
Chemicals with a share of 10 percent.
The joint venture is engaged in the production and marketing of
polyurethane foam systems. The aims of the Hungarian partner in
establishing this company were to eliminate the import of products
for hard currency and to increase exports against hard currency. Any
joint venture whose aim is to reduce hard-currency imports and at
the same time to promote exports has been encouraged by the new
1After the study by Dr Donat Banifert from the Ipargazdasagi Intezet (Institute
for Industrial Economics), Budapest, 1989.
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Hungarian legislation. The foreign partner was motivated to establish
the company due to the positive attitude of the Hungarian market.
The Elastogram Polyurethane GmbH is a concern of the BASF
works in the FRG, supplying in the past about two-thirds of the
polyurethane on the Hungarian market. A further aim was to extend
the deliveries of this new company to other CMEA markets as well.
The establishment of the company on behalf of the foreign part-
ner was further motivated by the possibility of increasing profits due
to the expected increase in turnover. The establishment of the joint
venture was not easy. The requirements were well known and nego-
tiations began in 1978. The filing at the Court of Registration was
done in 1985 and production started in 1986. Thus the period of
time between the first intention and final realization was about eight
years. The various necessary approvals (an approval was needed even
to start negotiations), the fact that this was the first joint venture to
be established in Hungary, the practice of recording every discussion,
and unexpected variations and uncertainties consumed much precious
time.
How the Partners Found Each Other
The Elastogram Polyurethane GmbH was a supplier to PEMU. A
proper and fair business relationship had already been established
between these two companies. PEMU had a very large production
profile, producing plastic foam basic materials and polyurethane sys-
tems for the footwear industry, insulation products for the vehicle
industry, and other special materials, e.g., soft plastic foam for the
furniture industry.
The basic raw materials for all the above products were imported
by PEMU from Elastogram. The two companies, therefore, had de-
veloped a business relationship. By establishing this new joint ven-
ture their connection was drawn even closer.
Harmonization of the Partners' Interests
The parties had a common interest. The primary aim of the Hun-
garian partner to increase hard-currency exports revealed problems
related to the customs duty charged on imported materials, double
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transport costs (the basic materials had to be imported and the fin-
ished products exported), and guarantees and service for customers
outside the country. The aims of the parties finally were resolved and
the foreign partner agreed to sell 20 percent of the yearly production
through its own organization.
E.2 Management of the joint venture
The top management body of the company is the board of supervision
(assisted by the general assembly). It decides on long-term strategic
plans and profit distribution (whether profit should be reinvested into
the company or withdrawn). The board of supervision consists offive
members: one delegated by PEMU, and two each by Chemolimpex
and by the German partner.
The management of the company's operation is performed by
two managing directors, with different responsibilities. One director
is Hungarian; the other is German. The Hungarian manager deals
with commercial, economic, and labor questions; the foreign director
oversees production and quality control. The two managing directors
must consult with each other every week to coordinate actions that
arise between the two different groups.
The foreign partner emphasizes strict quality control. The prod-
ucts must meet the highest requirements of foreign markets. This is
absolutely necessary in order to protect the brand image, which is
very important to both partners.
E.3 Production and staff data
The KEMIPUR staff consists of five physical workers, two truck
drivers, one import-export executive, one sales manager (foreign em-
ployee), two administrators, one director of finance, one bookkeeper/
wage accountant/social security account administrator, one store-
keeper, and two managing directors. The technical staff includes one
laboratory assistant (assigned to the technical director) and three
application technicians (responsible for client contacts and periodic
visits, problem-solving connected with supplying materials and re-
pairing machines, and performing maintenance service tasks). Thus
a considerable part of the staff maintains permanent relations with
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the. clients. The company attaches high importance to the above
tasks.
The company offers assistance for material processing and con-
sultations if a new material has to be supplied. The company also
produces and sells the machines used to mix two components to pro-
duce foam.
The total income of KEMIPUR in 1988 was Ft 1,150 million,
which is equal to 8,000 tons of produced materials, satisfying the total
needs of the Hungarian market. About 10 percent of the production,
Le., 800-850 tons, was exported for hard currency. The company's
profit was moderate due to high investment costs during the first year.
The basic aim was not only to obtain a high profit but also to retain
customers. The considerable profit in 1987 was divided between risk
and share funds (prior to taxation). Forming a risk fund of 10 percent
to 20 percent of the investment capital is obligatory; the company's
fund reached a level of 12 percent. In 1988, the profit was retained
in order to extend the activities of the company.
EA Markets
The local supplies of KEMIPUR are minimal. Only auxiliary materi-
als (tools, etc.) are required from local sources. The basic materials
for production are supplied by the foreign partner.
KEMIPUR does not face local competition. Competitive imports
would be possible in principle, but practically the chances are minimal
for the following reasons:
• The local prices are lower than the prices of any possible imports.
• Imports from a new company could be difficult because of various
obstacles (e.g., covering deposits for imports); local supply within
the joint venture agreement is considerably faster.
• Service facilities are more favorable and quicker with the local
joint venture than with a company operating in the FRG.
• Delivery time for local materials is shorter (maximum two weeks)
than for imported materials.
• Other delivery terms also favor local supply when compared with
imports (even if imports wO]1ld be practically possible).
The quality of KEMIPUR products, following the strict qual-
ity control and image requirements of the well-known brand, make
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the company almost unbeatable on the local market. Starting in
1990, however, the BVK (Chemical Works of Borsod) will produce
the polyurethane component "B" as well. It might be possible that
ordering this material locally would be more favorable than import-
ing it from the foreign partner. Contacts could be developed with
the BVK as a partner or even as a competitor.
E.5 Environmental protection
As is usually the case with all chemical firms, the question of possible
environmental pollution could be raised with regard to KEMIPUR.
The company has drastically reduced the likelihood of such problems,
however, by organizing the entire production into a fully enclosed
process in complete compliance with the very strict FRG regulations
for environmental protection.
E.6 Contact with local organizations
The premises of KEMIPUR are in the vicinity of the Hungarian part-
ner PEMU, and the operation between the two works is undisturbed.
The people from the village Solymar, the district of the work site,
however, are not very friendly towards the new KEMIPUR works,
according to local rumors. A possible reason might be that the
KEMIPUR works are different from other local works, salaries are
higher, and the managers are foreigners. No actual consequences,
however, have been ascertained regarding this matter.
E.7 Wage politics
Within KEMIPUR, tasks are more complex as each worker performs
different activities. Because of that, the aim is to pay higher wages
than the average local companies. Higher wages are further indicated
by the higher requirements and performance standards at KEMIPUR.
The cost level and cost-bearing capacity ofthe company, which in
this case does not limit wage levels, are the main criteria in establish-
ing salary levels. The gross income of the company (Ft 1,200 million)
has been achieved with a staff of only 20. Thus with KEMIPUR,
the profit/capita ratio greatly exceeded that of the average local
companies.
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The general assembly annually raises salaries, adapting them if
necessary to the rate of inflation, and always observing increases in
the connected costs. After the changes in 1988 (personal income tax
to be included in wages), the labor costs for KEMIPUR no longer
can be considered low.
The development of costs in this new phase requires a more de-
tailed study by the company. Prices of the local suppliers are going
up faster. Prices converted in hard currency had previously increased
annually by only 1 percent to 2 percent; now the rate is 5 percent. At
the same time, the possibility of increasing the price of the finished
products on the local market is limited. The products of KEMIPUR
belong to the first-grade import price level category, and this limits
price changes locally. Up to the present, the KEMIPUR prices are
10 percent to 15 percent lower than the price of similar imported
materials, but this might increase by 20 percent to 25 percent.
There is a considerable difference between the wages of the two
managing directors. The wages of the local managers were deter-
mined in comparison to the wages of similar local managers. The
case of the foreign manager was quite different. His salary was based
on the wages of similar managers in his country. This discrepancy
was resolved in such a way that the basic wages of the two managers
were fixed at an identical level, but a special bonus was given to the
foreign manager. Some further problems, however, had to be faced
in this respect as well. The question of whether the foreign manager
would have to pay social security contributions in Hungary had to
be clarified. This could be eliminated, but the question of income
tax still posed a problem. Finally, with a special application, it was
agreed that the foreign manager would pay an income tax equal to
the actual valid taxation in the FRG.
E.8 Taxation system from the point of view
of joint ventures
For joint ventures, taxation is less burdensome than it is for the
domestic companies. This does not mean, however, that there are
no problems, especially after the modifications that went into force
in 1989. Companies with foreign participation have had considerable
advantages in the system up to the present, and the profit taxation of
such companies ensures some of these advantages even today. Some
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changes of the regulations introduced in 1989, however, have made
the situation less favorable.
With the introduction of the New Company Law, the concept
of economic partnership has been determined. Up to the present,
the different statutes of the Cabinet and the Ministry of Finance,
which determines profit regulation, did not apply to companies with
foreign participation. The exceptions for joint ventures have been
automatically canceled, and the applicable profit regulations (except
for specifically exempted joint ventures) are now identical with the
regulations valid for local companies. As a result, many hundreds of
regulations are now automatically valid for joint companies as well,
with consequences that could not even be estimated at the time of
publication.
Special concern was caused by the statute of the Cabinet that
went into effect on December 31, 1988 (issued however some weeks
later), concerning the tax abstractions due to special natural and
other conditions. This statute applies to various products based upon
the general item classification.
The KEMIPUR products belong to an item classification that
is subject to this tax abstraction. According to this statute, the
company also will have to pay a separate tax. This statute in its
actual form contradicts the investment protection law, which states
that joint companies with foreign participation will not be charged
any tax in addition to the profit tax (or tax paid on the company's
profits). This special tax abstraction, however, could be interpreted
in such a way that it would be paid as expenses before calculating the
company's net profit. With this new taxation system, it is possible
that foreign investments will be less profitable. It is also alarming that
new provisions for companies are issued every year, some of which
are contradictory. Legal documents are sometimes made effective
retroactively, which causes unusual difficulties for the foreign partner.
Problems arise with regard to accounting. Procedures for entering
reports into the book of accounts have not been clarified. As foreign-
ers cannot possess real estate, a building (in this case the property of
PEMU) could not be entered into the accounts, and a special solution
had to be created in the form of a "capitalized rental right."
Starting in 1987, special bookkeeping instructions were edited and
sent to the individual joint companies; these instructions, however,
were never published. They state that the capitalized rental right
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can be handled as an immaterial asset. According to the genera.!
regulation, depreciations may be entered into accounting only upon
special approval from the Ministry of Finance. Therefore, the value
of PEMU's share would not diminish over time, and consequently the
capital share of the partners might be changed. Finally, a 4 percent
depreciation was granted yearly upon special approval of the Ministry.
The so-called "other payments for development purposes" could not
be handled as expenses. This was changed, however, in 1988.
Beginning in 1989, the company will not be charged a separate
company tax. At the same time, it will have to pay a "technical
development contribution" despite the fact that the company does
not make use of this.
The telecommunication infrastructure is not satisfactory; it is dif-
ficnlt to get telephone connections. The telefax line is often engaged
and sometimes out of order. A special computerized telecommuni-
cation system was planned with the foreign partner, but was not
possible to implement due to the lack of appropriate cables.
E.9 The future
By retaining the profit gained in 1988, KEMIPUR plans to extend its
activities, which will require a considerable capital investment. Up
to now, the company has produced only the component "A," while
the component "B" has been supplied by the foreign partner. Now
the company intends to produce the component "B" locally as well.
For this a so-called "Station B" is foreseen. This fulfills part of the
original joint venture contract.
Another expansion plan is to engage in the production of vehicle
components. For this activity, the foreign partner is ready to hand
over the production process of Cellasto springs and to supply the
necessary materials as well. If this plan is to be implemented, new
premises will be necessary, either through rental or purchase. Then
the joint venture products could be used for the production of Skoda-
Favorit and Lada-Samara cars within the frame of a special barter
agreement.
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F. Bulgarian Case Study by O. Lumvef
APV Bioinvest: Bulgarian-British Joint Venture
F.l Background
APV Bioinvest Co. is a joint venture company established in July
1985 as a result of the partnership agreement between the Bulgar-
ian company, Bioinvest Engineering, and APV pic, United Kingdom.
The agreement was reached after a careful research and selection pro-
cess done by the Bulgarian partner, as well as the active response and
interest shown by the British company.
The motives of the Bulgarian party for entering into a joint ven-
ture were mainly to develop economic, industrial, scientific, pro-
duction, and marketing cooperation in the field of biochemical and
biotechnological machine-building. During the first stage, the parties
agreed to work on a number of joint projects that mainly concerned
specific items of food industry equipment.
The foreign party of the joint venture is APV, the largest com-
pany in the world specializing in supplying process equipment for
food, beverage, and related industries. It is the only company that in-
cludes in its product portfolio the full spectrum of dry, liquid, frozen,
fresh, and snack food industries. APV has a broad, evenly distributed
product range, with no single segment of the food or beverage indus-
try predominating. An international company with sales of approxi-
mately £1 billion, APV employs a staff of 14,000.
On the Bulgarian side, the partner is Bioinvest Engineering, the
country's leading process-engineering company for food and bever-
ages with annual sales of nearly US$800 million, and with over 750
people employed worldwide. As a multi-industry group, Bioinvest
Engineering supplies expertise and equipment for the food, canning,
and tobacco industry; refrigeration and air treatment; and the chem-
ical, pharmaceutical, and biotechnological industries.
The equity shares were distributed with APV holding 55 percent
and Bioinvest 45 percent. The hard-currency capital share has not
been used for any kind of investment so far. The account in leva
is used to cover most of the joint venture's expenses, because there
is only negligible income available in hard currency. Upon mutual
agreement, the shares of the partners could be increased, but that
has not been done so far. It was agreed that the joint venture would
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have its headquarters in Sofia and its employees would be Bulgarian
citizens only.
F.2 Activity and management
The scope of the joint venture's business activities, as mentioned
above, is quite broad, and covers engineering activities and services
in biotechnological, refrigeration, food industry, machine-building as
well as consultancy activities, contracting, designing, and supply of
equipment, construction and start-up of industrial installations, tech-
nical assistance, service and maintenance, and also foreign trade ac-
tivities in Bulgaria as well as in third countries. Such a wide range
of activities was to be expected in view of the structure and profile
of the two parent companies.
The board of directors consists of five members who are appointed
by the partners. According to the company statutes, the chairman
must be of Bulgarian nationality. The board lays the overall policy
and takes decisions on the basis of consensus. The staff is very small
and includes:
• One managing director (engineering background).
• Three engineers (chemical and machine-bnilding engineering).
• One secretary and two part-time consultants.
The current managing director was selected with some difficulty
and after several personnel changes; trading experience was essential.
Technical skill and expertise in the managing body appeared to be
very important as do personal relations between joint venture staff
and partner representatives. Because of the high demand profile, the
managing director appears to be a key figure.
The demands on the staff are also higher than in local organi-
zations. Staff members are expected to perform a broad range of
activities due to the wide scope of the joint venture and the limited
staff size. The careful selection of personnel, which was one of the
difficulties at the beginning, became one of the main reasons for the
joint venture's subsequent stabilization.
Initially there were no problems concerning registration and op-
eration. This was due to the fact that no joint financing or contracts
existed then. There also were no problems concerning property or
office arrangements. Rather, problems were encountered due to the
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wide potential field of activities and the inability to follow the ini-
tial development program. This was the reason why APV-Bioinvest,
needed - again through experience - to find its real image, which was
possible after hiring staff with an engineering background. Problems
and difficulties encountered by the joint venture were not connected
with any legislative restrictions or other administrative formalities.
The weak point of the joint venture was the fact that it was not
connected with any previously organized production system or in-
dividual product. This was one of the reasons it did not earn any
substantial profit during the first years. There were no taxation prob-
lems or difficulties concerning the repatriation of profit to the part-
ners simply because profit did not exist. There also were no practical
problems concerning staff social insurance, salaries, or employing for-
eign citizens. The joint company is still regarded as a foreigner in the
domestic market.
F.3 Impressions and conclusions
After overcoming the problems mentioned above, it is the opinion of
both partners that the joint venture is starting to operate in a proper
way and is gathering momentum. There is positive development in
the engineering activities, and the representation of the British part-
ner in the local market is also becoming more efficient and stable.
This is opening the way for better prospects of future cooperation.
One of the weak points before establishing the joint venture was that
the British partner had no representative in the Bulgarian market,
and the partners did not immediately realize the necessity for one big
project to be used as a training base for the transfer of knowledge
and expertise.
The issuance of new legislation has revealed new potentials and
possibilities; there is still much to be done, but the knowledge and
experience gained during the initial period provide a good starting
point for successful future development.
Appendix 289
G. Soviet Case Study by V. Ranenko
and A. Soloviev (based on company materials)
Dialog - Personnel Management: Key to a Promising Start
G.! Background
The participants of the Dialog joint venture had previously cooper-
ated in developing electronic techniques as the production association
KAMAZ. Contacts with the American partner came by chance during
an exhibition of electronic equipment in the USSR. The president of
the American firm, Joe Rightehe, was interested in organizing a joint
venture in the USSR, taking advantage of perestroika in economic
management and the range of social changes taking place. As he put
it, the principles of perestroika (the acquaintance of the workers with
production management, creation, and control of innovation) call for
active labor. Democratization of production relations fully corre-
sponds with his personal concept of managing a work collective. The
unique understanding of this concept became obvious even during
the initial contact with representatives of the future Soviet partners
(e.g., the present director of the joint venture) and became the basis
for the joint venture's operation.
For the Soviet partners, the advantage of a joint venture lies in
the ability to engage in commercial and production activities without
a departmental managerial system.
Dialog was registered on December 12, 1987. The authorized fund
was distributed as follows:
• Production association KAMAZ, Ministry of the Automobile In-
dustry of the USSR (32.6%).
• Production Organization (P/0) Vneshtechnika (9.8%).
• Institute of Space Research, Academy of Science of the USSR
(7.2%).
• Central Economic Mathematical Institute, Academy of the Sci-
ences of the USSR (13.0%).
• Moscow State University (13.0%).
• Major Exhibition-Information Center of Economic Achievements
of the USSR (2.6%).
• Management Partnership International Inc. (MPI), USA (21.8%).
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The main goal of the joint venture is the production and sale of
personal computers and software in the USSR and abroad.
G.2 Activities of the joint venture
Dialog began operating in 1988, selling personal computers that the
American partner had imported as its contribution to the authorized
fund. Dialog also produced a number of software packages, mainly
with the help of Soviet specialists. Computers sold in the USSR
were supplied with a Russian text editor and a Russian text printer.
Dialog provides service to clients who purchase the computers.
Payment was accepted in rubles as well as in hard currency, which
made it possible to buy new computers abroad for resale and to pay
for additional equipment. From the beginning, sales were high and
software was created in the amount of 300,000 rubles. This was due to
the conditions of sale that Dialog guaranteed to the Soviet customers,
as follows:
• Accuracy and guaranteed delivery.
• Customer-oriented and tailor-made software.
• Maintenance.
• Option to pay by installment or in rubles.
During the first year, more than 3,000 personal computers were
sold, and a number of programs were developed in which foreign cus-
tomers were also interested. The partners agreed to reinvest all profit
in the joint venture. At present, the joint venture has a workstation
near Moscow (5,000 square meters of building units) where the per-
sonal computers are assembled with the use of Soviet assembly units.
Special computer rooms for developing software are available at the
Moscow State University and at Dialog's central building.
The joint venture has 15 branches in the USSR and a number
of joint ventures in Czechoslovakia. Plans to expand activities by
increasing the authorized funds are being developed. Further activ-
ities in producing electronic consumer goods and consultation and
training of specialists also are planned.
G.3 Unique personnel management
The Dialog staff consists of 45 personnel located at headquarters (in-
cluding ten staff programmers), and 400 employees in other branches
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of the joint venture. Recruitment and work assessment are directed
by a collective work team using a concept based on inner unity and
satisfaction for each employee. Consolidation based on a good psy-
chological understanding and a healthy climate is the main goal of
the joint venture. A special method of periodic assessment and test-
ing of professional and personal characteristics was introduced by the
American specialists.
Salaries at Dialog are lower than at the Soviet enterprise KAMAZ,
but at the end of 1988, the employees got a bonus ranging from 1,500
to 5,000 rubles, according to the contribution of each staff member.
In addition to this incentive, the director of the joint venture tries
to stimulate labor productivity by democratizing relationships among
employees, by showing respect for each individual, and by introducing
a friendly atmosphere. A family spirit is therefore dominant at the
company.
G.4 The near future
In general, Dialog may be regarded as a successful operation in the
USSR, with a high level of entrepreneurial capabilities. Some future
plans include activities to be performed in the following directions:
• Studying the Soviet market so as to build up a future strategy
based on real market research.
• Building new production facilities and special purpose enterprises
that will provide opportunities to enhance company activities.
• Reinvesting profit and overcoming issues concerning the noncon-
vertibility of the ruble.
H. Soviet Case Study
by V. Ranenko and 1. Soloviev
Homatec
H.I Background
Prior to organizing the joint venture, the partners had engaged in
cooperative deals. Within the framework of this cooperation (1986-
1987), the Soviet enterprise exported machine tools (mechanical
parts) to the German company for future production and sale.
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The joint venture was registered on July 16, 1987. The partners
are the Production Organization (P/0) machine-tool building plant
of S. Ordzonikidze (Moscow) and the company Heinemann Maschinen
und Anlagenbau, FRG. The joint venture specializes in production
and sales of machine tools, base-machine centers, and flexible models
and systems. The authorized fund is 47.7 million rubles.
The share of the Soviet partner is 32.5 million rubles (68.0 per-
cent) and includes the right to use a land area of approximately
25,000 square meters in the territory of the Soviet partner; build-
ings with an area of 11,200 square meters, various general purpose
buildings (valued at 33 million rubles); and part of the fixed capital
equipment, technical documentation, know-how (approximately 1.5
million rubles), and circulating assets (9.0 million rubles). The share
of the foreign partner is 15.2 million rubles (32 percent) and includes
fixed capital equipment, precision machine tools, measurement equip-
ment (3.6 million rubles), a system of automated project and office
equipment (1.4 million rubles), technical documentation and know-
how (1.8 million rubles), and current assets in foreign currency (9.5
million rubles).
H.2 Operation and activity
The production activity of the joint venture takes place in an area
of 800 square meters that is rented from the Soviet partner (a sec-
tion of the machine-tools building, the design office, and the ware-
house). The joint venture built the engineering education center for
the students of the Moscow Technical University, and plans to con-
struct its own production department and organize a branch office
in Leningrad. The staff of the joint venture consists of 18 specialists
(administrative and construction) who are hired on a contract basis
from the Soviet partners for additional payment.
In 1988, the joint venture produced 14 machine tools for East
Germany and Cuba, four manufacturing centers for the Soviet ship-
repairing plant in Kandalaksha, and six centers for Western cus-
tomers. Sales were carried out through Heinemann distribution chan-
nels. The profit was nearly 600,000 rubles, 200,000 of which were
distributed among the partners.
In the period 1989-1990, the joint venture plans to produce 25
to 30 machine tools, 50 percent of which are to be exported for hard
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currency. In the future, when their own production facilities have
begun operation, about 120 to 150 machine tools will be produced
and some manufacturing centers as well.
H.3 The near future
In the future, the joint venture will supply Soviet consumers of ma-
chine tools with spare parts and other services. The joint venture also
will organize a research and development unit for developing modern
technologies. The R&D unit will be able to provide information,
consultations, and engineering services to Soviet and foreign clients.
H.4 Impressions and problems
The main problems of the joint venture are:
• Material and technical supply is a very complicated procedure,
and it is often necessary to import some materials against hard
currency.
• The activity of the joint venture is not planned by the state bodies,
so the material and technical supply is not guaranteed by the state
plan.
• The joint venture would be ready to carry out the state orders if
suppliers were guaranteed through the national plan.
• It is difficult to obtain hard currency from the Soviet market.
Therefore, many Soviet managers are considering limiting the im-
port of machine tools and instead using hard currency to buy the
products of the joint venture.
I. Soviet Case Study by V. Ranenko
and 1. Soloviev (based on company documents)
Technikord
1.1 Background
Prior to organizing the joint venture, the partners engaged in scien-
tific and technological cooperation in the field of gas-flame covers.
The cooperative activities were a good basis for negotiating the joint
venture.
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The joint venture was registered on December 4, 1987. The part-
ners are the State Institute of Mining Chemical Raw Material of the
USSR (79 percent of the authorized funds), and the Societe Nouvelle
de Metalisation Industrie of France (21 percent). The total autho-
rized fund amounts to 4.1 million rubles. The joint venture declared
its activity in the field of producing special cords from powders for the
gas-flame cover of metal products. The share of the French partner
includes know-how, factory equipment, quality control, instruments,
and machineries. The share of the Soviet partner includes the right
to use land area, buildings, and equipment.
The planned volume of production is about 250 tons/year. In
1989, the venture planned to produce 75 tons. Distribution of the
product will be approximately 75 percent of production for the Soviet
market, and about 25 percent for the Western European market.
1.2 Operations
The average annual profitability of the invested capital is planned
to range from 10 percent to 12 percent. During the first years of
the joint venture, the main portion of profits will be reinvested into
production and the R&D fund of the joint venture.
The staff consists of 12 specialists. One foreign citizen (the com-
mercial director) and three Soviet citizens serve on the board of di-
rectors. The administration consists of foreign employees.
Technikord is a small producer, but its product is in considerable
demand on the Soviet market. The technology used by the joint
venture is based on Soviet innovations as part of the Soviet partner's
contribution to the authorized fund.
1.3 Problems
Among the problems needing resolution by the joint venture since
the beginning of its operation are:
• Preparation of the joint venture's management staff.
• Development of an appropriate strategy planning system for the
joint company.
• Development of a company image.
• Development of a market segment in the developing countries.
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J. Soviet Case Study by E. Razvigorova2
Interfackel: World-level Quality in a Ukrainian Village
295
J .1 Background
December 30, 1987 marked the birth of a joint Soviet-Austrian enter-
prise under the name of Interfackel. The registration was preceded
by 13 difficult meetings between the USSR partner, Fackel, and the
Austrian company, Metallisierung-Technologie-Systeme Gesellschaft
mbH (MTS) (Bad Viislau). To match two economic systems that
had developed in different ways turned out to be a hard job. The
historical development of the companies and their countries had to
be taken into consideration in the process.
The plant of the Soviet partner belongs to the All-Union Sci-
entific Production Association for Recycling Machine Components
(REMDETAL) and is situated in a village near Kiev. The plant
was restructured in 1982, and is closely associated with a research
institute, EO Paton.
The Austrian partner is the subsidiary of the Austrian firm Inter-
weld Schweifimaterialhandelsgesellschaft mbH, situated in Bad Viislau
and specializing in the production of similar equipment.
The meeting between the two partners happened by chance during
an exhibition in Moscow, where the two companies exhibited next to
each other.
The authorized fund of the joint venture is only 256,000 rubles,
51 percent of which belongs to the Soviet partner. An understanding
of the potential risks involved in joint undertakings has caused the
two partners to minimize their investments. At the time when the
feasibility study was performed, many loopholes existed in the rele-
vant legislation. Some of the problems that the partners considered
unsolvable at the time were the following:
• The formulation and content of the contracts.
• The price of raw materials, energy, equipment, and technological
know-how and its assessment.
• The price of finished products.
• The salaries and other personnel issues.
2Based on paper presented by Mr Kozlenko, Chairman of the Soviet-Austrian
joint venture Interfackel.
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• Duty regulations and the preparation or the opening of a bank
account.
Small technical problems, such as the preparation of the com-
pany's legal documents, registration of company cars, accommoda-
tion for foreigners working in the joint venture, and the payment for
business trips within the USSR were encountered during the initial
period. The two partners believed that these problems should be
resolved actively. They started to work and during the initial pe-
riod came to the conclusion that the legislative conditions are only
one side of the story. Sometimes it is necessary to work within a
completely different situation. Under these uncertain conditions, the
joint venture has started its activity by building an enterprise in a
400 square meters area with the necessary equipment, communica-
tions, and money. This formed the share of the Soviet partner. The
Austrian company contributed equipment, technological know-how,
compressors, computers, copy and telefax machines, and money.
J.2 Operation and activity
Six months after registration, the first production was released. De-
spite that, the fiscal year of 1988 was concluded almost without profit.
Profit, however, had not been the only goal of the joint venture. The
most important goal during the first year was to consolidate the joint
company, build up an organizational structure, and create joint in-
ternational activities. Great importance also was attached to defin-
ing bottlenecks and finding possible solutions. The initial difficulties
mentioned earlier appeared small compared to those encountered dur-
ing operation.
To resolve the main bottleneck concerning supply, the joint com-
pany began a search for relevant Soviet innovations on which the
future production of the joint company could be based. Part of the
first year was used for business trips by both the Soviet general di-
rector and his technical deputy (an Austrian citizen). They visited
many specialized exhibitions and fairs. More than 20 meetings with
more than 12 companies were held. Specialists from six countries vis-
ited the joint enterprise. Negotiations have been carried out within
Austria, the FRG, Italy, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. All attempts
to find relevant technology failed. To solve the problem, the joint
venture selected the offer of the electro-welding institute EO Paton.
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The first year of operation lessened the optimism. Selling against
hard currency turned out to be very difficult due to world competition
in the field. The newly emerging products of the joint venture are
competing against well known and established companies. The hope
that a low price based on low labor costs could be offered so as to
obtain market share also proved unrealistic. A direct relationship
between the level of payment and equipment productivity was found
to exist.
The first year was a learning process in the direction of a market
economy; knowledge of the market mechanism and prices was gained.
Soviet employees in the joint venture realized that in the absence of
state-planned orders, guarantees for wages and supplied materials do
not exist. That created the necessity to be flexible in thinking and
making decisions.
In spite of all these difficulties, the joint venture produced 600
pieces of equipment for special thermal covering during its first year,
156 of which were sold for hard currency, the rest to Soviet enterprises.
The most important achievement by the joint venture was the
absence of any complaints from either Western or Soviet customers.
This has a very important socioeconomic impact; in an ordinary
Ukraine village, a so-called world-quality level had been achieved.
This created a great deal of confidence among the people.
The joint venture established three cooperatives: Techkon-Fackel,
Bulat-Fackel, and Austro-Fackel.
J .3 Impressions
The experience of Interfackel shows that the use of different legislative
possibilities is important. For the time being, three sets of legislation
exist in the USSR by which business activities can be organized: the
law of enterprise, the law of cooperatives, and the decree of joint ac-
tivities. AIl possibilities have been used by Interfackel. An efficient
form of joint activity is the association, which should be organized
based on mutual interest, e.g., Agropromservice. The joint enter-
prise can obtain a large range of services from the association, which
provides members with necessary information and defines and dis-
cusses problems that can be solved by the responsible governmental
agencies. The variety of forms already existing in the USSR give
opportunities to enterprises to join their efforts on an international
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basis. Of course a common interest, flexibility, and entrepreneurship
also are required.
K. Bulgarian Case Study by V. Kotchev
Systematics
K.l Background
During the mid-1970s, the US company Honeywell Inc., already with
some experience in selling their products in Bulgaria, set a new tar-
get for its European Trade Division to expand sales in that country.
It was discovered that the target could be met in two ways: either
to continue operations along the established path of traditional sales
with its own sales force, or to look for new avenues to approach more
effectively the growing Bulgarian market for control and automation
products. Sending salesmen periodically to meet with Bulgarian cus-
tomers and to promote products did not prove to be the most effective
method of doing business. On the other hand, a local partner with
sufficient technical knowledge and experience and good contacts with
prospective customers in one or more branches of industry would
provide local support to expand the market for Honeywell products,
promote Honeywell's position in Bulgaria, and assist operations lo-
cally.
At the same time, the Bulgarian Ministry of Chemical Industry,
which controlled the chemical, petrochemical, pharmaceutical, pulp
and paper, and other divisions of the chemical industry, strongly
felt the need to upgrade its production facilities with new high-tech
control and automation systems. The feasibility study performed
by Ministry experts on the existing manufacturers of control and
automation systems worldwide showed that only three or four of the
largest manufacturers were up to the requirements of the Ministry;
among them was Honeywell.
The initiative came from both sides. A target project was se-
lected for the start-up Of the first distributed digital control system
in Bulgaria to be installed at a large synthetic fiber plant in the town
of Yambol. This involved a great number of technical consultations,
engineering exchange, and support from Honeywell. It also required
substantial training of local engineers.
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The success of this project in 1980 led to the next step in the coop-
eration between the Ministry and Honeywell; the establishment of a
common technical office to serve as a demonstration center, technical
library, and training center for Bulgarian engineers.
The experience of Honeywell and the Ministry of Chemical In-
dustry over the period 1979 to 1983, with legal support from the
government, led to the idea of a joint-stock venture in Bulgaria. In
September 1983, an agreement was signed creating a joint-venture
company under the name SYSTEMATICS. The partners listed in
the agreement are:
• Honeywell Inc., with headquarters in Minneapolis, USA, is an in-
ternational company, the world leader in automation control sys-
tems and products. They participate in the joint venture through
their affiliate Honeywell International Management in Milan,3 op-
erating in Southern Europe, the Middle East, the Mediterranean,
and Africa.
• The Bulgarian Chemical Industry participates in the joint venture
through the following three companies:
SYSTEMCHIM - a leading engineering company for data
systems and computer applications for industrial control and
management.
CHIMIMPORT - the largest Bulgarian foreign trade com-
pany operating in the chemical industry.
CHIMCOMPLECT - the major engineering and contract
company in the Bulgarian Chemical Industry (joined the
venture in 1985).
The statutory capital of the joint venture was US$264,000 to be
contributed in cash and in kind, and the share contribution: Honey-
well Inc. - 40 percent, SYSTEMCHIM - 40 percent, CHIMIMPORT
- 10 percent, and CHIMCOMPLECT - 10 percent.
The joint venture was registered in March 1984, and this is the
official date on which it started operation. The operation profile of
the joint venture is to provide engineering and marketing services for
3In March 1990 Honeywell changed its partnership in the JV to its affiliate in
Vienna - Honeywell Austria GmbH.
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Honeywell automation and control systems and products used by in-
dustry in Bulgaria and other countries, and a multitude of other engi-
neering hardware and software services to its wide range of customers.
In practice, it was planned to become the backbone of automation
for the chemical industry and a few other branches of industry in
Bulgaria. To attain this objective, the joint venture relied on:
• The use of Honeywell high-tech equipment.
• The excellent practical knowledge and experience of its engi-
neers in the field of microprocessor and computer-based systems
applications.
• The fine technical and financial backing of the joint venture
partners.
K.2 Capital structure
The initial capital of the joint venture, US$264,000, was split into
100 shares distributed among the parties. In 1985, when CHIMCOM-
PLECT was included in the joint venture, the shares were distributed
to include 10 shares for the new partner. No further changes have
since been made.
Honeywell contributed its share to the capital in kind, which
meant submitting a certain amount of control and automation equip-
ment; SYSTEMCHIM contributed its share in local currency (leva);
and the two other partners, CHIMIMPORT and CHIMCOMPLECT,
contributed their share in US dollars, which meant a contribution of
US$26,400 each.
As the amount ofthe initial capital share was relatively small, the
joint-venture agreement gave the partners the possibility of making
temporary additional investments in support of the joint venture op-
erations to be used for a certain period of time by the joint venture
without any liability or interest. The transfer of shares also was made
possible, but only in a limited number of cases such as reorganization,
incorporation, or restructuring of the parties; in this case, the newly
formed party would take over or transfer its shares to a third party
succeeding its rights or interests.
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K.3 Operational activities: management,
administration, and personnel
A specific feature in the operation of the Board of Directors from the
very beginning was that it would adopt decisions only by consensus.
This created a special atmosphere, which meant that unanimity was
the basis for the management, control, and direction of the joint
venture operation.
At the start of its operations in 1984, the joint venture had only
two employees as full-time staff, one director and one marketing ex-
pert. Slowly additional staff were appointed, so that today the num-
ber of employees totals 25. An additional 25 people work for SYS-
TEMATICS on a contract basis. These are mostly engineers from
SYSTEMCHIM, a partner company. The full-time staff of SYSTEM-
ATICS is split into two groups: the sales engineers group consisting
of 10 people, and the other is the administration support group con-
sisting of 15 people.
As time passed, an evolution took place in the national economy.
The strongly centralized system of control began to relax. The end-
user and foreign trade organizations started to be more and more in-
volved in the decision-making process. At a certain moment in 1986,
the ministries were replaced by associations. In practice, this meant
that the production units of a certain sector were no longer obedi-
ent producers, executing centrally planned quotas of given products.
They started to become equal partners with independent discretion
for decision making. In the process of decentralization which started
in Bulgaria, the previous policy of unification and dealing with one
manufacturer and supplier shifted more and more towards a new pol-
icy of plurality; at the same time, more and more automation and
control companies appeared on the market and competed with each
other.
Actions also were taken by some local organizations to copy the
SYSTEMATICS model and try to start up joint ventures with com-
peting companies. This also influenced the end-user who, for the first
time, was able to choose among bidders, manufacturers, and suppli-
ers. This possibility was further strengthened in 1989, with the adop-
tion of new legislation, specifically Decree No. 56 on economic activity
and the relevant regulations for its application. The establishment
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of a new economic system of "firms" is certainly contributing to eco-
nomic decentralization. This situation radically changed the market
for industrial control systems and automation equipment by making
it more fragmented and decentralized. Now decision power is split
between the individual end-users, with almost no power left in the
hands of the coordinating associations, consulting engineering orga-
nizations, or foreign trade organizations, to inJluence or direct their
preferences and choices - starting from individual pieces offield equip-
ment and ending with large distributed industrial control systems.
Another new phenomenon also took place. The state govern-
ment fostered a new policy directed towards establishing joint ven-
tures with a manufacturing profile. In this situation, SYSTEM-
ATICS felt a strong pressure from its Bulgarian partners, mainly
the association SYSTEMBIOCHIM, to organize joint manufactur-
ing of control systems in Bulgaria. This was foreseen eventually to
begin with the assembly and staging of such equipment and later
slowly to go into the manufacture of separate components and sub-
assemblies. Simultaneously, the idea for SYSTEMATICS to become
a partner with other Bulgarian engineering organizations like SYS-
TEMBIOCHIM and CHIMCOMPLECT was promoted and entered
international contracting.
SYSTEMATICS had to take some action in this new situation,
and so a memorandum was signed between the Association of Biotech-
nology and Chemical Industry and Honeywell late in 1986, outlining
the commitments of the two parties for the study and eventual im-
plementation of projects for the manufacture of Honeywell products
in Bulgaria and joint operations in international contracting. Now
SYSTEMATICS has to face and adapt to a new market situation in
Bulgaria.
Meanwhile, a steady evolution has taken place in SYSTEMATICS
as well. Since 1986, its operations have expanded from a purely
industrial field to three other areas:
• Building automation control systems.
• Information systems.
• Sales of spare parts, field instruments, components, and OEM
products.
For many years, well-established manufacturing and trading com-
panies have been operating in these markets, where SYSTEMATICS
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was relatively a newcomer. Its sole strategy was to make a break-
through, and it looked for opportunities to do so. The close contacts
established with various industries and their design and project or-
ganizations and the profound study of this market produced good
results. Presently, SYSTEMATICS is operating successfully in all
four of these markets.
K.4 Impressions
SYSTEMATICS has filled a very important niche in the national
economy, that of a versatile engineering organization in the field of
automation and control, combining a high level of engineering know-
how with a capability for flexible operation. Thus it is able to offer a
package solution to demands and fulfill its commitments effectively,
on time, and with high quality. For good reasons, the logo of SYS-
TEMATICS is "Exceptional reliability and flexibility."
The national economy has benefited substantially from SYSTEM-
ATICS' activities. Direct benefits include 25 highly sophisticated
industrial control systems operating in Bulgaria's largest chemical,
pharmaceutical, pulp and paper, and petrochemical plants. Many
prestigious buildings in Bulgaria are equipped with Honeywell build-
ing automation systems. SYSTEMATICS has over 100 users of
its information systems and software. Many also use Honeywell
components, among them the major machine tool and electronics
manufacturers.
In 1989 alone, SYSTEMATICS had 200 large and small projects
in operation at various sites in Bulgaria and abroad. During the last
five years, it has trained almost 250 engineers from Bulgaria and other
countries in the use and application of Honeywell equipment and
supplied the latest information to all of its customers. To date, SYS-
TEMATICS has sold over US$10 million of Honeywell equipment.
K.5 Future development and growth
The management of SYSTEMATICS considers that the first five
years since its establishment comprise the first stage of its existence
and operation. The joint venture took and continued to maintain a
lead over its competitors. SYSTEMATICS has lost very few jobs to
its competitors.
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The future strategy of SYSTEMATICS is expected to be:
• To consolidate and strengthen its position in Bulgaria.
• To expand from engineering into manufacturing and assembly of
Honeywell products in Bulgaria.
• To develop further its trading and credit capabilities.
• To expand its international operations and become a Honeywell
engineering center in its region.
• To maintain continuous steady growth of its revenues and profit.
• To be ahead of its competitors.
• To diversify its operations at home and abroad.
In applying the above mentioned strategy, SYSTEMATICS would
like to take advantage of promising trends in Bulgaria and abroad.
Having developed a high competence and good experience in its field,
it expects to make the best use of the growing markets in which it
operates. It intends to extend its ties further with the USSR, which
might lead to closer forms of cooperation. For the future, it would like
to make better use of its geographic location and continue to work
in the spirit of entrepreneurship and new leadership. Its practical
goals are to increase its turnover at least three times and its profit
five times over the next five years.
Overall, SYSTEMATICS is considered to be the most successful
joint venture in Bulgaria. It has served as a model for other joint
ventures in Bulgaria and also in other CMEA countries.
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